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THE COSTS OF LEGAL CHANGE 
* Michael P. Van Alstine 
In this Article, Professor Van ALstine analyzes the phenomenon of "legal 
transition costs." The great bulk of the attention of scholars and lawmakers has 
been directed toward improving the substantive approach of the law to real or 
perceived societal problems. What has been largely overlooked, however, is the 
friction inherent in legal change itself. Professor Van ALstine's analysis reveaLs 
that, whatever one's normative preferences, a legal system will incur costs simply 
in adjusting to the existence of new legal norms. Included among these are the 
costs of learning the content of new law; the uncertainty costs that flow from the 
loss of accumulated knowledge about the old law and from contending with 
the new; private adjustment costs, such as intraparty drafting and administrative 
costs, as well as the effect on interparty contractual networks; and the costs of 
formulation and interpretive error. 
Professor Van ALstine argues that, because of their potentially significant 
impact, the presence and extent of these legal transition costs should be viewed as 
material inputs in decisions over the merit, form, and structure of proposed 
changes in the law. A recognition of transition costs does not mean, however, 
that there is something inherently inefficient about legal innovation. Rather, by 
exposing the tangible effects of undisciplined change, transition cost analysis 
focuses attention on the assimilation of new law. It thus highlights for lawmakers 
the importance of available drafting and implementation techniques that can 
mitigate transitional friction before it arises, and as a result facilitate both the 
acceptance and effectiveness of legal reforms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most enduring features in the law, like elsewhere in human 
affairs, is change. Technological innovation, advancement in human 
knowledge, and simple realignment of political preferences combine, in a 
democratic polity, in varied and complex ways to exert constant press4re 
on existing solutions to legal problems. To make any plausible claim of 
adequately responding to the dynamics of human progress, therefore, any 
given body of legal norms will be subject to a ceaseless process of review, 
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adjustment, and renewal. 1 Put simply, the law, as Joseph Story observed 
well over a century ago, is constantly changing.2 
Through much of this nation's legal history, the steady pressure of pro-
gress did not translate into rapid transformations in the law. Reliance on 
common law courts as the preferred lawmaking institution, when paired 
with the doctrine of stare decisis, ensured that change occurred in a slow 
and incremental manner. Even at this nation's most profound, original 
moment of constitutional transformation, most issues of transition were 
avoided by broad acceptance of the accumulated wisdom of English common 
law.3 These early stabilizing mechanisms were bolstered by a view of the 
U.S. Constitution as an instrument that constrained, rather than facili-
tated, the adoption of new legal mandates.4 
The dynamics of the modem lawmaking enterprise, however, have sub-
stantially increased both the frequency and significance of legal transitions. 
The rise of legislative law, together with the advent of the administrative 
state, increased the typical size and ambition of· lawmaking projects. 
Progress in the law thus has come to be characterized more by large legisla-
tive initiatives than by slow accretions of common law experience. Even 
within this realm, more recent resort to novel and hybrid processes-such 
as new forms of delegated lawmaking, congressional-executive agreements, 
and "legislative" treaties-has introduced a variety of more subtle forms of 
legal change.5 
1. Frederick Maitland's observation nearly two centuries ago is particularly apt: 
When we speak of a body of law, we use a metaphor so apt that it is hardly a metaphor. 
We picture to ourselves a being that lives and grows, ·that preserves its identity while 
every atom of which it is composed is subject to a ceaseless process of change, decay, and 
renewal. 
2 FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND, Outlines of English Legal History, in THE CoLLECTED PAPERS 
OF FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND 41 7 ( H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1981). 
2. See jOSEPH STORY, Codification of the Common Law, in THE MISCELLANEOUS 
WRITINGS OF jOSEPH STORY 702 (William W. Story ed., Lawbook Exch. 2000) (1852). 
3. Indeed, during the founding period a number of states expressly adopted English com-
mon law-to the extent not inconsistent with the new state constitutions and statutes-as the 
initial foundation for their legal systems. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. X, § 3; MD. 
CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. V; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. XC; Act ofjune 13, 1799, ch. 821, 
§§ 4-5, 1799 N.J. Laws 608; Act of Apr. 15, 1786, ch. 35, 1786 N.Y. Laws 247; Act of Jan. 28, 
1777, ch. 2, § 2, 1777 Pa. Laws 3. 
4. Much of the early constitutional history of the United States was dominated by a focus 
on the limits of federal governmental power, as is made clear in the leading cases of the period. See 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat:) 316, 404-05 (1819) (emphasizing the constitutional 
limitation of federal governmental authority to specific enumerated powers); Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (holding that "[t)he powers of the legislature are defined, and 
limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written"). 
5. For a more detailed review of these diverse lawmaking processes, see infra notes 42-59 
and accompanying text. 
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Adding to the complexity has been a proliferation of extra~legislative 
bodies with formal or informal powers to create law. Some, such as the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission,6 have effective lawmaking authority.7 These have 
been joined in recent years by the active (and increasingly controversial8 ) 
participation of "private legislatures" and other drafting bodies in the 
preparation of legislative products.9 Increased activity at the international 
level has only added momentum to these trends. Growing cross-border 
interdependence has spawned a wide array of international institutions 
(such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), and the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITAL)) with assorted powers to initiate, 
interpret, or implement binding legal norms.10 
The consequence of these developments has been an increase in the 
velocity of legal change-or what might be termed an acceleration of law. 
Viewed from one perspective, the progression from an incrementalist com-
mon law approach to comprehensive legislative regimes has magnified the 
transitional impact of law reform projects. Separately, the proliferation of 
lawmaking institutions with overlapping powers-local, state, national, and 
international-has multiplied the potentially relevant sources of law, and 
in the process added layers of complexity to the dynamics of legal change. 
Unfortunately, policymakers and scholars have failed to appreciate the 
full implications of this acceleration of law. The great bulk of normative 
scholarly analysis remains directed toward changing the substantive approach 
of the law to real or perceived societal problems. Some, for instance, seek 
improvement based on notions of equality and fairness; others would pursue 
interests of efficiency or more objective calculations of net social welfare; 
still others prefer a more open discussion of aesthetics and morals. But 
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (establishing the U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission); see also infra note 56 and accompanying text (describing the powers of this commission). 
7. For further examples of this phenomenon, see infra notes 56-59 and accompanying 
text. 
8. See Alan Schwartz & Raben E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. 
PA. L. REV. 595 (1995) (criticizing on the basis of public choice theory the work of the American 
Law Institute (ALI) and the quasi-public National Council of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSL) in drafting the revisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) ); Robert E. 
Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783 (1994) (same regarding the work on the 
revision of UCC Article 9; see also Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: 
Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 NW. J. lNT'L L. & Bus. 681, 682-85 (1997) (extending this 
criticism to international lawmaking bodies). 
9. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (examining the work of a variety of pri-
vate bodies in drafting legislative products). 
· 10. The role of these and other international institutions in the development of the law is 
discussed in more detail infra notes 60--65 and accompanying text. 
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however weighed or articulated, the customary focus has been on the sub-
stantive benefits of legal reform. 
What has been overlooked is the friction inherent in change itself. 
Whatever one's normative perspective, a legal system will incur costs simply 
in adjusting to the existence of a new legal norm. These will arise, for 
instance, from the need to learn about the content of new law, as well as 
from an increased risk of uncertainty about its meaning and effect. Changes 
in legal directives likewise will compel intraparty adjustments and have subtle 
effects on interparty relationships forged around the old legal order. Indeed, 
transition costs reflect a systemic phenomenon. Although in differing 
degrees, they will arise from legal change in all fields, with all lawmaking 
structures (whether statutory, administrative, or judicial), and for all types 
of reform (regulatory, deregulatory, and so on). 
Scholars have long recognized that legal change will create substantive 
winners and losers. 11 New air quality regulations, for example, may benefit 
the populace at large; but they also may involve compliance costs for opera-
tions that have made long-term investments in reliance on the former legal 
regime. The focus of this work, however, has been on whether, and if so in 
what form and to what extent, a legal system ought to grant relief to those 
affected by substantive changes in the law.12 To be sure, the insights from 
these efforts have had a significant impact on their own plane. But they do 
not examine the inherent costs for all actors-whether beneficiaries, tar-
gets, or otherwise-that arise with the mere transition from an established 
legal norm to a new and untested one. 
Indeed, in some cases transition costs may be so great as to call into 
question the value of an entire reform project. In the parallel situation of 
private product markets, economists have observed that the costs of switch-
ing from an established product may counsel against even the adoption of 
otherwise superior altematives. 13 Consider as a commonplace illustration 
11. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1997); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. 
L. REV. 511 (1989). For a comprehensive analysis of transition relief policy with regard to sub-
stantive changes in the law, see DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND 
POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY (2000). 
12. See Fisch, supra note 11, at 1094-118 (analyzing the propriety of substantive legal 
change that is retroactive in application); Kaplow, supra note 11, at 614-15 (noting that the focus 
of the analysis is on "whether and how transition policy should mitigate the gains and losses that 
occur" when a change in government policy affects existing investments, and discussing as exam· 
ples various state policy changes that might limit the operation of an existing factory). 
13. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Dynamic Competition with Switching Costs, 19 
RAND J. ECON. 123 (1988) (analyzing the switching costs in product markets); Paul Klemperer, 
The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs, 18 RAND J. EcON. 138 (1987) [hereinafter 
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the so-called QWERTY keyboard layout. 14 Other arrangements may be 
more amenable to efficient ergonomic use. But the loss of the accumulated 
experience and network benefits associated with the established layout, 
when combined with the learning and related costs of adjusting to a new 
one, militate against a change even to a purportedly superior arrangement. 
Legal scholars also have applied these insights to private decisions to 
switch between legal products. Examples include standardized contract 
15 d · ' h f . . 16 Th h 1 terms an an enttty s c osen state o orgamzatton. ese sc o ars, too, 
have suggested that the existence of switching costs may lead private actors 
to decide against change, even when an existing legal scheme may be sub-
stantively inferior to a proposed new one.17 
Extant approaches to the broader phenomenon of state-initiated legal 
change have failed to appreciate the significance of these considerations. 
The adoption of new positive law in fact may present a more challenging 
problem. In contrast to private switching choices, legal change is initiated 
not by those who will bear the costs of transition, but rather by third-party 
lawmakers. And the systemic neglect of this issue has created little incen-
tive for lawmakers and scholars to consider such concerns in advocating 
changes to the law. 
My goal with this Article is to fill a gap in our understanding of the 
impact of transition costs on the process of legal change. I begin with a 
background and perspective. Part I first expands on the contention that the 
Klemperer, The Competitiveness of Markets] (same); Paul Klemperer, Markets with Consumer 
Switching Costs, 102 Q.J. EcON. 375 (1987) (same). 
14. This layouttakes its name from the first six characters on the top row of letters in a 
standard keyboard. It is one of the classical examples used by economists to illustrate the lock-in 
effects of networks that can develop around a product standard. For a review of this example, see 
Paul A. David, CUo and the Economics of QWERTY, AM. ECON. REV., May 1985, at 332. For a 
recent challenge to the network effect explanation, see S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The 
Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1990). 
15. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate 
Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 727-28 (1997) (analyzing the 
switching costs incurred by private parties in replacing established corporate terms); Michael 
Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995) 
(same). 
16. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. 
EcoN. & ORO. 225 (1985) (advancing a transaction cost explanation for why Delaware remains the 
preferred state of incorporation); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 
8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987) (same); see also Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware 
Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1068 (2000) (noting the 
arguments of various scholars for why Delaware remains preeminent that do not depend on that 
state's corporate law being "substantive[ly] superiorO"). 
17. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, at 728 (observing that "(s]witching costs may 
create pressure for a firm to avoid adopting terms in a new contract that deviate from those in its 
existing contracts [and noting that this) may be true even if the previous terms are inferior to ones 
that have since been developed"). 
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modem lawmaking enterprise has increased the velocity and significance of 
legal transitions. Part I then continues with an analysis of the broader 
structure within which legal change occurs. We will see that legal transi-
tions appear in a variety of often subtle forms, ranging from progressive 
regulatory reform to conservative deregulation, and even to state-induced 
adjustment in areas otherwise left to private control. To set the context for 
the analysis to follow, I conclude Part I with an examination of why cer-
tainty and stability in the law is of value for legal actors in the first place. 
Part II then turns to a core element of my claim: that a legal system 
can experience substantial friction from a mere change in the law, whatever 
its content or policy goals. There I undertake a detailed breakdown of the 
variety of what might be termed "legal transition costs." Included here are 
the costs of learning the content of new legal directives;18 the uncertainty 
costs that flow from the loss of accumulated knowledge of the old law and 
from contending with the new;19 private adjustment costs, such as intraparty 
drafting and administrative costs,20 and the effect on interparty contractual 
networks;21 and the costs of formulation and interpretive error.22 
I conclude in Part III with an examination of the positive implications 
of this analysis. Taken at its broadest level, an appreciation of legal transi-
tion costs should require that lawmakers and scholars incorporate a broader 
calculus in weighing proposed changes in the law. Legal innovation of 
course can be beneficial. Many existing bodies of law, for instance, are 
themselves highly uncertain, outdated, or otherwise defective, such that a 
failure to initiate change can itself be detrimental. Moreover, some impor-
tant social causes will merit legal reform irrespective of the friction associated 
with their implementation (one might think here of the civil rights acts of 
the 1960s). Because of their potentially significant impact, however, the 
presence and extent of legal transition costs should be viewed as material 
inputs in any reasoned decisionmaking process on the merit, form, and 
structure of proposed changes in the law. 
This final point is perhaps the most important. By exposing the tangi-
ble effects of undisciplined change, transition cost analysis focuses attention 
on the assimilation of new law. It thus highlights for lawmakers the impor-
tance of the available drafting and implementation techniques that can 
mitigate transitional friction before it aiises. I examine these techniques in 
18. See infra Part !I.A. 
19. See infra Part II.B-C. 
20. See infra Part Il.D.l. 
21. See infra Part 11.0.2. 
22. See infra Part !I.E; see also infra Part Il.F (discussing the costs incurred by public entities 
from legal transitions). 
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the final sections of this Article. We will see in Part Ill23 that, with appro-
priate sensitivity, lawmakers may adopt structural and particularized 
approaches to ameliorate transition costs in advance, and in the process 
facilitate both the acceptance and assimilation of legal reforms. 
· A concern about the friction associated with legal change cuts across 
some of the most animated scholarly discussions of our time. One common 
theme among debates as diverse as those over statutory interpretation,24 the 
U.S. Supreme Court's certiorari policy,25 preferences for rules over stan-
dards,26 and the proper force of stare decisis27 is the tension between the 
value of adaptability in the law and the harm to interests of certainty and 
23. See infra Part III.B (examini~g the means by which lawmakers can mitigate the impact 
of legal transition costs), III.C (analyzing the role of "mediating institutions" in assimilating 
changes in the law). 
24. For an introduction into the contentious literature on this subject, see generally William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987) [hereinafter 
Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation), William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory 
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990), and Cass R. Sunstein, 
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 ( 1989). Perhaps the most spirited 
debate over statutory interpretation concerns the proper role of legislative history in interpretive 
inquiries. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 29-37 (1997) (criticizing the use of legislative history); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, 
and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 68-70 (1994) (same); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990) (comprehensively 
reviewing the emergence of textualist approaches to statutory interpretation); see also infra notes 
201-203 and accompanying text (examining the interaction between transition cost concerns and 
statutory interpretation) . 
. 25. For critical examinations of this issue, see SAMUEL EsTREICHER & jOHN SEXTON, 
REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL jUDICIAL 
PROCESS (1986), Arthur D. Hellman, Ught on a Darkling Plain: Intercircuit Conflicts in the Perspective 
of Time and Experience, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 247 [hereinafter Hellman, Intercircuit Conflicts), and 
Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Reh114uist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403. I 
examine the implications of transition cost analysis for the U.S. Supreme Court's certiorari policy 
and the need for timely resolution of contentious national issues infra notes 416-422 and accom-
panying text. 
26. For an introduction to the voluminous literature on the rules versus standards debate, 
see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992), which 
analyzes the debate in law and economics terms; Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA 
L. REV. 379 (1985), which offers a critical view on the distinction; and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Fore-
word: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992), which discusses jurispru-
dential considerations on the preference for rules over standards in light of recent Supreme Court 
opinions. For a comprehensive analysis of the role of transition cost concerns in the choice 
between rules and standards, see infra notes 222-231,387-392 and accompanying text. 
27. The subject of stare decisis has been a fertile ground for scholarly analysis. For an 
introduction to the recent literature, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial 
Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422 (1998), Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The 
Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001), and 
Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Economic Perspective: An Economic Analysis of the Supreme Court's 
Doctrine of Precedent, 78 N.C. L. REV. 643 (2000). I examine the implications of transition cost 
analysis for the doctrine of stare decisis infra notes 400-407 and accompanying text. 
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stability.28 Carefully considered, much of this tension can be captured in an 
appre.ciation of the legal costs of change itself. My goal here is to offer a 
framework for understanding this systemic phenomenon, and thereby assist 
in striking a proper balance between the need qf the law to adapt to new 
environments and a sensitivity to the costs of doing so. 
l. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LEGAL TRANSITIONS 
A. A Perspective 
Prior to the ascendance of the modem nation-state, legal transtttons 
bore little operative significance.29 Matters began to change beginning in the 
nineteenth century, however, as newly unified European political orders set 
about rationalizing and systematizing the law on a broad scale. The result was 
the creation of comprehensive "true codes" whose purpose was to establish 
unified legal regimes for all issues within their scope.30 Unfortunately, the 
statist drafters of the time dispensed with the attendant transitional concerns' 
by simple legislative fiat: With a single stroke, they abolished all preexisting 
legal norms in their entirety.31 They then purported to avoid future 
28. To paraphrase one scholar challenging new international norms, the question is whether 
the benefits of any particular change in the law are "worth the candle." Paul B. Stephan, The 
Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743, 
780 (1999). 
29. The concentration of power in early autocrats left little room for discussion of the 
impact of changes in the law. Even as absolute powers began to wane (notably in the private law) 
in the nineteenth century, the new lawmakers largely saw their role as one of distilling accrued 
historical wisdom. Indeed, the early development of law in many European countries bega.n with 
a "reception" of the principles of Roman law established over a millennium before. FRANZ 
WIEACKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO 
GERMANY 69-158 (Tony Weir trans., Clarendon Press 1995) (1967) (describing the reception of 
Roman law in Europe in the 1500s). Most often, therefore, the goal of positive law in this early 
period was not to initiate change, but rather to ensure continuity with the past. See William 
Ewald, Comparative ]urisprudence(I): What Was It Uke to Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 
2012-43 (1995) (discussing the influence of the German "historical school" led by Karl von 
Savigny in the development of the law in the 1800s). 
30. See Jean Louis Berge!, Principal Features and Methods of Codification, 48 LA. L. REV. 
1073, 1075-81 (1988) (examining true code methodology); William D. Hawkland, Uniform 
Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291, 292 (describing a "true code" as "a pre-
emptive, systematic, and comprehensive enactment of a whole field of law"). 
31. The history of the French Code Civil is illustrative. See Angelo Piero Sereni, The Code 
and the Case Law, in THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD 55, 76 n.2 (Bernard 
Schwartz ed., 1956) (quoting and analyzing Article 7 of the Law of the 30th of Ventose, year XII 
(1804), which provided that as of its effective date all prior legal norms "shall cease to have the 
force and effect of general or particular laws with regard to the topics which are the object 
of ... the present Code"). 
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transition issues with the fiction that the codes provided all answers for all 
problems within their scope.32 
The legal history of the United States (in i~itation of its progenitor, 
the United Kingdom) initially followed a different course. Until early in the 
last century, the primary engine for progress in the law was the judiciary, 
and the primary vehicle for change came in the form of decisions rendered 
in individual disputes. Even early statutes-such as the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act of 189033-most often signaled only a new direction for the law; 
control over the route, speed, and even ultimate destination of the legal 
journey remained with the courts.34 
The common law method substantially minimized the impact of legal 
transitions. In contrast to modern comprehensive legislative action, changes 
in the path of the common law occurred through gradual and episodic 
accretions to the existing body of judge-made norms.35 · Even significant 
course changes often were carefully foreshadowed in earlier opinions.36 This 
process permitted the law-in the complimentary view of the leading 
scholars of the day at lease7-both to build on the experience of the past 
32. This directive of true codes was achieved in one of two principal ways. The first was 
through implication from the consistency and coherence of its provisions. Examples of this 
approach are the French Code Civil and the German Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch. Alternatively, a 
code can incorporate an express instruction to the same effect, although the precise methodolo-
gies differ. See, e.g., ALLGEMEINES BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [ABGB]art. 7 (Aus.); CODICE 
CIVILE [C.C.] art. 12 (Mario Beltramo eta!. trans., 1996) (Italy); C6DIGOC!VIL [C.C.] art. 6 (Julio 
Romanach, Jr., trans., 1994) (Spain). 
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999). 
34. See Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) ("The Sherman 
Act adopted the term 'restraint of trade' along with its dynamic potential. It invokes the common 
law itself, and not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to the term 
in 1890."); Nat'! Soc'y of Prof! Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (concluding that 
the Sherman Act delegates authority to federal courts to develop a federal antitrust common law). 
35. Legal transitions also were ofless significance in this early period because of the role of 
judicial opinions. Through careful elaboration of the grounds and meaning of each incremental 
change in the law, common law courts were able to manage the transition process. Perhaps more 
significant, the law-creating and law-applying institutions were the same. This avoided many 
of the problems associated with separation of powers and with divining the intent of a large 
legislative body. In the same vein, the significantly smaller size of a judicial body (as compared to 
a legislative one) facilitated decisionmaking, and therefore enabled more frequent clarification 
and adjustment during transitional periods. Cf. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard Posner, An Economic 
Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 267--68 (1974) (noting that the large size of 
legislative bodies makes decisionmaking more difficult). For a detailed analysis of the continuing 
role of courts in mitigating legal transition costs, see infra notes 408-410 and accompanying text. 
36. For examples of this phenomenon, see Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua Co. 
Bank, 246 N.Y. 369 (1927), which foreshadowed the acceptance of the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel, and Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gardon, 222 N.Y. 88 (1917), which presaged the develop-
ment of the contractual duty of good faith performance. 
37. See STORY, supra note 2, at 702 (praising the common law for not being "an absolutely 
fixed, inflexible system, like the statute law" but rather "a system of elementary principles and of 
HeinOnline -- 49 UCLA L. Rev. 799 2001-2002
'- r 
Costs of Legal Change 799 
and to accommodate innovations in human affairs. To paraphrase 
Benjamin Cardozo, the common law method permitted judge-lawmakers to 
"lay [their] own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid 
by others who had gone before [them]."38 
In the last century, however, the limitations of this incrementalist 
approach became increasingly evident as the growth of economic inter-
dependence and shared social concerns increasingly required broader 
solutions. As a result, this country-as Guido Calabresi famously observed 
in 1982-is now firmly embedded in an "age of statutes."39 This rise of leg-
islative law in tum has led to a growth in both the breadth and detail 
of lawmaking projects. Our law thus is now characterized more by the intri-
cacies of the Clean Water Act40 (and its implementing regulations41 ) than 
by particularized developments in the common law of torts or property. 
At the same time, increased activity at all levels has added complexity 
to the lawmaking process.42 State legislatures, for instance, now regularly 
adopt measures to displace or supplement the common law; state adminis-
trative bodies and municipal subunits often are empowered to do the same. 
Yet judicial lawmaking has continued to flourish, both in many areas of its 
traditional preeminence43 and in the interstices of statutory law.44 
general juridical truths, which are continually expanding with the progress of society, and adapting 
themselves to gradual changes of trade, and commerce, and the mechanic arts, and the exigencies 
and usages of the countty"); O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 468 
(1897) (comparing the common law to "the development of a plant, each generation taking the 
inevitable next step, mind, like matter, simply obeying a law of spontaneous growth" and con-
cluding that "[i]t is perfectly natural and right that it should have been so"). But see Hathaway, 
supra note 27, at 605 (arguing that because of path dependence, "courts' early resolutions of legal 
issues can become locked-in and resistant to change"). 
38. BEN]AMINN. CARDOZO, THENATUREOFTHE]UDICIALPROCESS 149 (1921). 
39. GUIDOCALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THEAGEOFSTATUTES 163 (1982). 
40. · 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
41. See 40 C.F.R. § 1 (2000). 
42. Competition among lawmaking institutions is a long-standing phenomenon. That 
between the law courts and the Courts of Chancery for control of the progress of the common law 
(among other things) in sixteenth century England provides a good early example. See David W. 
Raack, A Histary oflnjunctions in England Before 1700,61 IND. L.J. 539, 558--60 (1986) (describing 
the competition). 
43. Although there have been a number of targeted legislative initiatives (such as attempts 
to regulate products liability), the judiciary continues to have substantial control over the tradi-
tional common law fields of contract, torts, and property. 
44. Legislative enactments in this country (with the noteworthy exception of Louisiana) 
have traditionally not aspired to the preemptive, comprehensive, and systematic nature of the 
civil codes common in Europe and South America. Instead, even comprehensive statutes typi-
cally have adhered to a perpetual index model of legislation. This approach adjusts and organizes 
the preexisting body of law, but nonetheless leaves substantial authority to the judiciary to fill 
gaps with common law principles and otherwise to develop the law within its scope. See Mark D. 
Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common Law?-Recent American Codifications, and Their Impact on 
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For its part, the U.S. Congress increasingly has arrogated authority to 
itself through an expanding field of federal legislative enactments;45 and 
national administrative agencies also have become active lawmakers on the 
basis of congressional delegations of rule-making authority.46 
Moreover, increasing cross-border interdependence has led to more 
substantial exercises of the treaty-making authority of Article II, Section 2 
of the U.S. Constitution. These efforts, significantly, have included a new 
class of self-executing treaties, which have direct effect as law without 
implementing legislation (and thus without the involvement of the U.S. 
House of Representatives).47 The president also has sought and obtained 
enhanced authority to control the content of legislative enactments in 
international matters through congressional-executive agreements48-as in 
the case of world trade agreements and NAFf A.49 
Judicial Practice and tlte Law's Subsequent Development, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1119, 1199-252 (examining 
the history of the interaction between legislation and the common law in the United States). 
45. Most often, this expansion is founded on congressional exercises of authority under the 
Commerce Clause. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has intervened with a new juris-
prudence of limitation. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States 
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see also infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text (examining the 
transitional impact of such judicial decisions). 
In contrast to the rise of legislative law on the national level, federal courts have experienced 
a severe constriction of their common law powers. See Atherton v. FDIC, 59 U.S. 213, 217-23 
(1997) (canvassing Supreme Court precedent on federal common law and noting its limited 
scope); Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981) (observing that federal common law is 
limited to '"few and restricted' instances" (quoting Wheedlin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 
(1963))); see also SCALIA, supra note 24, at 13-14 (criticizing federal court lawmaking in our "age 
of legislation ... where, with a qualification so small it does not bear mentioning, there is no such 
thing as common law"). 
46. Prominent examples include the Securities Act of 1933, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77s 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999), which granted rule-making authority to the SEC; the Department of 
Energy Organization Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7173 (1994 & Supp. V 1999), which did the 
same for the DOE; and the Occupational Safery and Health Act of 1970, codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 655 (1994 & Supp. V 1999), which did the same for OSHA. See also 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999) (defining the required procedures for administrative rule making). 
47. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687 
(1998) (analyzing a new class of self-executing "legislative treaties" in the field of international 
private law); see also John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense 
of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999) (analyzing the constitutionality of self-
executing treaties). 
Treaties reflect one of the rare instances of unicameral lawmaking under the Constitution. 
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (providing for legislative consent to treaties presented by the presi-
dent solely by two-thirds vote of the Senate). 
48. Under this procedure, Congress agrees to reject or accept through Article I imple-
menting legislation, with limited debate and without amendment, an international agreement 
whose precise contours are left to executive negotiation. For examples of such authority, see 19 
U.S.C. §§ 2112, 2191, 2902 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
49. North American Free Trade Agreement, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473 (1994 & Supp. V 
1999). For an overview of the "fast-track procedure" for these international trade agreements, see 
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Paralleling these developments has been a proliferation of new law-
making processes as well as of extralegislative institutions with formal or 
informal lawmaking powers.50 Perhaps the most prominent example of this 
modern phenomenon is the role of "private legislatures"51 in the drafting 
of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).52 Formal state legislative involve-
ment in this process was limited to almost routine adoption of the code 
with only isolated and minor revisions.53 Similar processes abound. Con-
sider, for example, the broader uniform law movement. Like the UCC 
(and its recent revisions), responsibility for this area of the law in large 
measure has been delegated to independent drafting institutions.54 Myriad 
Michael A. Carrier, All Aboard the Congressional Fast Track: From Trade to Beyond, 29 GEO. 
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 687, 711-15 (1996), and Melissa Ann Miller, Note, Will the Circle 
Be Unbroken? Chile's Accession to the NAFTA and the Fast Track Debate, 31 VAL U. L. REV. 153, 
156-65 (1996). 
50. The involvement of private forces in the creation of law also raises a separate concern 
about the role of powerful interest groups. The largely critical analyses of "interest group public 
choice theory" focus on the power of concentrated (that is, relatively cheaply organized) interest 
groups to influence governmental policy at the expense of larger, but more dispersed; groups 
whose organization costs are higher. For an introduction into the literature on this subject, see 
ROBERT E. MCCORMICK & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION, AND THE 
ECONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST-GROUP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT (1981), and 
Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 (1988). For a comprehensive 
analysis of this aspect of public choice theory as applied in one substantive context, see Daniel 
Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by 
Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
51. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 8, at 595 (coining the term "private legislature"); see also 
supra note 8 (citing other critical examinations of the work of such bodies in drafting statutory 
products). 
52. The UCC was a cooperative drafting effort of the private American Law Institute 
(ALI) and the quasi-public National Council of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL). See William). Woodward, Jr., Private Legislation in the United States-How the Uni-
form Commercial Code Becomes Law, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 451 (1999). 
53. The one noteworthy exception to this was the work of a special legislative commission 
in New York upon the initial adoption of the UCC. For a compilation of the work of this com-
mission, see 1 STATE OF N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE (1955). 
54. See, e.g., Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American 
Trust Law at Century's End, 88 CAL L. REV. 1877, 1881-82 (2000) (discussing the role of 
NCCUSL and the ALI in drafting trust law); Fred Miller, The View from Experience, 52 HASTINGS 
L.J. 621,621-27 (2001) (discussing the history and processes ofNCCUSL and describing its role 
in the drafting of uniform law). This process has continued in the adoptions of new articles of the 
UCC as well as the comprehensive revision of existing ones (specifically, Articles 3, 4, 4A, 5, 8, 
and 9, with continuing work on Articles 1, 2, and 2A). See A. Brook Overby, Modeling UCC 
Drafting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 645, 652-56 (1996) (describing the revision process). 
Purely private entities have a role in creating and implementing the law as well. See Jody 
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000) (describing the 
pervasive role of private entities in administrative agency lawmaking, and concluding that there is 
little principled reason for retaining the public versus private law distinction in this area of the law 
at all); Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative 
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independent bodies also have a formal role in the creation of law at the 
federal level;55 and some have practical lawmaking authority.56 Even the 
U.S. Supreme Court57 (through the Rules Enabling Ace8) has legislative-
like powers with regard to issues of civil procedure and evidence.59 
On the international plane as well, private legislatures are actively 
involved in the drafting of law, in particular in the area of private law.60 
These are supplemented by an array of formal international bodies (includ-
Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 62 (1990) (examining the variety of 
means by which Congress has delegated authority to nongovernmental bodies). 
55. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, tit. VI, 108 Stat. 4106, 
4147-50 (establishing the independent National Bankruptcy Review Commission with authority 
to make recommendations on the reform of bankruptcy law); Rehabilitation Amendments of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-221, § 142a, 98 Stat. 17, 27-28 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 780--
781 (2000)) (establishing the National Council on the Handicapped (now the National Council 
on Disability) with authority to recommend legislation to aid the disabled); National Gambling 
Impact Study Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 104-169, 110 Stat. 1482 (1996) (establishing the 
National Gambling Impact Study Commission with authority to review existing government poli-
cies and practices regarding gambling regulation). 
56. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994 & Supp. 
V 1999) (delegating authority to the U.S. Sentencing Commission to promulgate binding 
sentencing recommendations unless Congress objects through formal action). Various similar 
sentencing commissions also exist at the state level. See Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard Orland, 
Foreword: Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines, 73 GEO. L.J. 225, 225-30 (1984) (describ-
ing the history of sentencing commissions in the United States); see also Defense Authori-
zation Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, Pub. L. No. 100-526, 102 
Stat. 2623, 2627-31 (1988) (creating the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure and 
granting it specified powers to close military bases unless Congress takes formal action to the 
contrary). 
57. Another modern phenomenon in the same vein is the legislation-like actions of federal 
courts in creating and overseeing comprehensive structural injunctions on matters such as prison 
reform and school desegregation. See Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies: 
A Tale of Two Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 538-42 (1999) (discussing structural injunctions 
for school desegregation); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. 
L.J. 1355, 1363 (1991) (same for illegal prison conditions). 
58. 28 u.s.c. §§ 2071-2077 (2000). 
59. For a discussion of the lawmaking authority of the Supreme Court under the Rules 
Enabling Act, see Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic 
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887 (1999), which analyzes the legitimacy of 
Supreme Court rule-making authority, and Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking "Substantive Rights" (in the 
Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47 (1998), which observes that 
"[w]ith the Rules Enabling Act, Congress has delegated to the Supreme Court the power to make 
supervisory Rules of procedure for federal courts." ld. at 88-89. 
60. See Stephan, supra note 28, at 753-56 (describing the work of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), and the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law); Van Alstine, supra note 47, at 694-701 (same). 
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ing the WT0,61 WIP0,62 the World Health Organization (WH0),63 and the 
International Labor Organization (ILOt1) with variegated powers to 
formulate, interpret, implement, and even create binding legal norms.65 
Taken alone, there is nothing inherently unsettling in these develop-
ments; increasingly complex human interaction will justify increasingly 
frequent and sophisticated adjustments in the law. This acceleration of law, 
however, has produced a legal system characterized by a complex web of 
interaction among competing lawmaking institutions and processes. Each 
change in the law-whether the creation of new norms or the revision of 
existing ones-now carries a transitional impact not only within its own 
realm, but also in a growing field of kindred regimes. For its part, the 
heightened production of potentially relevant law has only magnified the 
frequency and the significance of legal change in the modem lawmaking 
enterprise. 
B. A Typology of Legal Transitions 
The significance of legal transitions comes into sharper focus when we 
view the dynamics of change along a different axis.66 Independent of the 
more recent phenomenon of the acceleration of law is a more enduring 
jurisprudential debate about its proper province. At issue here is whether 
aggregate social welfare is better advanced by a preference for public regula-
tion over private ordering, and if so, on what subjects, in what form, and 
61. See John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Commentary: The World Trade Constitution, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 530-36 (2000) (discussing the structure and authority of the WTO). 
62. See Susan A. Mort, The WTO, WIPO & the Internet: Confounding the Borders of Copy-
right and Neighboring Rights, 8 FORDHAM lNTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 173 (1997) (discussing 
the structure and authority ofWIPO). 
63. See Jay M. Vogelson, American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice 
Standing Committee on World Order Under Law, Report to the House of Delegates, 30 lNT'L LAW. 
665, 687 (1996) (discussing the structure and competence of the WHO). 
64. See Jay M. Vogelson, American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice, 
Report to the House of Delegates: International Labor Organization, 30 lNT'L LAW. 653, 654-58 
(1996) (analyzing the procedures and work of the ILO). 
65. The World Trade Organization, for instance, plays a significant role in creating law 
through the adjudication of trade disputes. As a practical matter, the growing body of jurispru-
dence by the Appellate Body of the WTO in the interpretation of the world trade agreements has 
created a common law of international trade. See Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and 
International Trade Law (Part One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. lNT'L L. REV. 845 (1999)· (describing 
the de facto development of binding common law by the WTO); Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: 
De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy), 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1 
(1999) (same); McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 61, at 512 (describing and endorsing the 
WTO's adjudicative power but rejecting proposals to grant it regulatory authority). 
66. I thank Dean Joseph Tomain for his insightful thoughts on this typology of legal 
transitions. 
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to what extent.67 The answers to these questions are neither clear nor 
static. As a result, there is an enduring instability in the law, albeit in 
differing degrees at different times. A necessary step in understanding the 
effect of this instability-and thus the significance of legal change in 
general-is to recognize the variety of ways in which legal transitions occur 
in the modem regulatory state. 
A common theme of much of modem legal scholarship has been that 
more traditionally private matters should be subject to public regulation.68 
More recent debates, in contrast, have focused on whether social welfare 
would be better served by returning particular areas of the law to the con-
trol of private forces. 69 And while these controversies tend to be the most 
heated, they do not tell the whole story. Much of the modem legislative 
agenda is devoted not to transfers from private to public control or the 
reverse, but rather to the propriety of change in areas already subject to 
comprehensive public regulation. 
This suggests that legal transitions might be better understood if con-
sidered in two distinct dimensions. The first, "vertical" dimension involves 
the choice between public and private regulation.70 "Horizontal" transi-
tions, on the other hand, occur when lawmakers either choose to reform a 
body of law already subject to public regulation71 or otherwise alter the legal 
67. Distilled to an elemental proposmon, public-regarding lawmakers face a choice 
between what might be viewed as active and passive forms of governance. In the active form, 
lawmakers pursue societal goals through familiar, positive laws (statutes, administrative regula-
tions, and the like) adopted in accordance with prescribed procedures. For reasons that will 
become clearer below, these need not be mandatory; even so-called default rules pass as positive 
law in that they apply (that is, are binding) unless derogated from affected legal actors. See infra 
notes 103-109 and accompanying text. The passive form of governance, in contrast, might be 
described simply as the absence of the active one. Often operating under the broad label "private 
ordering," this category covers the wide swaths of human activity that are not subject to formal 
state mandates or other legal guidance. As I will explain in more detail below, this approach 
characterized most areas of the law in this country until the middle of the last century. See infra 
notes 73-74 and accompanying text. 
68. For examples of recent scholarship proposing comprehensive new public regulation, see 
Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of 
Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 837 (2000), Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs 
of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1179 
(1998), and Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 
107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2361 (1998). 
69. For examples of recent scholarship in this vein, see Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a 
Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001), which argues 
for the application of a private contractual model to family law, and Alan R. Palmiter, Toward 
Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, which argues for reduction 
of public regulation of certain disclosures in securities offerings. 
70. See infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text (examining private-to-public legal transi-
tions); infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text (examining public-to-private transitions). 
71. See infra notes 92-102 and accompanying text (examining horizontal legal transitions). 
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environment in a manner that spurs private adjustment of private affairs.72 
As the following brief examination of these dimensions will illustrate, legal 
transitions are frequent and substantial, and appear in a variety of often subtle 
forms. 
1. Vertical Legal Transitions 
a. Private-to-Public: Regulation 
Among the most significant jurisprudential trends of the last century 
has been increasing public regulation of matters formerly left to private con-
trol.73 In a process that steadily gained momentum throughout the twenti-
eth century, matters as diverse as labor relations, securities trading, racial 
and gender discrimination, consumer protection, and environmental rights 
were removed from the province of contract, tort, and property law and 
newly regulated by public legislation.74 
The result in each of these and myriad similar cases is a vertical 
transition from private control to public regulation. Whereas, for exam-
ple, employers used to be able to control the work environment and impede 
the efforts of employees to organize, a gradual regulatory process leading to 
the Occupational Safety and Health Ace5 and the National Labor Relations 
Ace6 imposed restrictions;77 whereas landowners used to be essentially free 
72. See infra notes 103-109 and accompanying text (examining what might be viewed as 
private-to-private legal transitions). 
73. The classical approach to the law was dominated by an expansive notion of freedom of 
contract; as a result, private parties in large measure retained for themselves the power to define 
their respective rights and obligations. All that remained for the office of the law was to establish 
certain rudimentary pretrade endowments, in particular regarding property rights. For a broad 
examination of this historical tension between. public and private law, see Symposium, The New 
Private Law, 73 DENY. U. L. REv. 993 (1996), and Symposium, The New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 707 (1991). 
74. See Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theary w the Principle of Private Autorwmy: Lon 
Fuller's "Consideration and Farm," 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 162 (2000) (noting that until the early 
twentieth century, "freedom of contract ... had governed labor law, landlord/tenant, urban land 
use, environmental law, insurance, transport, and on and on" (citing WIEACKER, supra note 29, at 
434)); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political Faith, 22 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 
959, 960 (describing the early phase of the post-New Deal era dominated by a substantial faith in 
the political branches in the adoption of economic and social law). 
75. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (requiring a variety of actions 
by employers to create a safe workplace); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1900-1999 (2000) (refining those 
requirements). 
76. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (creating a broad range of protec-
tions for employees in their bargaining with employers); 29 C.F.R. § 102 (2000) (refining those 
protections). 
77. Like the evolution in many other fields, the Occupational Safery and Health Act as 
well as the National Labor Relations Act were preceded by a variety of increasingly ambitious 
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to exploit their own property, the Clean Air Act78 and the Clean Water 
Ace9 introduced significant limitations; and whereas the common law of 
contracts opened the way for landlords, employers, and owners of public 
accommodations to discriminate against minority groups, a variety of civil 
rights acts established new protections.80 These statutory provisions were 
then often supplemented by detailed administrative regulations.81 
Vertical conversions from private to public regulation also can occur 
in more subtle ways. Although diminished, judicial lawmaking remains an 
important engine of change in public law. This is so because some areas 
still within the common law are essentially public in nature. Consider as an 
illustration the creation of new common law crimes (a paradigmatic example 
of public lawmaking).82 Although accomplished by judicial action, these 
new requirements or prohibitions backed by the power of the state in effect 
reflect a transition from private control to public regulation. 
b. Public-to-Private: Deregulation 
The second form of vertical legal change can be seen as the opposite of 
the first. Transitions from public regulation to private ordering arise when 
lawmakers remove regulatory requirements or restrictions, and thus return 
an area of human affairs to private control.83 As such, this broad category 
might conveniently operate under the label deregulation; nonetheless, as I 
regulatory efforts at both the state and federal level. Not all aspects of the two acts thus reflected 
a complete transition from private to public regulation. 
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 1-1799 (2000) 
(setting forth implementing regulations promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency). 
79. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1337 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
80. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,303 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
81. In the common case in which administrative regulations add public law mandates 
on the basis of legislative delegations of authority to do so, they reflect an instance of vertical, 
private-to-public legal transitions. When, in contrast, they merely interpret the content of 
already existing legislative mandates, administrative regulations more resemble a horizontal 
transition within the public law realm. 
82. See State v. Miranda, 715 A.2d 680, 685-88 (Conn. 1998) (recognizing a new common 
law crime of failure to discharge a legal duty to protect a child); State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703, 
704 (S.C. 1984) (creating a new common law crime of murder of a viable unborn fetus). But see, 
e.g., Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733, 735 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that in code 
states such as Arizona courts lack authority to recognize new crimes); Commonwealth v. Booth, 
766 A.2d 843, 846 (Pa. 2001) (same as to Pennsylvania). 
83. Even where formal positive law does not exist, cohesion in a field of human activity 
may be brought about by other, nonlegal social norms. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in 
Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 462 (1990) (discussing the variety of community 
and relational controls on contractual behavior); Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-
Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005 (1987) (analyzing tht! decisionmaking strategies of parties to 
long-term commercial contracts). 
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will describe below the phenomenon of the removal of public law mandates 
is broader than this familiar term might suggest. 
The first and most common type of deregulation involves the elimina-
tion of statutory (and derivative administrative) controls by governmental 
action. Driven in large measure by the law and economics movement84 as 
well as by the insights of public choice theory,85 statutory deregulation rose to 
significance as a jurisprudential response to the perceived excesses of modem 
public law.86 The result in recent years has been a dismantling of regulatory 
oversight over broad sectors of commerce, including the telecommunica-
tions, transportation, banking, and (most recently and controversially) the 
electric power industries.87 
A second, less conspicuous form of deregulation arises when· a court 
declares that a legislative body has exceeded its constitutional authority. 
The result of such a declaration is that an area previously subject to public 
regulation lapses to otherwise applicable sources, often private ordering. 
Long ignored in constitutional jurisprudence,88 the present Supreme Court 
84. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 
STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983) (arguing for the deregulation of insider trading); Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Regulation and Responsibility: A Note on Banking, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1079, 108-h'l7 (1992) (arguing 
for increased deregulation of banking). 
85. See Daniel A. Farber & PhilipP. Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory in the Nine-
ties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457 (1992) (discussing the role of interest groups in public lawmaking as a strain 
of public choice theory); Peter L. Kahn, The Politics of Unregulation: Public Choice and Limits on 
Government, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 280 (1990) (same). 
86. See David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 
647 (1986) ("Privatization-turning formerly governmental responsibilities over to the private 
sector-has become a popular idea in recent years. Its proponents promise greater efficiency, 
lower costs, and the avoidance of legal entanglements unique to government."); Merrill, supra 
note 74, at 961-62 (noting the deregulation of a number of industries, which began during the 
Jimmy Carter and the Ronald Reagan administrations, and describing the influence of public 
choice theory on the deregulation movement). 
87. Consider as a topical case study the deregulation of the electric power generation and 
distribution industry in California. Whatever the desired long-term benefits of this effort, the 
mere transition from the stability of an established regulatory framework to the relative uncer-
tainty of private market forces has produced significant short-term distortions. These have been 
exacerbated by the particular manner in which lawmakers structured the substantive rules gov-
erning the deregulation. See Peter Coy & Christopher Palmeri, Financial Post Editorial: Deregulat-
ing Power, the Wrong Way, NAT'L POST, Aug. 23, 2000, at C15 (describing criticisms of the 
deregulation process); Holman W. Jenkins Jr., How California Turned out the Lights, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 30, 2000, at A27 (same). 
88. For a prolonged period (from the end of the Lochner era until quite recently), the possi-
bility of substantive limits on Congress's Commerce Clause power was viewed as little more than 
theoretical. See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387 
(1987) (discussing the long period in which the Supreme Court had not invalidated a congres-
sional statute on the basis of the Commerce Clause); see also Bruce Ackerman, Revolution on a 
Human Scale, 108 YALE L.J. 2279 (1999) (discussing the change of constitutional jurisprudence 
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has reinvigorated the debate over this "judicial deregulation" with a more 
aggressive interpretation of the Commerce Clause,89 as well as of the doc, 
trine of state sovereign immunity.90 It has already invalidated a number of 
social and economic federal statutes on this basis, and in the process also 
called into question a whole range of others.91 
2. Horizontal Legal Transitions 
Notwithstanding recent efforts toward deregulation, changes in the 
law in the modern regulatory state predominantly occur in areas already 
subject to public control. In its most prosaic manifestation, regulatory 
reform involves the revision or replacement of an existing legal norm by the 
lawmaking institution that created it. One might term this intra,institutional 
legal reform. Examples of this form of legal transition abound. It occurs 
whenever Congress amends an existing statutory scheme,92 in particular one 
that entirely preempts the regulated field,93 or when a federal administrative 
at the end of the Lochner era); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 
47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995) (same). 
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The invalidation offederallegislative law may also 
result in a public-to-public transition. If state legislation already covers the field, the removal of 
federal mandates will merely mean a transition to a different form of public regulation. See infra 
notes 100--101 and accompanying text.· 
90. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Cmty., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
91. Judicial action is also the source for another, less common form of public-to-private 
vertical transition: the elimination of formerly mandatory rules of the common law. Consider as 
an example here the duty of good faith, a supposedly immutable rule of contract law. In spite of 
this label, the clear trend in recent courts has been to restore the principle of good faith and fair 
dealing substantially to the control of private contractors. See Dennis M. Patterson, A Fable from 
the Seventh Circuit: Frank Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 IOWA L. REV. 503 (1991) (describing and 
criticizing this trend); Michael P. Van Alstine, OfTextualism, Party Autonomy, and Good Faith, 40 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1223, 1247-57 (1999) (same). Judicial deregulation in this form has 
gained in prominence in recent years in tandem with the broader movement to remove public law 
mandates in favor of private ordering. 
92. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 106-202, 114 Stat. 308 (2000) (amending the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938); Pub. L. No. 106-230, 114 Stat. 477 (2000) (amending the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986); Pub. L. No. 106-313, 114 Stat. 1251 (2000) (amending the Immigration and 
Nationality Act with respect to certain nonimmigrant aliens). 
93. A prominent, and currently controversial, example is the preemption of state statutory 
and common law concerning all contractual aspects of air transportation in favor of federal regula-
tory control. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 41,713 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see 
also Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136(v) (1994 & Supp. V 
1999) (preempting state regulation in areas covered by the act); Medical Devices Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360(k) ( 1994 & Supp. V 1999) (prohibiting state regulation in its field of coverage). 
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body revises an existing rule.94 Intra-institutional reform likewise describes 
the frequent transitions at the state level when a legislature or adminis-
trative agency amends an existing body of public law within its field of 
h . 95 aut onty. 
Recent years have also witnessed the rise of more complicated forms of 
horizontal legal transitions.96 The first step in this direction was the crea-
tion in the last century of administrative bodies conceived of as legislative 
agents with the authority to fill in statutory details.97 Also in this category 
are the more novel forms of lawmaking explored above,98 such as the 
increased use of the treaty-making power as an alternative to formal legisla-
tion, of extralegislative entities to assist in the formulation of new legal 
norms, and of a variety of private bodies to develop transjurisdictional law 
on behalf of public legislatures.99 
Interinstitutional regulatory reform results from an arrogation of author-
ity by a lawmaking institution in an area already subject to regulation by a 
subordinate one.100 Examples of this type of public-to-public transition span 
the spectrum of hierarchical relationships in our constitutional system. The 
94. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 243.100-.103 (2000) (establishing Regulation FD, which substan-
tially alters the system of disclosure by public companies); 65 C.F.R. § 69,667 (2000) (enacting 
complicated amendments to amortization regulations concerning intangible property). . 
95. One could scarcely capture in a footnote even a representative sample of recent 
changes to state public laws. For two particularly controversial recent state legislative enactments, 
see H. 1705, 112th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2001), which regulated consumer credit in 
Indiana, and H.R. 350, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1995), which comprehensively 
reworked Ohio's civil code regarding tort and other civil actions, but was declared unconstitu-
tional in State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999). 
96. See supra notes 47--65 and accompanying text (describing the variety of recent novel 
and hybrid forms of lawmaking). 
97. See Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 452--67 (1986) 
(describing both the rise of administrative agencies and the history of the Administrative Procedure 
Act); Loren A. Smith, ]udicialization: The Twilight of Administrative Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 427, 432-
36 (describing the rise of administrative agencies in the latter half of the twentieth century). 
98. See supra notes 47--65 and accompanying text. · 
99. Horizontal cooperation among formally sovereign entities in the creation of transjuris-
dictional uniform law also reflects a form of intra-institutional transition, although through a shift 
to a higher level of social organization. This may or may not involve some form of a vertical 
integration through a formal institution (such as an administrative or consultative body) with 
authority to promulgate draft legislation. See Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory 
Competition, Extemalization, and jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47, 49 (1993) (observing that 
international regulatory cooperation "constrains . horizontal competition and is equivalent to a 
move up the scale of social organization to institutionalization (or regulation) at a higher level of 
social organization"). 
100. The reverse process may also reflect an instance of inter-institutional legal transition. 
That is, when a superior institution removes legal mandates in favor of regulation by, for instance, 
institutions geographically closer to the governed-a process that when undertaken on a broad 
scale is often referred to as devolution-the result is· a transition from one form of public regula-
tion to another. 
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most familiar pattern is the preemption of state public law by new federal 
legislation on the basis of the Supremacy Clause.101 A similar, though now 
less common, phenomenon occurs when a legislature acts to supercede an 
existing framework of common law norms in an area that was itself public 
law in nature. 102 
3. State-Induced Private Adjustment 
The effect of changes in the law would not seem to be a matter of seri-
ous concern for legal regimes that are not mandatory in character. Because 
much of contract law, commercial law, and similar fields merely define the 
default rules of exchange, for instance, they remain subject to disposition by 
party agreement. As a result, it is appealing to assume that changes in this 
jus dispositivum (at least those not retroactive in application) impose no 
immediate adjustment costs on transactors. If they are not content with a 
new rule, they are free simply to contract around it. 
This overlooks the benefits of a well-developed body of background 
law. It is now well recognized that it simply is impractical or too costly for 
transactors to craft all aspects of their relationship from scratch.103 Even for 
purely consensual relations, therefore, the state can serve a valuable func-
tion by supplying a stable set of cost-free default rules to operate in the 
background of party agreements. 104 As familiarity grows over time, this 
default legal framework then can free transactors of the need to dicker over 
uncontroversial details, enable them to focus their negotiations on matters 
101. U.S. CONST. art. VI. The Supremacy Clause also grants preemptive effect to treaties 
adopted in accordance with Article II, Section 2. The U.S. Senate ratification of a treaty 
designed to be self-executing, therefore, will also result in a hierarchical legal transition to the 
extent state law is in conflict. See also supra note 47 and accompanying text (describing the 
operation of self-executing treaties). 
102. Examples of this type of regulatory reform include the replacement of common law evi-
dentiary rules by the Federal Rules of Evidence (or, for that matter, state rules of evidence) and 
replacement of judge-made criminal law in those states that have adopted criminal codes. 
103. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Fi!Ung Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic The-
ory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 92-93 (1989) (describing the various transaction costs that 
give rise to contractual incompleteness); David Chamy, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative 
Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1819 (1991) (noting that "[i]n almost 
all transactions, it would be extremely costly to draft a contract that purported explicitly to 
address the obligations of the parties for all conceivable future contingencies"). 
104. Even lawyer-economists enamored of the benefits of market forces acknowledge the 
efficiency of a well-developed body of background law. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. 
Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1444-46 (1989) (noting the general 
view among lawyer-economists that corporate law can play a socially desirable role by freeing con-
tractors of the cost of negotiating all aspects of their deals (citing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & 
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 34 (1991) (arguing that 
corporate law codes provide for corporations an efficient set of"off-the-rack" default terms))). 
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particular to their transaction, and reduce the risks of private formulation 
105 
error. 
Because of the importance such a framework assumes over time, a state 
decision to alter even a background legal regime may induce a form of 
private-to-private transition.106 That is, not unlike new mandatory law, a 
modification of default rules of exchange will require that private transactors 
review and restructure their affairs to respond to the new opportunities and 
obstacles. The particular form of sanction for noncompliance may be 
different (state-enforced criminal or civil liability versus private loss),107 
but parallel adjustment incentives will mean that a change in default legal 
rules can carry a transitional impact much in the same manner as the public 
law transitions just discussed. 108 This is all the more true in· our age of 
105. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the 
Interactions Between Express and ImpUed Contract Terms, 73 CAL L. REV. 261, 262 (1985) 
(describing the "Expanded Choice postulate" that state supplied background rules "expand con-
tractors' choices by providing standardized and widely suitable 'preformulations,' thus eliminating 
the cost of negotiating every detail of the proposed arrangement"); id. at 263 (emphasizing "the 
value of [state-supplied) implied terms as widely .useful, predefined signals that reduce the inci-
dence of certain identifiable rypes of [private) formulation errors"); see also EASTERBROOK & 
FISCHEL, supra note 104, at 34 (noting that "[c)orporate codes and existing judicial decisions 
supply [default) terms 'for free' to every corporation, enabling ventures to concentrate on matters 
that are specific to their undertaking"). 
106. In theory, transactors may be able to avoid some of the adjustment cost for new default 
rules by a wholesale choice of the law of a jurisdiction that has not adopted the proposed change. 
A variery of complications undermine the attractiveness of this option. First, states maintain a 
monopoly on the validiry of choice of law clauses, as well on the invocations necessary for their 
recognition. Moreover, even when permissible, a private choice of law requires parry agreement. 
In absence of express negotiation, therefore, a transactor cannot be assured that any particular 
standardized choice of law clause will be operative. Finally, when-such as for the UCC in the 
United States-all relevant jurisdictions have cooperated in creating uniform law, the choice of 
law option is effectively meaningless. See U.C.C. § 1-105 (1999) (validating a parry choice oflaw 
only if the jurisdiction chosen bears a "reasonable relation" to the transaction at issue). For more 
detail on the role of "exit" in assessing the impact of legal change, see infra notes 393-396 and 
accompanying text. 
107. State action also can induce substantial private-to-private transitions through litigation 
as a result of the remedy sought for legal violations. Consider the AT & T antitrust case. The state 
in that case sought to dismantle an existing system of private ordering operating in the form of a 
large corporate enterprise. Upon a finding of an antitrust violation, and a subsequent consent 
decree, the result was in effect state-mandated "private deregulation." See United States v. 
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 222-34 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom., Maryland v. United States, 460 
U.S. 1001 (1983). Legislative guidance on how that was to be accomplished did not come for 
over a decade, which itself involved a form of vertical legal transition. See Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 251 (Supp. V 1999). 
108. See supra notes 73-102 and accompanying text (discussing private legal transitions that 
arise from a change in a default legal regime). 
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comprehensive prescription of default rules through legislative action (wit-
ness the Uniform Commercial Code) .109 
With this foundation, I can now state concisely the premise of the 
analysis to follow: Our increasingly fragmented and complicated political-
legal environment has spawned an increase in the breadth, complexity, and 
velocity of legal transitions. What has been overlooked in this acceleration 
of law is the derivative increase in the friction associated with change 
itself. 110 Whether beneficiaries or targets, legal actors-and in the aggregate 
the legal system as a whole-will incur costs simply in accommodating new 
legal norms. These costs of simple adjustment will arise, significantly, 
whatever substantive policy goals the norms pursue and however well they 
are crafted to achieve those ends. 
Part II examines these legal transition costs in detail. To set the context 
for that analysis, I first turn to a brief discussion of why certainty and stability 
is of value for legal actors in the first place. Through this review of the 
force of established law we will set a foundation for a deeper understanding 
of the costs of undisciplined change, and thus of the benefits of mitigating 
transitional friction before it arises. 111 
C. The Value of Legal Certainty 
It is one of the requirements of a just legal system that lawmakers rea-
sonably communicate the content of the law to the governed. As the 
Supreme Court often has emphasized, a legal norm so unclear in its 
substance that citizens "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due 
process of law."m 
109. As noted above, the Uniform Commercial Code in recent years itself has been subject 
to a comprehensive round of revisions. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
110. Although the literature is limited, some scholars have touched on the notion of legal 
transition costs (most often with reference to the doctrine of stare decisis), but without a compre-
hensive analysis of the phenomenon. See Lawrence E. Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Dynamics 
of the Legal Process, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 408-10 (1982) (noting a departure from precedent 
involves transition costs); Lee, supra note 27, at 652 (observing that the overruling of precedent 
by the Supreme Court imposes adjustment costs); see also Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-in Effects in 
Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813, 821 (1998) (noting that the relative merit of an existing 
legal norm must involve consideration of the transition costs of adopting a new one); cf. Gregory 
E. Maggs, Reducing the Costs of Statutory Ambiguity: Alternative Approaches and the Federal Courts 
Study Committee, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 123, 127 (1992) (analyzing the costs of statutory 
ambiguity). 
111. See infra Parts III.B-C (analyzing the available means of mitigating legal transitions and 
the role of mediating institutions in ameliorating the impact of legal change). 
112. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385,391 (1926) (citing lnt'l Harvester Co. v. 
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914)); see also Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350 
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A voidance of uncertainty in the articulation of legal mandates is not 
only a matter of minimal justice. Prudential considerations also suggest 
that clarity in the meaning and effect of law provides affirmative benefits 
to individual legal actors, and thus in the aggregate to society in general. 
Some degree of legal certainty in fact is essential to the very functioning of 
a capitalist system.113 Indeed, certainty may have value even apart from the 
substance of the particular legal norm at issue. "In most matters," as Justice 
Louis Brandeis famously observed, "it is more important that the applica-
ble rule of law be settled than it be settled right."114 
Clear and stable legal norms provide benefits to legal actors in a vari-
ety of ways. 115 First, they promote efficient decisionmaking by affected firms 
and individuals in the arrangement of their affairs. Bolstered by judicial 
adherence to precedent, 116 settled rules of law provide the framework for less 
costly, more accurate, and thus more effective planning for future activity.m 
In consensual transactions, the predictability enhanced by established law 
enables more efficient drafting of contracts and other interparty legal docu-
ments intended for future, especially multiple or repeat, use. 118 
(1964) (noting "the requirement of the Due Process Clause that a criminal statute give fair warn-
ing of the conduct which it prohibits"). 
113. This insight was one of the significant contributions of Max Weber. See 2 MAX 
WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 883 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968); see also 
Anthony D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 n.ll, 8 (1983) (citing Weber and dis-
cussing the importance of legal certainty for the rule of law). 
114. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
115. A focus on legal certainty does not mean that narrow rules always should be preferred 
over flexible standards. Some important equitable values of their nature are not susceptible to 
precise articulation for all factual scenarios within their scope. Moreover, as I explain below, when 
insufficient information is available about the regulated activity flexible standards may be the 
preferred normative model. See infra notes 387-392 and accompanying text. 
116. For an introduction to the voluminous debates over the proper role of the doctrine of 
stare decisis, see supra note 27. See also infra notes 400-407 and accompanying text (examining 
the doctrine within the framework of transition cost analysis). 
117. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM INAMERICA (Paul Gewirtz ed., 
Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989), reprinted in 88 COLUM. L. REV. 989 (1988) (discussing from a 
comparative perspective the work of Karl Llewellyn, including his views on the value of legal 
certainty); Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 430 (asserting that cer.tainty through adherence to 
precedent enables both political and private actors to plan more efficiently "against the 
background of known rules"); Lee, supra note 27, at 651 (observing that the certainty provided by 
the doctrine of stare decisis "enables more efficient planning"); Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal 
and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 93, 107 (1989) (arguing that 
legal certainty, as supported by adherence to precedent, "permit[s) better planning by legal 
actors"). 
118. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, at 719-20 (arguing that established background 
law promotes "drafting efficiency" in the preparation of standardized forms); Robert E. Scott, The 
Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 854 (2000) (suggesting that for-
mal adherence to established rules promotes stability and facilitates the creation of "standardized 
terms that parties can use thereafter in signaling their intentions"). 
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Legal certainty also can lead to a progressive decrease in the costs asso-
ciated with obtaining professional advice. Familiarity with settled legal 
norms in a particular field gradually enlarges the pool of practitioners with 
the expertise to offer advice, as well as the depth and accuracy of that 
expertise. The resultant increase in competition leads to higher quality 
legal and other professional advice. The net effect is less costly and more 
efficient expert guidance as private actors plan for and execute legal 
• 119 transacuons. 
Familiarity with an established body of law among legal actors them-
selves likewise may lead to a reduction of transaction costs through 
strengthened bonds of interfirm trust. 120 Not unlike the function of rules of 
grammar, a settled legal regime provides a framework for efficient commu-
nication between transactors. This in turn decreases the costs and risks 
in the initial negotiation and later performance of consensual transac-
tions.121 Derivatively, the certainty provided by a settled body of law leads 
to a reduction in dispute resolution costs, both by narrowing the universe of 
potential controversies and by facilitating settlement when controversies do 
• 122 
anse. 
A related, if more subtle, benefit flows from the effect legal certainty 
has on the development of private forms and practices. Clarity and stability 
in positive legal norms can set the foundation for establishment of private 
conventions in the interstices of the law. For individual firms, legal cer-
119. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, at 726 (arguing that the use of established stan-
dardized terms results in efficiency gains from "higher quality and lower cost legal and professional 
services in the future, as lawyers and accountants gain (and retain) expertise by encountering 
questions or disputes regarding a particular contract term"). 
120. For analyses of the importance of interfirm trust in the creation and performance of 
contracts, see P. Goran T. Hagg, The Economics of Trust, Trust-Sensitive Contracts and Regulation, 14 
lNT'L REV. L. & ECON. 437 (1994), and G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation 
of Commercial Contracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REV. 221 (1991). 
121. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, at 727 (describing the efficiency benefits that flow 
from transactor familiarity with established standardized terms). Charles Goetz and Robert Scott 
have observed a similar phenomenon in the use of conventional "preformulated" contract terms. 
See Goetz & Scott, supra note 105, at 287 (arguing that as such terms become established through 
repeated judicial interpretation, they fulfill a "labeling" function by "provid[ing] a uniform, and 
therefore intelligible, system of communication"). 
122. The proposition that certainty in the law decreases dispute resolution costs is a well-
accepted one. See, e.g., Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 35, at 265 (arguing that "[a]n increase in the 
predictability of the outcome of litigation should result in an increase in the settlement 
rate ... [and] reduce the total costs of legal dispute resolution"); Lee, supra note 27, at 643 (argu-
ing that judicial adherence to established doctrine decreases the costs associated with litigation). 
For more on this point, see infra notes 175-194 and accompanying text. 
HeinOnline -- 49 UCLA L. Rev. 815 2001-2002
Costs of Legal Change 815 
tainty encourages investment in cost-saving administrative practices, such 
as in the form of intrafirm standardization. 123 
Similarly, predictability can speed the development of efficient inter-
firm conventions. These operate to fine-tune rights and obligations only 
incompletely or imperfectly defined in the positive law. This benefit of cer-
tainty is captured in the notion that an established legal regime can facili-
tate the creation of networks of private contractual formulations for issues 
left unresolved in the regime's express provisions. 124 
Certainty in the law, like elsewhere in human affairs, is a relative con-
cept. In its purest form it likely does not exist at all.125 And some equitable 
values may not be susceptible to precise articulation in any event. But the 
longer a given body of law remains in force-and especially the more it is 
subject to judicial interpretation and is applied in diverse factual circum-
stances126-the greater the benefits of certainty and predictability it may 
offer to legal actors in the arrangement of their affairs. 127 
These considerations alone suggest that a loss of the certainty that has 
developed in a given body of law over time may result in significant costs. 
As we shall discuss in more detail below, the costs involved in accumulating 
a storehouse of interpretive precedent128 as well as in developing familiarity 
among legal professionals and transactors129 may become wasted investments 
upon the repeal or replacement of an established legal regime. But we shall 
also discover that the costs of legal transitions are deeper and more profound 
than the loss of certainty in this narrow sense. A fuller understanding 
requires an analysis not only of the loss of accumulated legal certainty, but 
also of the new burdens imposed, when an established legal norm is replaced 
with a new and untested one. 
123. For a more detailed review of the benefits of standardization, see infra notes 250-253 
and accompanying text. 
124. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, at 763--64 (discussing the role of the law in 
facilitating the creation of private networks of standardized contractual terms); Klausner, supra 
note 15, at 837 (observing that "[l]egislatures, in enacting corporate law, and courts, in deciding 
corporate law cases, in effect serve as standard-setters and hence as facilitators ... of contractual 
networks"). For a detailed examination of the legal transition costs associated with the loss of 
established networks of contracts, see infra notes 274--294 and accompanying text. 
125. As Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, "the logical method and form flatter that longing 
for certainty and for repose which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is illusion, and 
repose is not the destiny of man." Holmes, supra note 37, at 466 
126. This is a well-recognized benefit of judicial interpretation. See Klausner, supra note 15, 
at 777 ("The benefit of judicial interpretation lies in the reduction of uncertainty."). For more on 
this point, see infra notes 175--178 and accompanying text. 
127. For a more detailed examination of this process of progressively enhancing the cer-
tainty in a body of law, see infra notes 175--194 and accompanying text. 
128. See infra notes 195--198 and accompanying text. 
129. See infra notes 140-155 and accompanying text. 
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II. THE COSTS OF TRANSITION BETWEEN LEGAL REGIMES 
In almost any form of social organization, a decision to alter or replace 
a norm of guidance or control will involve some level of transitional fric-
tion. As one moves up the scale from small and homogeneous private 
groupings to broad governmental regulation of a diverse polity, the extent 
and complexity of this friction is only likely to increase. The next step in 
appreciating the significance of this phenomenon is to examine in detail 
the distinct sources and types of costs that arise from such a transition in 
state-created legal regimes. 
A. Learning Costs 
Much as lawmakers may deny it/30 and the public may decry it,131 
crafting legal norms to address the complexity and variability of human 
affairs is a difficult and complicated enterprise. An increasingly sophisti-
cated modem polity, as well as a heightened diversity both among 
lawmakers and the governed, has necessitated increasingly sophisticated 
legal accommodation. A consequence is that the law itself is increas~ngly 
specialized, detailed, and complex. This fact has become so ingrained in 
our collective consciousness that one need hardly examine the Internal 
Revenue Code132 (with attendant regulations133 ), the Bankruptcy Code134 
130. The desire of lawmakers to distill the law into simple, easily digestible propositions is a 
long-standing one. See jOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 39-40 (2d ed. 
1985) (noting the efforts of Frederick the Great of Prussia in the early 1800s to prescribe the 
resolution for all conceivable factual disputes in the form of a civil code containing in excess of 
17,000, supposedly uncomplicated, provisions); Paul Edward Geller, Staffing the ]mliciary and 
"Tastes" in Justice: A Commentary on the Papers by Professors BeU and Clark, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1849, 1859 (1988) (observing that "[o)ne purpose of the French Civil Code [of 1804] was to 
establish a universal handbook of general rights and duties from which any reasoning layperson 
could draw directives for action in particular cases"). 
131. See, e.g., Mike Archer, Plain English Puts People in Charge, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 
11, 2001, Lake Sentinel section, at 1 ("(Average citizens) get knocked to their knees by a barrage 
of complicated legal language .... As residents, they should be able to participate in decisions that 
affect their lives. The law confirms that right. But for the average person, the language barrier 
effectively prevents it."); Mae M. Cheng, Immigration Q & A: Can In-Laws Get Their Visas 
Extended?, NEWSDAY, Nov. 10, 2000, at G2 (noting that because of the complexity in "immigra-
tion and welfare laws, it is very difficult for the average person to figure out the benefits for which 
they are eligible"); John D. McKinnon, For Taxpayers, Life }ust Got Much More Complex, WALL 
ST. J., June 1, 2001, at A2 (noting that complexity in the recent changes to the tax code "will 
generate huge headaches for tens of millions of taxpayers" and quoting an e-mail to an ABA 
internet site to the effect that "[t]he administrative burden on families will be daunting"). 
132. 26 u.s.c. § 1 (1994). 
133. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.01 (2000). 
134. 11 u.s.c. § 101 (1994). 
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(with attendant rules135 ), or the various federal secunttes acts136 (with 
implementing regulations137 ) to illustrate the point. And, unfortunately, 
complexity often travels with the unwanted companions of formulation 
error, vagueness and ambiguity, unintended gaps in coverage, and the prin-
. l f 1: 138 ctp e o unroreseen consequences. 
The law, in short, must be learned, and the· process of doing so 
involves costs. Firms and individuals must determine what laws are rele-
vant to their activities; they must assess the scope and effect of the 
applicable ones; and they must master the complexities of the more detailed 
or technical provisions. Most often, lay actors do not incur these learning 
costs through first-hand investigation. Instead, it is typically more efficient 
for them to purchase legal knowledge from professionals with specialized 
education and expertise in the fields of law relevant to their affairs. 139 Not 
all actors, of course, purchase knowledge from specialized professionals in 
the planning of legal transactions. Some consciously choose to run the risks 
of misinformation rather than incur the learning costs required for mastery 
of the law.140 Others will lack the resources or experience to seek out pro-
fessional legal advice in advance of their legally relevant conduct. This 
only means, however, that the learning costs are borne at the point of 
legal sanction, rather than in advance of (or in avoidance of) such a 
consequence. 
Not all legal learning costs, however, are borne directly by regulated 
firms and individuals. A variety of public and private institutions contrib-
ute in various ways to the accumulation of knowledge about the law. The 
public court system, for instance, subsidizes the learning of the law by soci-
ety at large through judicial opinions on the resolution of legal disputes. 141 
This is particularly true in countries such as the United ·States that follow 
135. See FED. R. BANKRUPTCY R. 1001 (2000). 
136. See 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994). 
137. See 17 C.F.R. § 200.1 (2000). 
138. For a more detailed examination of the errors that may accompany the formulation of 
legal norms, see infra notes 297-302 and accompanying text. 
139. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, at 723 n.24 (noting the efficiencies from pur-
chasing legal and other professional advice that may arise from "economies of scale and scope and 
from movement along the learning curve"); see also Klausner, supra note 15, at 783-84 (examining 
the same contention). 
140. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 26, ·at 572-76 (discussing the significance of private decisions 
not to become informed about the law regarding the choice between rules and standards). To the 
extent that new legal mandates increase learning costs, they likely also will add to the number of 
legal actors that choose to run the risk of being misinformed about the law. See infra notes 324-
329 and accompanying text (discussing such "ignorance costs"). 
141. For more on this role of courts as "mediating institutions," see 'infra notes 408-410 and 
accompanying text. 
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the common law tradition of detailed and reasoned judicial opinions.142 
Indeed, by elaborating on and adding coherence to the law in this way, 
court opinions in effect create public goods, accessible to all and exhaustible 
b 143 y none. 
Legal scholars perform a similar function. The production of law review 
articles, treatises, and other legal literature creates a ready base of knowledge 
for consumption by legal practitioners and other professionals.144 Public 
interest institutions (such as legal clinics) also serve as a source of 
knowledge for those segments of society that are unable to bear legal 
learning costs on their own.145 Legal professionals can also provide effi-
ciencies in learning the law; for as they become familiar with a particular 
legal regime, the per transaction cost of researching and communicating its 
b l. d 146 content to su sequent c tents ecreases. 
As a result, the learning costs for a given body of law are likely to 
decrease over time.147 The longer the law remains in effect, the greater the 
opportunity for interpretive court opinions and scholarly analysis. Familiar-
ity among legal professionals likewise lessens risks and thus reduces costs 
142. · See Michael Wells, French and American Judicial Opinions, 19 YALE J. !NT'L L. 81, 109 
(1994) (observing that the "disparity between the typical French opinion and the American 
model is worthy of attention, because American theorists regard the reasoned opinion as crucial to 
the success of the whole legal system"). 
143. The key attributes of public goods are that they are "nonexcludable," which means that 
one user cannot exclude use by others, and "nonrivalrous," which means that one person's con-
sumption of the good does not diminish its availability for use by others. Robert G. Bone, A New 
Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 262 n.96 (1998) 
(describing these two characteristics of public goods); see Clarisa Long, Patents and Cumulative 
Innovation, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 229, 231 (2000) (same). 
144. Through their support of legal education and scholarly output by faculty members, 
public law schools also internalize some of the costs of learning the law. Similarly, law students, 
even those at private law schools, in effect subsidize the dissemination of knowledge about the law 
through their paid tuition and fees. 
14 5. The prevalence and efficiency of modern means of communication (including televi-
sion, the Internet, and so on) also assist in the dissemination of knowledge about the law, in par-
ticular for those otherwise unwilling or unable to seek out professional legal advice. 
146. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, at 723 (observing that one of the "learning 
benefits" of a standardized contract term is that its use "may reduce the costs and improve the 
quality of [professional] advice because many [legal] professionals will be familiar with the term 
from past experience"); Kaplow, supra note 26, at 574 n.40 (observing that legal advice costs may 
decrease over time as lawyers and law firms gain familiarity with a given issue). 
14 7. This is not to say that any particular existing legal norm necessarily will be more valu-
able as compared to all alternatives. Another substantive solution may offer greater net societal 
benefits, in particular if the existing norm has become ossified in light of social or technological 
change. See infra notes 369-374 and accompanying text (discussing in more detail the role 
of legal transition costs in evaluating proposed changes in the law). The simple message here is 
that as knowledge of an established legal norm accumulates, the costs associated with learning its 
content will decrease. 
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through improved quality of advice. 148 In addition, interaction among prac-
titioners in the same and related fields leads to a dispersion of the collective 
learning benefits among all participants in a legal community.149 The body 
of knowledge and experience so accumulated over time functions to decrease 
the learning costs of the law for covered firms and individuals.150 
The introduction of a new body of legal norms, therefore, will impose 
a new round of learning costs. Whether in the form of a statute, admin-
istrative regulation, or judicial opinion, a new rule of law must be identi-
fied, analyzed, and digested.151 The extent of these new learning costs also 
is likely to increase in direct relation to the ambition, novelty, and com-
plexity of the reform project.152 An incrementally new common law rule, 
for example, likely will impose lower learning costs than a comprehensive 
l . l . d 153 egts auve pro uct. 
148. A similar phenomenon occurs even without the involvement of legal professionals. 
General (if sometimes imperfect) knowledge of the law can be expected to diffuse throughout 
society through the informal interaction of affected individuals. For example, a lay employee need 
not wade into the details of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in order to 
learn from experience and communication with colleagues that plan administrators owe some 
generalized duty offairness in plan decisions. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l) (1994) (providing that 
administrators must discharge their duties with respect to a plan "solely in the interest of the 
participants and beneficiaries"). 
149. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, at 738-40 (examining how the interaction of law 
firms and other professionals disperses the accumulated learning benefits on commonly used 
contractual terms); see also id. at 719-25 (discussing the "learning benefits" that arise from the use 
of widely accepted standardized contract terms); Steven Walt, Novelty and the Risks of Unifarm 
Sales Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 671, 692-93 (1999) (describing the learning benefits that flow from 
prior experience with and information about the law). For a discussion of the related notion that 
the accumulation of judicial precedent on open-ended legal standards can decrease the uncer-
tainty costs, see infra notes 225-231 and accompanying text. 
150. As I have noted, one of the means by which legal learning is disseminated is through 
court opinions on private disputes. See supra notes 141-143 and accompanying text. None-
theless, there may be insufficient incentives for the production of these public goods. 
Notwithstanding the societal learning benefits, public litigation to resolve uncertainties may 
reflect a positive externality for the participants. That is, the legal system requires the parties to 
bear their own litigation costs, but does not permit them to internalize the resulting learning 
benefits. As a consequence, the existing system may create insufficient incentives for an optimal 
amount of judicial precedent on newly created legal norms. See Walt, supra note 149, at 692-703 
(discussing this point in terms of a "learning externality"). 
151. Cf. Lee, supra note 27, at 657 (noting with regard to the Supreme Court that "when 
the Court abandons one of its decisions, private and public actors will be forced to incur addi-
tional costs in response to the replacement precedent"). 
152. Indeed, even those not directly affected may incur legal and other learning costs from 
investigating the scope and effect of new laws. That is, firms and individuals will incur legal and 
other professional service costs simply in determining that a new legal norm does not affect their 
affairs. 
153. As we have seen, however, this is also the trend of lawmaking in this country. Recall 
that recent decades have witnessed a progressive eclipsing of the common law approach in favor of 
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These legal learning costs in fact will arise at each of several levels of a 
learning chain. A first order exists at the level of legal professionals: judges, 
law professors, and, most significant, legal practitioners. These professionals 
must master the provisions of the new law, resolve questions of scope and 
limitation, and unravel issues of meaning and effect. These activities 
involve costs, not only in direct economic terms, but also in the form of 
investments of . time and foregone opportunities.154 As commercial 
enterprises, law firms ultimately pass along much of these learning costs to 
affected legal actors in the form of increased service fees. 155 
Indeed, professional learning costs will arise even if the new body of law 
merely builds upon or extensively borrows from the regime it replaces. 
Consider the revision of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.156 
Although it has introduced a number of innovations, the revised article 
is substantially based on the core principles of its predecessor.157 It none-
theless contains a number of significant substantive innovations, as well as 
technical challenges such as a reworked numbering system. 158 The simple 
lack of familiarity with the content of this new body of law, and in particu-
lar with the extent of its novelty, will impose learning costs on legal profes-
more comprehensive legislative products. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. The 
result is a likely increase in the learning costs that arise from each instance of legal transition. 
154. As noted above, in most cases learning costs ultimately are borne by those who seek 
advice from legal practitioners. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, in some 
cases these costs of new legal norms in part may be internalized by law firms and other profes-
sionals for commercial reasons. For instance, law firrns-in particular large ones whose economies of 
scale permit continuous and comprehensive monitoring-may produce complimentary summaries 
of new developments in the law in order to attract new clients and retain existing ones. 
155. At some level, the interests of lawyers in this regard may be contrary to those of society 
at large. To the extent that new law imposes additional learning costs, including through the 
need for increased professional services, it will benefit the economic interests of lawyers. See also 
Kaplow, supra note 26, at 620 (observing that "[s]ince some of the promulgation costs [of law) and 
much of the costs of advice and enforcement consist of fees for lawyers' services, the profession as 
a whole has a general interest that tends to oppose that of society"). 
156. Nearly all of the. states have now adopted revised UCC Article 9, which governs the 
creation, perfection, and priorities among security interests in personal property. For most, though 
not all, of the states, the revised article entered into effect on July 1, 2001. See U.C.C. § 9-701 
(2000). 
157. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Filing and Enforcement Under Revised 
Article 9, 54 Bus. LAW. 1965, 1966 (1999) (setting forth the observation of the reporters for 
revised Article 9 that "[t)he two Articles follow the same general approach to providing a com-
prehensive scheme for the regulation of security interests in personal property and fixtures"). 
158. See Michael W. Dunagan, Vehicle Repossessions and Resales Under Revised U.C.C. Arti-
cle 9: The Requirements and the Consequences of Non-Compliance, 54 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 
192, 193 (2000) (observing that "(s]ome of the most significant differences between the old and 
revised Article 9 involve changes in the statutory format, such as a new numbering system"). 
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sionals in the field of secured financing. 159 This is true even though one of 
the purported purposes of revised Article 9 was to clarify and simplify the 
law.160 
A second order of learning costs arises from the process of educating 
affected legal actors (especially repeat players161 ) about the impact of the 
new law on their specific operations and activities. It is at this level that 
the bulk of the practical learning of the law is accomplished. Even when 
firms purchase knowledge from specialized professionals, the specifics of the 
law must be fleshed out and given practical meaning, the law's complexities 
must be distilled into a digestible form, and its application to actual transac-
tions and disputes must be clarified. To carry forward the revised Article 9 
example, the necessity of educating secured lenders about how the new law 
affects their specific operations will create a separate layer of learning 
costs.162 
Finally, the knowledge acquired by a firm about a change in the 
law must be translated for consumption and implementation by its lay 
employees-a third order of learning costs. Without effective education 
procedures for employees, a firm's initial- learning about the law means lit-
tle. To carry that knowledge into effect, firm agents "on the ground" must 
internalize the new requirements of the law. In a similar way, employees 
must develop sufficient practical knowledge about new legal mandates in 
order to understand and adhere to new or updated firm compliance 
regimes.163 One need only cite experience with antidiscrimination law to 
159. Revised Article 9 has already spawned many seminars and law review symposia as well 
as innumerable articles, books, and other legal works. See, e.g., Barkley Clark, Revised Article 9 of 
the UCC: Scope, Perfection, Priorities, and Default, 4 N.C. BANKING lNST. 129 (2000); Edwin E. 
Smith, Overview of Revised Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1999); Symposium on Revised UCC 
Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENTL REV. 857 (1999). 
160. See Kenneth C. Kettering, Repledge and Pre-Default Sale of Securities Collateral Under 
Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1999) (describing these purposes of revised 
Article 9); Steven 0. Weise, An Introduction to the Revised U.C.C. Article 9, SF01 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1 
(Sept. 7, 2000), available at http://www.westlaw.com (same). 
161. The learning costs associated with legal change will be of particular concern for long-
term participants in the affected field. For one-shot or very infrequent players (say, a new business 
in need of a start-up loan) a change in the law is unlikely to impose new learning costs. In con-
trast, a repeat player with established policies and procedures will incur a new round of learning 
costs with each change in the law. Nonetheless, certain changes in the law will advantage active 
repeat players to the extent they are able to spread private adjustment costs over a greater number 
of transactions. See infra note 267 and accompanying text (discussing private adjustment costs for 
frequent participants in a given activity). 
162. For an analysis of the technical transition rules of revised Article 9, see Caroline N. 
Brown, U.C.C. Revised Article 9: The Transition Rules, 79 N.C. L. REV. 993 (2001). See also infra 
notes 357-358 and accompanying text (noting the typically narrow focus of such transition rules). 
163. Some laws in fact require that firms develop monitoring and record-keeping systems to 
ensure that their employees comply with their substantive legal mandates. Alternatively, under 
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illustrate this point. The continuing violations of the law in this field in 
part can be attributed to the failure of affected actors effectively to incur 
this significant, third stage of learning costs for recent legal developments. 164 
All of these learning costs are associated with legal change. The new 
norms may indeed introduce substantive improvements to the law. The 
mere transition between old and new nonetheless may involve potentially 
substantial learning costs for firms and individuals as they become familiar 
with, and give practical effect to, a new legal regime. 
B. Uncertainty Costs 
The costs of uncertainty that arise from legal transitions may appear 
similar to the learning costs just discussed. They are, however, conceptually 
different and ultimately more significant. Learning costs involve deter-
mining the content of a new law, mastering its complexities, sorting out its 
scope. Even after the most detailed and careful analysis, however, numer-
ous questions are likely to remain. No body of law, for example, can plausi-
bly address all matters within its scope, or anticipate all future 
developments in a given field of human activity. 165 These concerns are only 
compounded by questions of norm hierarchy as a body of law grows in com-
plexity and detail. 166 The resulting normative gaps, both open and hid-
some statutory schemes, as interpreted, firms can be subject to liability for failing to create and 
monitor compliance regimes for their employees. For a more detailed examination of this point, 
see infra notes 270-273 and accompanying text. 
164. See, e.g., Romano v. U-Haul lnt'l, 233 F.3d 655, 670 (1st Cir. 2000) (affirming a puni-
tive damages award against an employer for sexual harassment by its employees because it did not 
show that it had "an active mechanism for renewing employees' awareness of the policies through 
either specific education programs or periodic re-dissemination or revision of their written materi-
als," nor that its "supervisors were trained to prevent discrimination from occurring"); Equal 
Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1249 (lOth Cir. 
1999) (upholding a punitive damages award against Wal-Mart based on actions by its employees 
because the evidence revealed "a broad failure" on its part to educate employees and supervisors 
on the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
165. It is a well-recognized phenomenon that, to some degree, every body of legal rules is 
incomplete, for (among other things) lawmakers lack the ability to foresee all issues that may arise 
within the regulated field. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 
GEO. L.J. 319, 333 (1989) ("Every statute is enacted against a congeries of background assump-
tions about law, society, and the operation of the statute itself. These assumptions often turn out 
to be wrong, or insufficiently sophisticated, as circumstances change over time .... "). The pre-
cise degree to which legal norms are inherently indeterminate, however, is highly controversial. 
For an introduction to the literature on the subject, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 
125 (1961), which discusses the two "connected handicaps" of "ignorance of fact" and "indeter-
minacy of aim" in the identification of general standards of conduct, and Jules L. Coleman. & 
Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (1993). 
166. For an elaboration on this point, see infra notes 185-190 and accompanying text. 
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d 167 1 'd bl 1 d f" "168 . en, a most unavot a y eave a greater egree o open texture m new 
legal texts than in established ones. 
In short, even after all that is learnable about a new body of law is 
learned, some level of uncertainty likely will remain. Eventually, an institu-
tion with formal authority to .render final interpretations-typically, though 
by no means always,169 a competent court...,.-can be expected to resolve many 
(perhaps most) disputed issues of law under a new legal regime.170 In the 
interim, however, legal actors will bear the costs of contending with the 
• 171 
new uncertamty. 
Uncertainty costs arise in what might be viewed as both negative and 
positive forms. Negative uncertainty costs, which I will address first below, 
reflect the loss of the accumulated experience with a legal regime over time. 
Positive costs, on the other hand, reflect the uncertainty created by doubts 
over the precise meaning of, and simple lack of familiarity with, a new body 
of law. The two notions obviously are closely related, and indeed may be 
viewed as opposite sides of the same conceptual coin. But as we continue to 
examine the broad variety of legal transition costs, there is a value in pulling 
apart these two aspects of uncertainty and analyzing them separately. 
167. For a discussion of hidden gaps in legislative texts, see Van Alstine, supra note 47, at 
768-75. 
168. HART, supra note 165, at 124-25 (coining the phrase "open texture" to describe the 
indeterminacy in both legislation and judicial precedent). 
169. In our modem administrative state, the interpretive function is also fulfilled by regula-
tory agencies acting within the scope of authority delegated by the legislature. While not binding 
per se, the Supreme Court has made clear that an interpretive decision by a federal administrative 
agency on an issue within its area of expertise is entitled to substantial deference. See Chevron v. 
Nat'! Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). For more on this point, see infra notes 411-
414 and accompanying text, discussing the role of administrative agencies in mitigating legal 
transition costs. In theory, the legislature itself could adopt authoritative interpretations of its 
own statutory provisions as uncertainties emerge over time. For reasons of efficiency and the 
dynamics of group decisionmaking, however, this is rarely done. Interestingly, a French attempt 
in the early 1800s to require that all interpretive decisions be made by a legislative commission 
proved to be a terrible failure. See jOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW I 376-80 
(1968) (discussing the failure of this experiment prescribed by the French Constitution of 1791). 
170. Alternatively, in the case of a private dispute resolution the uncertainty will remain 
until a private adjudicative body (such as an arbitral tribunal) renders a final decision. The 
expenses of resolving legal disputes in this forum also reflect uncertainty costs; but because arbitral 
decisions commonly are not made publicly available, they will not provide future benefits for non-
parties. I explore this point in greater detail below. See infra notes 431-435 and accompanying 
text (discussing the role of public interpretive decisions in mitigating legal transition costs). 
171. Professor Louis Kaplow also addressed uncertainty in his significant work on transition 
policy. The focus of that analysis, however, was not on doubts about the content of law after 
adoption. Rather, it was on uncertainty over prospective changes in governmental policy, and the 
role this form of uncertainty plays in shaping transition compensation policy. See Kaplow, supra 
note 11, at 513 (observing at the outset of his analysis of transition policy that "[t)he central fea-
ture of any transition situation is the existence of uncertainty concerning future government pol-
icy prior to the government action"). 
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1. Negative Uncertainty Costs: The Loss of Accumulated Certainty 
The certainty offered by an express legal provision-whether a posi-
tive law norm or a private form-essentially has two components: drafting 
precision and interpretive gloss. The first of these reflects what might be 
termed the provision's inherent certainty~ 172 As is readily apparent, there is 
likely to be a close relationship between the clarity of a new legal norm and 
the degree of care that is taken in articulating its intended content.173 This 
drafting precision thus delivers a built-in degree of certainty for later inter-
preters and other affected legal actors.174 
What is more significant at this point in the analysis is the role of 
interpretive precedent. Simply stated, legal precedent (in particular a 
common law system) decreases uncertainty. 175 Whenever a competent 
coure
76 issues an interpretive ruling, that precedent reduces in some way the 
uncertainty surrounding the legal provision.177 In so distilling the content 
172. Cf. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, at 725-27 (noting that the "inherent benefits" 
of a network product are those that "flow from its technical qualities alone"); Mark A. Lemley 
& David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 570 
(1998) (discussing the "inherent benefits" of a contract term that flow from "the innate clarity of 
the term" as well as past interpretations). 
173. Lawmakers that take care in drafting legal norms in this way in effect internalize the 
costs of legal change. For more on this point, see infra notes 375-399 and accompanying text, 
which analyzes the available means of mitigating legal transition costs. 
174. As will be discussed in more detail below, however, the creation of a new body of law-
even one designed to improve on a predecessor-carries a new risk of drafting error. See infra 
notes 297-302 and accompanying text. 
175. This point has been made by a variety of prominent scholars in the past. See OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 111-12 (Little, Brown & Co. 1946) (1881); 
William M. Landes & Richard Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. 
& ECON. 249, 271-72 (1976); see also Klausner, supra note 15, at 777 (noting that "scholars 
writing from a variety of perspectives have observed that precedents in general reduce the uncer-
tainty of the legal rule they interpret''). But see D'Amato, supra note 113, at 10 (observing that 
the proliferation of potentially inconsistent precedent on a single issue may actually increase 
uncertainty). 
176. I use this term "competent" here in the jurisprudential sense of a judicial body acting 
on an actual controversy and within its prescribed jurisdiction and scope of authority. 
177. An interpretive decision that marks a substantial deviation from an accepted view on 
the content of a legal norm can also initiate its own phase of legal transition costs. Of particular 
concern in this regard will be controversial, and therefore potentially erroneous, decisions 
by lower courts until the legal issue is definitively resolved by the supreme court in the relevant 
jurisdiction. For a prominent example of this situation, see In re Peregrine, 116 B.R. 194 (C.D. 
Cal. 1990), which held that state law procedures for the perfection of security interests in 
copyright receivables were preempted by the Copyright Act. See also Alice Haemmerli, Insecurity 
Interests: Where Intellectual Property and Commercial Law Collide, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1645, 1652 
(1996) (observing that the field of security interests in copyright law "has been cast into utter 
confusion" by the In re Peregrine case). 
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of the law, the ruling provides guidance to future legal actors in the 
f h . a . 178 arrangement o t etr anatrs. 
Interpretive precedent plays a particularly important role for compre-
hensive bodies of law. Here, repeated judicial examination can fill gaps, 
resolve ambiguities, delineate scope, and in general bring coherence even 
to a large set of detailed and complicated rules. Consider, for example, the 
numerous cases that have interpreted the Bankruptcy Code179 since enact-
ment. Beyond resolving specific interpretive controversies, the cumulative 
effect of these decisions is to create cohesion in a body of law-an over-
arching theme that governs the interaction of its constituent parts. This 
process thus adds value even to provisions that have not yet been subject to 
formal judicial examination. 180 
Legal norms of low inherent certainty181 also are likely to benefit con-
siderably from interpretive gloss. Where a legal norm is ambiguous or oth-
erwise crudely drafted, judicial interpretation may be the only effective 
means of bringing coherence to the law. To illustrate this point, consider 
the Supreme Court's role in clarifying the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). 182 Ambiguous and 
sometimes contradictory liability provisions in the act spawned nearly twenty 
years of confusion in the field. 183 In the face of congressional inaction, the 
178. Karl Llewellyn, the father of the Uniform Commercial Code, recognized this point 
early in the last century: "One interpretation of a doubtful point in court or out gives clear light 
on a thousand further transactions." Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?~An Essay in Per-
spective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 731 (1931). 
179. A search of electronic databases revealed over 46,000 reported opinions on the inter-
pretation or application of the Bankruptcy Code. 
180. In most civil law systems, the interpretive decisions even of supreme courts in theory 
do not have formal precedential effect. Nonetheless, ~ven in such jurisdictions formal decisions 
by supreme courts carry at least a strong persuasive effect for subsequent courts. See Thomas 
Lundmark, Book Review, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 211, 212 (1998) (reviewing INTERPRETING 
PRECEDENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (D. Neil McCormick & RobertS. Summers eds., 1998)) 
(observing that a recent report on a variety of jurisdictions found that "all of the civil law jurisdic-
tions that were studied recognize the binding or persuasive quality of precedents in practice, even 
if not in theory"). 
181. See supra notes 172-174 and accompanying text (discussing the notion of inherent 
certainty). 
182. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
183. See Mary M. MaloneyHuss, CERCLA Operawr Liability: What Is a Parent Corporation w 
Do After United States v. Bestfoods?, 2 DEL. L. REV. 111 (1999) (discussing the Supreme Court's 
clarification of liability issues under CERCLA); Lucia Ann Silecchia, Pinning the Blame & Piercing 
the Veil in the Mists of Metaphor: The Supreme Court's New Standards for the CERCLA Uability of 
Parent Companies and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 115, 173-201 (1998) 
(describing the confusion under CERCLA and proposing legislative action). 
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Supreme Court ultimately intervened with an opinion that resolved a range 
of contentious liability issues under the act. 184 
Interpretive precedent will be of value even for legal provisions of 
seemingly high precision. Most important, judicial review can resolve 
issues of norm hierarchy. Every new legal norm must find its "fit" with 
related regimes and within the legal system's overall hierarchy of norms. The 
common law must yield to contrary statutory provisions, for example, and 
these in tum to the Constitution. Through a process of "testing,"185 judicial 
review can clear away uncertainties not only about the content of a new 
legal provision, but also about its conformity with superior norms. This 
validation process is necessary even for highly specific rules. 186 
Similarly, judicial precedent is necessary to define a new provision's 
scope of effect in interaction with related bodies of law. Here we confront, 
for example, the perennial debates over whether a particular statutory 
scheme was intended to displace or merely to supplement the prior norms 
in the field. 187 Consider as just one illustration the interaction between the 
Uniform Commercial Code and the preexisting common law.188 Even for 
terms of high precision (such as many of the provisions of Article 9), judi-
cial testing is necessary to resolve when specific dictates of the code may (or 
184. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61-73 (1998) (holding that parent com-
panies could be held liable under CERCLA on piercing the corporate veil theories or if they acted 
as a direct operator of a facility that caused a violation). 
185. Goetz & Scott, supra note 105, at 286-87 (coining the term and describing the role of 
the state in testing combinations of express and implied contractual terms for latent defects). 
186. Another illustration of this phenomenon is when a competent court reviews whether a 
state statute or common law norm has been preempted by a federal statute on the basis of the 
Supremacy Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
187. One important aspect of these debates is whether a particular statute should be viewed 
as a true code. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (discussing the true codes common 
in Europe and South America). For a comprehensive examination of this issue, see Mark D. 
Rosen, What Has Happened w the Common Law?-Recent American Codifications, and Their Impact 
on Judicial Practice and the Law's Subsequent Development, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1119, 1199, which 
concludes that legislative enactments in the United States typically have adhered to a "perpetual 
index" model, which organizes and adjusts, but does not preempt, the preexisting legal order 
(often state common law). 
188. There is no small amount of confusion on this issue. See also William D. Hawkland, 
Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291, 299-305 ( 1962) (concluding that 
the UCC is a "true code"); RobertS. Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Section 1-103 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 906, 908--13 (1978) (emphasizing the continuing 
significance of common law principles under the UCC). Compare U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1 (1999) 
(suggesting that the code does not rely on the preexisting common law but rather "provide[s] its 
own machinery for expansion of commercial practices"), and U.C.C. § 1-104 cmt. (1999) 
(asserting that "[t]his Act [is] carefully integrated and intended as a uniform codification of 
permanent character covering an entire 'field' of law"), with U.C.C. § 1-103 (1999) (stating that 
the common law remains in effect unless displaced by the provisions of the code). 
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must) yield to common law notions such as waiver and estoppel189 or, more 
controversially, to pervasive flexible norms such as the obligation of good 
.c . h _J: 190 Ialt penormance. 
Testing also can reveal hidden inconsistencies or latent ambiguities in 
legal text that is otherwise clear on its face. At some level, the normative 
content of every rule of positive law remains in doubt until the ultimate judi-
cial authority in the relevant jurisdiction renders a final interpretive deci-
sion on its meaning and scope.191 The scrutiny occasioned by judicial 
review in this way can uncover depths of meaning in a legal provision or 
recognize implied restrictions not readily apparent from its text. When gaps 
remain, judicial examination can in an appropriate case utilize even highly 
precise provisions to construct conforming extensions by analogy, or 
through a more comprehensive process of inductive reasoning.192 The testing 
of a legal provision may be of even greater value when the response to such 
inquiries is in the negative. Certainty may be enhanced in a particular way 
when a final authority declares that the provision is not ambiguous or oth-
erwise subject to a latent restriction.· 
Indeed, the value of a legal provision in this sense may grow with the 
mere passage of time. The absence of a formal interpretive decision in the 
context of an actual legal dispute may serve as an indicator that the provi-
sion is uncontroversial, and that others have not discovered a latent flaw in 
• • 193 1ts apparent meanmg. 
The sum of these considerations is that the legal certainty provided by 
a given legal norm likely will grow over time. Through successive examina-
tion and clarification, interpretive decisions can be expected to remove 
189. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (stating that, among others, the common law principles of "estop· 
pel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invali-
dating cause" remain in effect unless displaced by "particular provisions" of the code). 
190. For a detailed examination of the controversy over the conceptualization of the con-
tractual duty of good faith, see infra notes 228-230 and accompanying text. 
191. In our system, of course, the final expositor of the meaning of law is the judicial 
branch. This is particularly true for constitutional text, as . the Supreme Court emphatically 
asserted in its recent decision on scope of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. 
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (holding that '"whether particular opera-
tions affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of Congress 
to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled 
finally only by this Court"' (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 
273 (1964) (Black, J., concurring))). 
192. For an examination of such a process in the case of true codes and similar legal texts, 
see Van Alstine, supra note 47, at 733-37. 
193. Cf. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, at 720-21 (observing that "[t]he fact that ... [a 
contract] term has persisted without having caused major problems is indicative of its workability" 
and that "prior users of the term may have noted problems in its formulation and modified the 
term accordingly"). 
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ambiguities, resolve inconsistencies, and otherwise define the contours of 
legal norms after adoption. The cumulative consequence is a progressive 
reduction in the universe of potential disputes over a new legal norm and 
thus a progressive increase in the certainty it affords legal actors contem-
plating future action. 
When, then, a legal system chooses to repeal or replace an established 
legal norm-even one that upon original adoption was uncertain or other-
wise suboptimal-it risks the loss of an important societal investment.194 
The accumulation of interpretive precedent involves substantial private 
litigation and public adjudication costs. 195 Over time, these costs, as we 
have seen, may provide a payoff in the form of increased legal certainty. To 
be sure, new legal norms themselves can enhance the certainty in a legal 
field by expressly resolving contentious issues and otherwise addressing the 
existing legal costs that inhibit socially beneficial activities.196 But without 
careful accommodation (about which more later197 ), undisciplined reform 
may compromise the certainty that has coalesced around the established 
norms in the field/ 98 with the result that the costs of development no longer 
bring benefits for future legal actors. 199 
194. There is an affinity between the costs of creating certainty in a legal field over time and 
the notion of "sunk costs." WILLIAM F. SAMUELSON & STEPHEN G. MARKS, MANAGERIAL 
ECONOMICS 238 (Zd ed. 1995) (describing a sunk cost as one "that has already been incurred and 
cannot be recovered"); David Harbord & Tom Hoehn, Barriers to Entry and Exit in European Com-
petition Policy, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 411, 414 (1994) (describing sunk costs as those costs 
that cannot be recovered upon the cessation of the related activity or even exiting from the 
industry). 
195. See infra notes 330-337 and accompanying text (noting the costs incurred by public 
institutions from private litigation). 
196. . The legal benefits of accumulated certainty of course must be balanced with substan-
tive benefits of legal change, which may include the clarification of unresolved issues in the law. 
As I discuss below, the proper role of the transition 'costs from changing the norm thus is as one 
material input in a reasoned decisionmaking process. See infra notes 369-374 and accompanying 
text. 
197. See infra notes 375-399 and accompanying text (discussing the means by which law-
makers can address the accumulated certainty in a field of law and thus mitigate transition costs of 
legal change in advance). 
198. In the same way, the repeal or replacement of an established body of law also will 
devalue the certainty that arises from the absence of disputes over a longer period of time. See 
supra note 193 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits that flow from the mere passage of 
time). 
199. This point may obtain even if a new legal. norm is designed merely to restate the precise 
substance of the one it replaces. A five-year effort in the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration to simplify the wording of its regulations provides a good illustration. The clearly 
stated goal of this continuing effort is only to reformulate the regulations into "plain English," and 
not to change their substance in any way. One example is an attempt to replace outmoded lan-
guage in a 1971 regulation from "Means of Egress" to "Exit Routes." Although all participants 
in the process have acknowledged that no substantive change is intended, the mere notion of 
rewording the regulation has generated considerable criticism based on the fear that something 
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2. Positive Uncertainty Costs: Contending with New Legal Norms 
The adoption of a new body of law also will impose uncertainty costs 
when viewed ex ante. Beyond the potential loss of accumulated experience 
and knowledge, the adoption of newly articulated legal norms represents a 
new moment for questions of meaning, scope, and effect.200 When, as is now 
commonly the case,201 the source of new norms is a legislature, adoption also 
will initiate a new round of debate about institutional allocations of law-
making authority. Ample illustration for this point can be found in the 
spirited modern debates over the power of federal courts to interpret and 
develop statutory 1aw.202 All things being equal, in other words, new legal 
norms are likely to be more risky than the ones they replace.203 
This new round of potential uncertainty in the law imposes positive 
costs on legal actors in a variety of ways. The first relates to the process of 
planning to accommodate the unclear mandates of the law. Simply stated, 
uncertainty means risk, and risk avoidance involves planning costs. In the 
context of a new legal rule, this risk arises from the broadened realm of 
potential interpretations. Until authoritative interpretive action, legal 
actors must incur the increased expense of planning for, and executing 
schemes to address, the multiple contingencies that fall within the wider 
range of doubt. The consequence in the interim is less accurate and thus 
less efficient decisionmaking. 204 
Just as with all other types of transition costs, examples of this phe-
nomenon abound. To chose just one, consider the confusion created by the 
might be "lost in translation." Cindy Skrzycki, Simplifying Language Gets Complicated, WASH. 
POST, June 5, 2001, at El. 
200. See supra notes 186-190 and accompanying text (examining the interaction of new law 
with superior norms as well as related bodies of law). 
201. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (discussing the growing significance of 
legislative lawmaking). 
202. Compare Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 68 (asserting that the Constitution limits the 
role of federal courts in recognizing the sources of law), and Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of 
Originallntent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 59, 64-65 (1988) (same), 
with Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 24, at 1479-80 (advocating an active 
role of courts in dynamically adjusting statutory law to reflect new societal values), and Eskridge & 
Frickey, supra note 24, at 358-62 (incorporating dynamic considerations into a broader model of 
statutory interpretation). 
203. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 105, at 278 (observing with regard to private contractual 
terms that "[a) new or emerging formulation is risky because it has not been sufficiently tested for 
various types of formulation errors"). With regard to the risks that flow from the potential for 
drafting and interpretive errors, see infra notes 295-329 and accompanying text. 
204. A further consequence of the uncertainty of new legal rules is an increase in the risk of 
erroneous interpretations by private actors. For a discussion of these related "private error costs," 
see infra notes 321-323 and accompanying text. 
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Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RIC0).205 The goal 
of the act may have been laudable. But uncertainties about RICO's precise 
meaning and effect (in particular with respect to civil liability) initiated an 
extended period of increased planning and litigation costs for affected legal 
actors.206 The more risk-averse ones simply may have refrained from poten-
tially covered, but nonetheless legal, activities altogether. 
Closely in parallel with these considerations is a likely increase in the 
cost of legal and other professional advice.207 Uncertainty in a new body of 
law, in particular an innovative or complicated one, may mean a reduction 
in competition from the smaller pool of professionals with sufficient 
resources to develop timely expertise.208 The likely result of the heightened 
uncertainty thus is both a decrease in the quality of professional services 
and an increase in the costs of obtaining competent advice.209 
The new moment of uncertainty also will translate into increased 
negotiation costs. For consensual transactions, uncertainty about the legal 
infrastructure broadens the range of issues in need of private resolution. In 
so doing, a new body of law may introduce friction into the negotiation of 
transactions within its scope. The resultant increase in the costs of private 
ordering will make some socially desirable transactions less efficient and 
deter others altogether.210 
Relatedly, a new legal regime of uncertain content likely will lead to 
increased dispute resolution costs. I have noted above that the accumulation 
205. 18 u.s.c. § 1961 (1994). 
206. See Michael A. DiMedio, A Deterrence Theory Analysis of Corporate RICO Uabiliry for 
"Fraud in the Sale of Securities," 1 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135, 158-59 (1994): 
I d. 
Neither the RICO statute nor its judicial interpretations provide equivalent clarity or 
specificity [to the federal securities laws]. In this respect, uncertainty also imposes costs. 
In many cases, when the outcome is uncertain, a prudent defendant may assume the 
worst and proceed from there. This creates an incentive to avoid risky situations through 
extra investigation and settlement expenditures. 
207. Although uncertainty costs extend beyond the learning costs discussed above, there is a 
relationship between the two. Uncertainty can increase learning costs, as legal professionals must 
expend additional time and effort in an attempt to discern the content of the law. See Maggs, supra 
note 110, at 126 (noting that ambiguous statutes "augment the cost of legal research by increasing 
the number of cases and amount of other material that an attorney must consider to understand 
the law"). 
208. See supra notes 119, 139 and accompanying text (examining the role of legal and other 
professionals in legal learning and in reducing uncertainties in the law). 
209. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 26, at 613 (observing parenthetically that the uncertainty from 
an open-ended legal term will impose "interim additional costs" on transactors from the necessity 
of"acquiring expensive, although only marginally helpful, advice" about potential meanings). 
210. The risks of uncertain new legal rules may discourage transactors from undertaking 
socially desirable transactions in the first place. See infra notes 239-242 and accompanying text 
(analyzing this contention in more detail under the rubric of opportunity costs). 
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of interpretive precedent involves costs, and that these may become a wasted 
investment upon the repeal of the subject body of law.m The introduction 
of a replacement regime begins the process anew. Ambiguous or uncertain 
terms first may increase the universe of potential disputes, and thereby the 
likely incidence of litigation.212 Similarly, because the meaning and effect 
of new norms may be difficult to predict, the new uncertainty may lead to a 
protraction of litigation once filed. Beyond a new round of public litigation 
costs,213 this likely also will mean an increase in the costs of negotiating out-
of-court settlements.214 
Perhaps paradoxically, even the introduction of a body of law designed 
to reduce litigation can impose increased dispute resolution costs. Consider 
as an illustration the unfortunate story surrounding the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995.215 One of the primary goals of the 
PSLRA was to inhibit securities fraud litigation.216 Not long after its adop-
tion, however, Congress was confronted with evidence217 that the actual 
effect of the PSLRA was to foment litigation.218 Congress attempted to 
211. See supra notes 195-199 and accompanying text. 
212. See Lee, supra note 27, at 648-53 (asserting that the stability in the law gained by 
adherence to precedent lowers uncertainty and thereby decreases litigation costs); Macey, supra 
note 117, at 107 (asserting that the stability gained by adherence to precedent lowers uncertainty 
and thus "result[s] in less litigation"); Maggs, supra note 110, at 127 (observing that ambiguity in 
statutory norms "promotes litigation [that] ... consumes attorney's fees and the time of all the 
parties involved"). 
213. See infra notes 329-337 and accompanying text (examining public litigation costs insti-
tutions upon a change in the law). 
214. Cf. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 35, at 265 ("According to the economic analysis of 
the settlement of legal disputes out of court, an increase in the predictability of the outcome of 
litigation ... should reduce the total costs of legal dispute resolution."); Landes & Posner, supra 
note 175, at 272 (observing that "uncertainty will increase the private costs of negotiating out-
of-court settlements of disputes resulting from attempts to apply [an uncertain] statute because the 
outcome of litigation over the meaning of the statute will be difficult to predict"). 
215. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 
Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
216. See Eugene P. Caiola, Comment, Retroactive Legislative History: Scienter Under the Uni-
form Security Utigation Standards Act of 1998, 64 ALB. L. REV. 309, 314-27 (2000) (noting the 
goal of the PSLRA to inhibit securities law litigation). 
217. See JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST & MICHAEL A. PERINO, SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM: 
THE FIRST YEAR'S EXPERIENCE 3 (John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 
140, 1997) (citing statistics suggesting that the PSLRA stimulated state court litigation); Michael 
A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 273, 302-14 (1998) (same). But see Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False 
Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 91-94 
(1998) (arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the PSLRA in fact fomented 
litigation in state courts). 
218. See Caiola, supra note 216, at 328-34 (noting that uncertainty about the meaning of 
new pleading requirements introduced by the PSLRA caused a three-way split among the circuit 
courts). For a review of this split, see Press v. Chemical Investment Services Corp., 166 F.3d 529 
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address this problem with a new statute, the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act (SLUSA) of 1998,219 designed to clarify the PSLRA. Unfor-
tunately, the SLUSA itself has initiated a new round of litigation because of 
uncertainties about its precise effect.220 Notwithstanding the goal to decrease 
litigation, therefore, these repeated changes in the law in fact have imposed 
substantial transitional dispute resolution costs.m 
Uncertainty costs nonetheless will vary with the nature of the new 
legal provision at issue. A narrow, rigid rule defining a specific right or 
obligation-a statutory provision requiring a particular act within a specific 
time, for instance222-in the typical case may raise few transitional con-
cems.223 Because of the relative precision of rigid rules, less is to be gained 
from interpretive precedent over time.224 
(2d Cir. 1999), Bryant v. Avado Braruls, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999), and In re Silicon 
Graphics Inc., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999). 
219. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 
112 Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
220. One of the principal reasons for confusion here relates to cryptic references in the 
SLUSA to a dispute over the amended pleading requirements in the PSLRA. See S. REP. No. 
105-182, at 5-6 (1998) (purporting to add a legislative intent to the PSLRA adopted three years 
earlier); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-803, at 15 (1998) (same); see also 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 767-68 
(including a statement by President Bill Clinton upon signing the SLUSA of his view on the dis-
pute). Although the purported purpose for these legislative references was to clarify the law, their 
actual effect may have been simply to add fuel to the controversy. See Nicole M. Briski, Com-
ment, Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Did Congress 
Eliminate Recklessness, Motive, and Opportunity?, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 155 (2000) (noting the split 
in the circuit courts on the issue and arguing that the Supreme Court should step in to resolve the 
confusion); Christopher J. Hardy, Comment, The PSLRA's Heightened Pleading Standard: Does 
Severe Recklessness Constitute Scienter?, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 565 (2001) (discussing the same confu-
sion and arguing in favor of one particular circuit court view). 
221. As we will see in more detail below, the essential question here is whether the desired 
long-term decrease in litigation costs ultimately will outweigh the increase in transitional dispute 
resolution costs. See infra notes 369-374 and accompanying text. 
222. Rules of procedure provide a good example. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A) 
(requiring an answer within twenty days of the service of the complaint); FED. R. APP. P. 
4(a)(l )(A) (stating the general rule that a notice of appeal must be filed with the distrigt court 
clerk within thirty days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered). 
223. But even here, uncertainty costs may result from questions of validity and norm hierar-
chy. See supra notes 185-190 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertainty that may exist 
even for clear and narrowly tailored rules). 
224. Crafting a norm as an inflexible rule instead tends to impose costs ex ante. That is, 
legal rules require lawmakers to bear the full cost of careful formulation and well as of negotiation 
and compromise at the time of drafting. To the extent that drafters refuse to internalize these 
costs, they in effect impose them on subsequent interpreters and other affected legal actors 
(whether public or private). In the legislative realm, this accounts at least in part for the substan-
tial increase in attention by legal scholars and courts to issues of statutory interpretation. See 
supra note 24 (providing an introduction to the contentious literature on statutory 
interpretation). For an analysis of the value of careful drafting in mitigating the costs of legal 
transitions, see infra notes 380-382 and accompanying text. 
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In contrast, a new, open-ended standard of indefinite scope and content 
may leave substantial postadoption uncertainty .225 Legal norms in this form 
take on functional content only through progressive judicial interpretation 
and application in a variety of factual contexts over time.226 Upon adop-
tion, therefore, legal actors will lack guidance on the content of the law, 
and thus on how to arrange their affairs efficiently ex ante and to resolve 
interpretive disputes ex post.227 This is the heart of uncertainty costs. 
Take, for example, the pervasive legal obligation of good faith in the 
assertion of rights and the performance of duties.228 Although the notion 
began to take hold in this country in the middle of the last century, 229 even 
225. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, at 724 (noting that judicial precedent is a form 
of "learning benefit" for contract terms and arguing that for terms structured as standards "the 
accumulation of judicial precedent would tend to be a major source of learning benefits"); Kaplow, 
supra note 26, at 577 (observing that, as compared to narrow rules, standards tend to increase ex 
post enforcement costs). 
226. The formulation of legal norms as general standards rather than precise rules may occur 
either by design or as a result of the inability or unwillingness of lawmakers to make the necessary 
policy choices. See Maggs, supra note 110, at 132-33 (noting that in order to avoid controversy 
"lawmakers may choose to leave key issues unresolved in hopes that the judiciary will supply an 
answer and absorb the political consequences"). Some commentators have also argued that a 
preference for status quo reinforcing open-ended standards may result from the simple organizational 
structure of a lawmaking institution. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 8, at 598-99 (arguing that 
the structure and composition of the private bodies involved in drafting uniform law will lead to 
excessive reliance on open-ended standards that merely confirm the· status quo, except when 
concentrated interest groups are able to obtain targeted rules favorable to their interests). 
227. See Kaplow, supra note 26, at 611 (noting that "[t]o the extent laws are promulgated as 
standards, predictabiliry will be enhanced by precedent to the extent precedent transforms stan-
dards into rules"). 
228. A host of statutory regimes impose an obligation of good faith (or prohibit bad faith) 
for conduct within their scope. For a very recent example, see the Anticybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act, which creates a cause of action to challenge bad faith registrations of Internet 
domain names. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (Supp. V 1999). Indeed, there is a burning controversy 
over whether a duty of good faith inheres in all statutory rights and obligations. Consider, for 
example, the debate over whether there is an inherent duty of good faith under the Bankruptcy 
Code (which contains no such express duty). See In re Khan, 35 B.R. 718 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 
1984) (finding an implied good faith requirement in Chapter 7). But see Katie Thein Kimlinger 
& William P. Wassweiler, The Good Faith Fable of II U.S.C. §707(a): How Bankruptcy Courts 
Have Invented a Good Faith FiUng Requirementfor Chapter 7 Debtors, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 61 (1996) 
(sharply criticizing the courts for creating such a requirement when Congress deliberately 
refrained from incorporating one in the code). 
229. For a detailed examination of the early history of the duty of good faith, see STEVEN J. 
BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH: PERFORMANCE, BREACH, 
ENFORCEMENT 212-34 (1995). The common law of nearly every state imposes an obligation 
of good faith in contract, as does the Uniform Commercial Code. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-203 (1999) 
(imposing a general obligation of good faith for all transactions within the scope of the UCC); see 
also Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed Standards for Evaluating When the Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing Has Been Violated: A Framework for Resolving the Mystery, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 585, 585 n.1 (1996) (citing state courts that have expressly recognized a duty 
of good faith in contract). 
HeinOnline -- 49 UCLA L. Rev. 834 2001-2002
834 49 UCLA LAW REVIEW 789 (2002) 
now considerable controversy remains over its conceptualization.230 There 
are substantial reasons for preferring such flexible standards in many cir-
cumstances as the most effective means of legal development.231 But without 
careful accommodation, the introduction of a legal norm in this form is 
likely to impose increased planning, dispute resolution, and related uncer-
tainty costs for legal transactions within its scope. 
Another effect of the uncertainty spawned by legal change is an 
increase the likelihood of a form of opportunism. Broadly, opportunism 
may be viewed as bad faith exploitation of uncertainty. 232 As unpredict-
ability in the law grows, so too will the latitude for dubious claims masked 
as legitimate argumentation.233 Specious or otherwise bad faith assertions 
can be detected and punished. The costs of doing so through litigation, 
however, are substantial, particularly in this country;234 and there is the low 
probability of formal sanction in any event.235 Until definitive judicial 
interpretation, therefore, the introduction of a new legal regime will 
230. For the leading views on the subject, see Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the 
Common Law Duty w Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980), Patterson, supra note 
91, and RobertS. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 
67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982). See also Van Alstine, supra note 91, at 1247-57 (describing the 
controversy). 
231. Ensuring situational fairness or a recognition of a need for the gradual evolution of a 
uniform foundation for multi jurisdictional transactions, for example, may militate in favor of creating 
a general framework and leaving the law to a causistic application and development by courts over 
time. See also infra notes 387-392 and accompanying text (examining the role of transition cost 
analysis in choosing between rules and standards). 
232. The notion of opportunism is most commonly discussed in contract law. See Timothy 
J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 521-22 (1981) 
(defining opportunism in contract law as a situation in which one party "behaves contrary to the 
other party's understanding of their contract, but not necessarily contrary to the agreement's 
explicit terms, leading to a transfer of wealth from the other party"); see also Charles J. Goetz 
& Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1139 n.l18 (1981) 
(discussing opportunism in contract). For broader examinations of opportunism from a law and 
economics perspective, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 103 (5th ed. 
1998), which discusses opportunism, and OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 47 (1985), 
which defines opportunism as "self interest seeking with guile." 
233. Cf. Muris, supra note 232, at 525 (discussing "subtle opportunism" in contract and 
noting that, because it is difficult to detect and is "easily masked as legitimate conduct, [it 
is) ... discoverable only at a high cost"). 
234. I say "particularly" here because of the American rule on attorneys fees, Under this 
rule-which is contrary to the approach of most legal systems-even successful litigants must bear 
their own litigation costs. 
235. Rule 11 sanctions for bad faith assertion of legal claims are rare. Indeed, in 1993, Rule 
11 was amended to limit the circumstances in which a court may sanction a party (and her law-
yers). See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (amended Dec. 1, 1993). 
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increase the likelihood of opportunistic argumentation at the margins of the 
l 236 aw. 
Finally, in our increasingly complex legal landscape uncertainty may 
arise from the simple potential for legal transitions. We have seen above 
that the increase in the sources of legal norms has led to an acceleration of 
law itself.237 A potential consequence is a decrease in the long-term stabil-
ity of any particular legal solution, and thus a likely increase in the overall 
costs that flow from uncertainty in the law.238 
C. Uncertainty and Opportunity Costs 
Legal transitions also may impose uncertainty costs in a more subtle 
form: By decreasing guidance on the content of the law, the introduction of 
new legal norms may deter activities a legal system would want to encour-
age. The net result is a form of opportunity cost,239 because affected legal 
actors are unwilling to bear the increased risks that accompany the 
increased uncertainty in the law. 
Such opportunity costs may arise in one of two separate but related 
situations. The first is a new legal regime designed to facilitate a particular 
type of transaction or activity, but that does so with insufficient clarity. If for 
instance a new legal norm only crudely defines rights or obligations, 
affected legal actors rationally may choose not to engage in transactions in 
that field of law. As the uncertainty moves up the scale of transactors' risk 
tolerance, therefore, it will work to deter even legal activity that may be 
beneficial to them, and thus to society as a whole.240 
236. There are also nonlegal disincentives to bad faith conduct. See, e.g., Charny, supra 
note 83, at 392-97 (discussing the social, relational, and other nonlegal sanctions for bad faith 
actions). The role of social norms in regulating private behavior has become a hotly debated sub-
ject in recent legal scholarship. For an introduction into the legal literature on social norms, see 
ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000), Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social 
Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996), and Symposium, Law, Economics, & Norms, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1643 (1996). 
23 7. See supra notes 39-65 and accompanying text. 
238. See McKinnon, supra note 131 (quoting a tax lawyer as observing that because of the 
likelihood of repeated changes in the tax code in the future legislators have "create[d) a sense of 
uncertainty which is very difficult for people and a tremendous trap for the unwary"). 
239. See Klausner, supra note 15, at 777 (asserting that the costs that flow from uncertainty 
in the parallel case of private contract terms include "the opportunity cost of not taking actions 
that would enhance firm value but that nonetheless entail a risk of violating the term"); see also 
POSNER, supra note 232, at 6 (defining opportunity cost as "[t)he benefit foregone by employing a 
resource in a way that denies its use to someone else" and noting for purposes of example that "the 
major cost of higher education is the foregone earnings that the student would make if he were 
working rather than attending school"). 
240. See Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 299 (1986) (observing that uncertainty in the law may lead to excessive 
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A second instance of opportunity costs in this sense occurs when the 
state too coarsely identifies the activities it intends to deter. As Justice 
Thurgood Marshall long ago observed in connection with the constitutional 
void-for-vagueness doctrine: "Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens 
to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' ... than if the boundaries of the 
forbidden areas were clearly marked."241 This is particularly so if the sanc-
tions for violation are serious, such as in criminal law, or if the risk of 
exemplary damages is great. Here, the sanctions alone tend to cause 
excessive risk aversion, an effect only exacerbated by uncertainty in the 
definition of the prohibited activity in the first place.242 The result is that 
potentitally affected actors will avoid questionable, but nonethless legal, 
activity entirely. 
Because it is likely to increase uncertainty, legal change will carry a 
heightened risk of such opportunity costs. The net result is a loss to society 
as a whole from the unwillingness. of transactors to engage in or fully exploit 
beneficial, legal activity, even when the very purpose of new legal norms is 
to improve the legal environment for that activity. 
D. Private Adjustment Costs 
Even in our highly regulated modern legal world, the norms of positive 
law, of necessity, play only a limited role in the details of human affairs. 
This is so because the breadth and diversity of human activity preclude 
risk-aversion and thus to a loss of possible gains); D'Amato, supra note 113, at 5 ("[U]ncertain law 
may deter activity that the state wants to encourage. If rules relating to sales, commercial paper, 
negotiable instruments, deeds, wills, and the like approach ... complete uncertainty, the 
underlying commercial activities will be deterred if not stifled."); Walt, supra note 149, at 698-
705 (suggesting that excessive novelty in new international sales law may lead transactors to opt 
out of its application and thus compromise the law's goal of fostering international uniformity). 
241. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 
377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958))) (ellipsis in 
original). 
242. One cited example in this vein is the possibility of criminal liability for banks under 
the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5322 (1994). As one author has noted, the risk of such 
a sanction may lead banks to avoid doing business even with some legitimate operations. See John 
K. Villa, A Critical View of Bank Secrecy Act Enforcement and the Money Laundering Statutes, 3 7 
CATH. U. L. REV. 489,507 (1988). John Villa observes that because of uncertainty in the liabil-
ity provisions of the act, 
I d. 
financial institutions that attempt good faith compliance ... will inevitably err on both 
sides: those that construe the statute too narrowly will become the target of grand jury 
investigations and possibly prosecuted, while those who construe it too broadly will be 
sued by customers with whom they unjustifiably refuse to do business. 
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lawmakers from addressing all issues in any particular field of law.243 
Moreover, pragmatic considerations most often mandate that the details of 
compliance-the precise manner in which· firms and individuals ensure 
their activities remain within the confines of the law-be left to the legal 
actors themselves.244 
As a result, nearly all areas of the law remain subject to a complex 
interaction between legal norms laid down by the state and private norms 
designed to supplement, implement, and (when allowed) adjust the positive 
law. Seen another way, beyond the patent function of defining express 
norms of conduct,245 positive law also fulfills a broader role of facilitating the 
creation of private conventions in the interstices of the law.246 
When, then, the state decides to change the law, transition costs will 
arise from the effect on the private conventions established within the 
framework of the old legal order. These private order costs can be distilled 
into two main categories: The first, which I discuss immediately below, is 
what might be termed intraparty transition costs. Broadly, these arise from 
the need to review and adjust internal forms and practices in response to a 
change in the law. The second category relates to the validity and meaning 
of interparty practices:247 the costs that flow from the impact on contractual 
and other conventions developed between private parties to regulate their 
interaction. 
1. Intraparty Adjustment Costs 
a. Private Drafting Costs 
We have noted above that one of the benefits of stability in the law is 
that it encourages legal actors to create efficient standardized conventions 
to regulate their affairs within the confines of the law.248 Indeed, almost any 
243. In addition, as noted in greater detail below, the common infirmities of vagueness, 
ambiguity, and lack of foresight will leave some degree of indeterminacy even in express rules of law. 
See infra notes 297-302 and accompanying text. These likewise will necessitate the development 
of private norms to fill the gaps in the regulatory scheme of any particular body of law. 
244. The evolved administrative state has filled some of the void through delegations of 
lawmaking authority to ministerial actors. For examples of such delegations of implementing 
authority, see supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
245. These norms may be either mandatory or "default" norms. For an examination of the 
impact of transition costs even for default rules, see supra notes 103-109 and accompanying text. 
246. This observation is particularly apt for the United States, where the basic premise of 
the federal constitution is one of a limited government. As a result, the operative principle is that 
private action is permissible unless and until prohibited by affirmative governmental action 
(including through the recognition of private liability). 
247. See infra Part 11.0.2. 
248. See supra notes 123-124 and accompanying text. 
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body of law designed to govern continuing activity will stimulate the devel-
opment of a number of internal forms (employment policies, instruc-
tion manuals, and the like), many of which are highly firm-specific, if not 
proprietary. 
Such intrafirm standardization carries a variety of advantages.249 First, 
the distillation of accumulated experience into a permanent form creates 
learning benefits.250 These flow from the ability to dispense with de novo 
development of contracts and similar forms for subsequent transactions as 
well as de novo training of firm employees. Standardization thus reduces the 
per transaction cost of repeat activities by freeing transactors from the 
resource costs of crafting individualized terms for each new transaction.251 
Similarly, standardization permits retention of progressive improve-
ments from review and testing over time. As a reflection of accumulated 
wisdom and experience, it also should be less subject to formulation and 
interpretation error.252 Finally, standardization may create intrafirm effi-
ciencies in interaction with third-party professionals. Repeat use of a stan-
dard form can enhance its familiarity among legal and other advisors, which 
in tum will reduce the cost and improve the quality of their advice.253 All 
things being equal, therefore, a well-established private form is likely to be 
more efficient than a new one. 
The development of private conventions, however, involves costs. In 
addition to the resources for initial formulation, there will be opportunity 
costs associated with the engagement of firm agents. Not unlike the norms 
of positive law, the internal assimilation of a convention also will involve 
learning and uncertainty costs.254 And transaction costs will arise from pro-
gressive refinements over time. 
A decision to replace an established convention, therefore, may initi-
ate a new round of such costs. To illustrate this point, consider the com-
monplace, nonlegal illustration of a change from one word processing 
249. These benefits are not limited to multiperson firms. Individuals also can secure effi-
ciencies for repeat activities through a distillation of past experience in the form of routines and 
habits. 
250. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, at 725-26 (discussing the "network benefits" 
that arise from the use of standardized terms); Klausner, supra note 15, at 78~9 (same). 
251. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 105, at 28~7 (arguing that the use of standardized con-
tract terms "greatly simplifies and reduces the cost of contracting"). 
252. Cf. id.; Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, at 720-21 (arguing that the use of standard-
ized industry contract terms will reduce the cost of formulation errors). 
253. These benefits of familiarity by external advisors with established private forms parallel 
those of familiarity of legal practitioners with an established body of law. See supra notes 144-146 
and accompanying text (discussing the learning benefits of stability in the law). 
254. See supra Part II.A (analyzing the learning costs of new law), II.B (examining the 
uncertainty costs of new law). 
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program to another (from, say, WordPerfect to Word because of a change in 
firm policy). Here, the loss of the accumulated knowledge of firm agents 
will require retraining, including through expertise purchased from external 
consultants. Moreover, the net loss of experience will decrease efficiencies 
in the interaction among firm employees,255 and in their ability to transfer 
those efficiencies to new staff.256 Firm-specific refinements to the old pro-
gram as well as the established interfaces with other firm practices likewise 
may be compromised. Finally, the lack of familiarity with the new program 
will enhance the costs of internal and external quality control, as well as 
the likelihood of error in future transactions. 257 
In a similar way, intraparty adjustment costs will result from a repeal or 
replacement of the legal environment in which a private convention was 
developed.258 A change in the law will first require private actors to reexamine 
their existing forms to address new legal opportunities and risks. Necessary 
adjustments then will carry the cost of formulation and implementation. 
The replacement of an established private formulation also may 
compromise the accumulated learning and related benefits of standard-
ization, and increase the likelihood of interpretive error by firm agents in 
the future. 259 
Consider, as a brief example, the changes to the contract formation 
rules initiated by the original adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code.260 
Although not mandatory, these changes imposed upon transactors the costs 
255. Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner aptly refer to these efficiencies as "internal net-
work benefits." See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, at 727-28 (analyzing private decisions to 
replace established contract terms). 
256. See id. (observing that a decision to replace a standardized contract term will result in 
the loss of such internal learning and network benefits). 
257. Cf. id. (illustrating intrafirm switching costs with the example of a change from an 
IBM personal computer to a Macintosh). 
258. Cf. id. (discussing the switching costs that arise when parties change standardized con-
tract terms); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
63, 86 (1989) (discussing the "adjustment costs" that affected parties must incur to "adapt their 
behavior" to a change in tort law). For a discussion of switching costs in product markets, see 
supra note 13, which cites economics literature on private switching costs. 
259. Though analogous, these intraparty adjustment costs are different in kind from the 
broader learning costs discussed separately above. At issue with private forms is not the cost of 
learning the content of new law; rather, it is the cost of reviewing and adjusting those forms to 
address the changes in the law, as well as the loss in efficiency that results from doing so. 
260. One prominent example of the changes initiated by the Uniform Commercial Code 
was section 2-207. That section introduced complicated revisions to the common law rules gov-
erning contract formation through the exchange of standardized forms. See U.C.C. § 2-207 
(2001). For an introduction to the contentious debates over this provision, see Douglas G. Baird 
& Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards and the Battle of the Farms: A Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. 
L. REV. 1217 (1982}, and John E. Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the "Battle of the Farms": Solutions, 39 
VAND. L. REV. 1307 (1986). See also infra notes 313-319 and accompanying text (discussing 
other problems with the interpretation of section 2-207). 
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of reviewing and redrafting existing contract forms to adjust to the new 
risks. Years of trial and error in the courts also resulted in new requirements 
for transactors desiring certain protections in the formation process.261 The 
result was additional rounds of review and adjustment costs, some of which 
are still being incurred nearly forty years after the initial adoption of the 
code.262 
b. Private Administrative Costs 
Private adjustment costs also will arise from required changes to intra-
firm administrative practices and procedures. Particularly in large or decen-
tralized firms, such formalized practices (working in tandem with 
standardized forms) secure compliance with the law as well as uniform imple-
mentation of firm policy. They are utilized, for example, by managers to 
ensure proper dissemination of legally relevant information;263 by corporate 
compliance officers to secure adherence to regulatory requirements; by 
human resource directors to ensure uniform investigation of employee com-
plaints; and by purchasing and sales managers to control the creation 
of contractual obligations.264 The regularization of such practices can bring 
efficiencies that parallel those for standardized forms (learning benefits, 
d . . d ) 265 re uctlon m error costs, an so on . 
Like standardized forms, then, a change in the legal infrastructure can 
impose private adjustment costs through its effect on established adminis-
trative methods and practices. Upon a change in applicable legal norms, 
private actors will be required to reexamine their implementation regimes 
261. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 102 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding 
that a conditional acceptance can be manifested merely in a party's conduct); Dorton v. Collins 
& Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1168 (6th Cir. 1972) (holding on the same issue that an accep-
tance that is "subject to" additional terms was not sufficient to preclude contract formation); 
Constr. Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1968) (holding that 
under U.C.C. § 2-207 an offeree need merely indicate that its acceptance is based on additional 
terms in order to preclude contract formation); Rota-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 
497 (1st Cir. 1962) (holding that under U.C.C. § 2-207 any new material terms transform a pur-
ported acceptance into a rejection and counteroffer). 
262. It is interesting to note that the UCC drafting bodies are now busily at work redrafting 
UCC Article 2, which will initiate a new round of such private adjustment costs. For the most 
recent draft of the revision, see Drafts of Uniform aru.l Model Acts, at http://www.law.upenn.edu/ 
611/ulc/ulc.htm (last modified Oct. 4, 2001). 
263. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-201(27) (1999) (making any notice to an organization effective 
unless it has systems in place that ensure communication of information to relevant officers in a 
timely manner). 
264. Administrative contracting practices give practical value to standardized contract 
documents. Standard business terms, however carefully crafted, are of little value if agents do not 
take care that they are employed in conformity with the firm's contract formation policies. 
265. See supra notes 250-253 and accompanying text. 
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for conformity with the new law. When necessary, adjustments will have to 
be made, with the attendant costs of creation and implementation. In some 
cases, a change in the law will cause affected legal actors to create entirely 
new administrative structures to secure the advantages and avoid the nega-
tive consequences of the new legal regime.266 And, significantly, these pri-
vate adjustment costs may not fall equally on all affected actors.267 
Although in different degrees, nearly every change in the law will 
involve private adjustment costs of this kind. To name just one example, 
consider once again the recently adopted revision ofUCC Article 9.268 The 
numerous changes to the law governing secured credit initiated by this new 
body of law will require that lenders and credit seekers review and revise 
their internal forms and business practices to accommodate the new risks 
d . . 269 an opportunltles. 
It is important to emphasize, finally, that these administrative adjust-
ment costs-like all of the other legal transition costs under discussion 
here-are different in kind from substantive compliance costs. Many legal 
regimes affirmatively require the creation of private administrative practices. 
Take, for example, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).270 This act 
establishes (among other things271 ) criminal liability for failure to devise and 
maintain "a system of internal accounting controls" for certain foreign 
activities.272 In contrast to the transitional adjustment costs just discussed, 
266. Administrative adjustment costs parallel, but are different from, the "third order of 
learning costs" discussed above. See supra notes 163-164 and accompanying text. The latter 
refers to the costs of disseminating knowledge of the law to lower-level firm employees. Adminis-
trative adjustment costs, in contrast, involve the initial expense of developing and implementing 
firm practices to ensure compliance with legal mandates and firm policy on a continuing basis. 
267. Some changes in the law may bestow a competitive advantage on frequent players who 
are able to spread their adjustment costs over a greater number of transactions. See Larry T. 
Garvin, The Changed (and Changing?) Uniform Commercial Code, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 285, 343 
( 1999) (noting that the adoption of revised UCC Article 9 may disadvantage "[s]mall banks and 
relatively infrequent credit users" because "[j]ust like their more active competitors, they will have 
to change their forms and, in a good many instances, their methods of doing business, but they 
will have fewer transactions over which to spread their costs"). · 
268. See supra notes 156-160 and accompanying text (discussing the potential uncertainty 
costs of revised Article 9). 
269. See Garvin, supra note 267, at 343 (noting the need of lenders and credit users to 
change their forms and business methods in response to revised Article 9). 
270. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) 
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
271. Substantively, the FCPA prohibits payments by certain domestic and international 
entities made with the purpose of improperly influencing foreign governmental officials. See 
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2000) (governing issuers under the federal securities laws); § 78dd-2 (2000) 
(governing certain other "domestic concerns" subject to the federal securities laws); § 78dd-3 
(2000) (governing other entities while in the territory of the United States). 
272. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2000) (mandating that entities subject to the federal securities 
laws establish such internal accounting controls); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (5) (2000) (creating 
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these private accounting controls are part of the direct compliance costs 
contemplated by this act.273 
2. Impact on Accrued Private Networks 
One of the principal benefits of stability in the law governing consen-
sual transactions is that it facilitates the creation of networks of interparty 
l £ 1 . 274 s· .1 . £ 275 h k contractua 10rmu auons. 1m1 ar to mtraparty rorms, t ese networ s 
develop from the need to resolve issues left unsettled in the express provi-
. f . . l 276 stons o posmve aw. 
As Professors Charles Goetz and Robert Scott have observed, private 
contract terms (like state-supplied default rules277 ) are likely to grow in value 
as they become accepted across a particular transaction type.278 Once estab-
lished in this way, standardized formulations serve as a stable, and thus more 
accurate, medium of communication between transactors.279 By gradually 
criminal liability for any such entity that "knowingly fail[s] to implement a system of internal 
accounting controls"). Similar administrative adjustments costs can result from legal transitions 
initiated by judicial action. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648-49 
(1999) (holding that school districts can be held liable under Title IX for "deliberate indifference" 
to student-on-student sexual harassment if they do not respond to known peer harassment 
in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-
08 ( 1998) (holding that an employer has an affirmative defense to liability under Title VII for acts 
of its employees if it can prove that it "exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly 
any sexually harassing behavior, and ... that plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid 
harm otherwise"). 
273. Nonetheless, even in such cases private adjustment costs may arise from any subsequent 
legal change. For example, Congress has already amended the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
on two separate occasions. See Title V-Foreign Corrupt Practices Amendments, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, §§ 5001-5003, 102 Stat. 1415 (1988); Act of Nov. 10, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 
3302. The effect in each \=ase was a new round of adjustment costs arising from the need to review 
and revise existing practices to adjust to the new legal environment. 
274. See supra note 124 and accompanying text; see aho Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, at 
763-64 (noting that through their creation of mandatory and default corporate law rules, "[s]tate 
legislatures and judiciaries ... implicitly perform the function of standard-setting organizations"); 
Klausner, supra note 15, at 837 (observing that "[l]egislatures, in enacting corporate law, and 
courts, in deciding corporate law cases, in effect serve as standard-setters and hence as facilita-
tors ... of contractual networks"). 
275. See supra notes 245-248 and accompanying text. 
276. Most provisions of law governing consensual transactions are in the form of default 
rules subject to change by the parties. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (2001) (stating that "[t]he 
effect of provisions of [the UCC] may be varied by agreement"). 
2 77. See supra notes 1 7 5-194 and accompanying text (discussing how the certainty in an 
existing body of law is likely to increase over time). 
278. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 105, at 286-87 (advancing this point and referring to 
standardized terms as "preformulations"). 
279. Professors Goetz and Scott refer to this as the "labeling function" of standardized terms. 
Id. at 287. 
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increasing the number of mature contract terms, the process of stan-
dardization also can broaden the pallet of reliable options; this permits 
transactors to choose secure formulations that are more carefully tailored to 
their specific needs.280 
Moreover, and more important, standardized contract terms can offer 
the benefit of formal judicial interpretation. As acceptance of a particular 
term across a group of transactors grows, so too does the likelihood of judicial 
interpretation.281 Once blessed with an officially recognized meaning in this 
way, an established private formulation offers greatly enhanced reliability 
(and thus decreased risk).282 Over time and in a stable legal environment, 
then, private actors (especially repeat players) are increasingly likely to 
develop networks of efficient contractual formulations whose meanings are 
protected by official endorsement. 283 
Just as a stable legal environment can facilitate the evolution of pri-
vate contractual networks, however, a change in the background legal regime 
can compromise them.284 Most plainly, the creation of new mandatory law 
(so-called "immutable rules"285 ) will displace contrary contractual terms. 
280. See id. at 287-88 (arguing that standardization "provides private parties with more 'off-
the-rack' choices and thus offers a 'better fit' for those predisposed to purchase a standard cut and 
size"). 
281. This means that each new user of a widely accepted term in effect confers a benefit on 
other users. Similar to a video game system (say, the Sony PlayStation), the value of a panicular 
contractual formulation will grow with each new user. This is so because an increase in the number 
of users enhances both the likelihood and effectiveness of interaction with others, and therefore 
the value to each individual user. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, at 733-35 (suggesting 
that new adopters of standardized contract terms confer positive network externalities on existing 
users); see also Klausner, supra note 15, at 798-805 (discussing the notion of network externalities 
in greater detail). Later adopters of contractual formulations also confer a benefit on existing 
users by increasing the likelihood of judicial interpretation. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, 
at 729 (arguing that increased adoption of a particular term confers positive learning and network 
externalities on existing users). 
282. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 105, at 288 (referring to the benefits of official "recogni-
tion," and concluding that "[c)ontract interpretation ... serves to determine and announce rela-
tively reliable definitions of contractual formulations that are protected by official acceptance"). 
283. As a result, an official judicial interpretation of even a privately generated contractual 
term creates a "public good." See supra notes 141-143 and accompanying text (discussing the 
notion of a public good and observing that judicial opinions creates public goods with regard to 
the learning costs of law); see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 105, at 286 (arguing that "[t)he state's 
recognition of the evolutionary trial and enor process" for the creation of standardized contract 
terms "functions as a regulatory scheme designed to promote these 'public goods"'). 
284. In this respect, the loss of private contractual networks closely parallels the learning 
and uncertainty costs discussed above. Like those forms of general transition costs, the replace-
ment of an established body of background law will impose costs from the uncertainty about the 
continued validity and effect of old private fo~mulations and from the necessiry to develop and 
learn about the content of new ones. 
285. Ayers & Gertner, supra note 103, at 87 (describing immutable rules as ones that "can-
not be contracted around; they govern even if the parties attempt to contract around them"). 
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But even changes to default rules-those that are subject to disposition by 
the parties-may upset established private formulations. In a default legal 
regime, the challenge for interpreters is to determine which private terms 
are intended to supplant and which merely to supplement the state-supplied 
background rules.286 By sanctioning specific invocations over time, the 
process of official recognition permits transactors to signal their intent with 
increasing precision. A change to the content of default rules, then, can 
upset the careful balance of interactions developed within the framework of 
the prior legal order. 
The net effect of this impairment of established contractual networks 
is the imposition of private adjustment costs. First, like intraparty forms, 
the initial development of interparty formulations involves significant 
internal transaction costs.287 These include the resource costs of time, 
effort, and the like expended in developing, testing, and revising a stan-
dardized term.288 In addition, there will be learning costs associated with 
accumulating and disseminating knowledge about the term's intended 
• 289 
meanmg. 
Moreover, because final control over interpretation and enforcement 
·a · h h 290 h · a 1 · k 291 rest es wtt t e state, t ere are senous exogenous eve opment ns s. 
286. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 105, at 281 (describing as "trumps" those contractual 
signals that are designed to displace default contractual terms). 
287. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, at 727-28 (noting the loss of internal learning 
benefits and related costs that arise from switching from an established contractual term to a new 
one); see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 105, at 2 7 6-7 8 (noting that "the process of contractual 
formulation is subject to inherent endogenous hazards that emerge and undergo correction only 
over time"). , 
288. In some cases, the costs of developing standardized formulations are borne by industry 
associations and other standard-setting organizations. Examples include the Corporate Trust 
Indenture Project of the American Bar Foundation and the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles of the Financial Accounting Standards Board. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, at 
761-63 (citing these examples and discussing their role as standard-setting organizations). In the 
international arena, prominent examples include the International Commercial Terms 
(INCOTERMS) and the Uniform Customs & Practices for Documentary Credits (UCP) promul-
gated by the International Chamber of Commerce. See also infra note 380 (describing the role of 
standard-setting organizations in internalizing the costs of developing private formulations). 
289. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 105, at 265 (describing the standard "transaction costs" 
of formulating contractual terms as "those resource-oriented costs of time, effort, and expertise 
expended in the negotiation and drafting of agreements"); cf. Debra R. Cohen, West Virginia Cor-
porate Law: Is It "Broke"?, 100 W.VA. L. REV. 5, 24 (1997) (discussing the savings in transaction 
costs associated with adopting a pretested model law). 
290. An apparent exception to this rule occurs with private arbitration. Nonetheless, even 
in this case final control over the interpretation and enforcement of privately generated contract 
terms rests with third parties, namely, the independent arbitrators. 
291. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, at 720 ("A newly customized contract 
term ... may often entail relatively high error costs."); see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 105, at 
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These flow from the fact that the precise effect of innovative terms will 
remain unclear-and latent errors undetected-until formal judicial inter-
pretation.292 In the interim, therefore, innovators of contract terms will 
bear the costs of the uncertainty.293 
Each transition in a background legal regime risks the reimposition of 
these costs. Without careful accommodation,294 private parties may lose the 
accrued benefits of established private networks, and thus be forced to incur 
again the development costs for new ones. Moreover, the replacement of a 
settled regime may recreate the environment of risk associated with gener-
ating new private formulations in the first place. Each change in the law 
thus risks reinitiating the long period needed for private networks to perco-
late and evolve, with all of the attendant planning, negotiation, and dispute 
resolution costs of establishing secure private formulations. 
E. Error Costs 
Legal transitions also may occasion an increase in error costs. Broadly, 
these costs arise from imperfections in the articulation, or inaccuracies in 
application, of the law.295 Just as the adoption of new legal norms may create 
a new moment for uncertainty about their meaning and effect,296 it may initi-
ate a new cycle for potential error in their formulation and interpretation. 
A first form of error costs arises at the point of production.297 Law-
makers are neither omniscient nor perfectly prescient,298 and language itself 
278 (discussing the risks of innovation in private contractual terms that flow from the absence of 
prior testing by courts "for various types of formulation errors"). 
292. See supra notes 185-192 and accompanying text (analyzing the role of judicial "testing" 
in defining the content and validity of legal norms). 
293. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 105, at 278 (arguing that innovation involves risks for private 
contractors and observing that "[s]ince the legal system retains ultimate power over interpretation and 
enforcement, parties cannot be certain what effect will be given to any formulation until it is tested"). 
294. See infra notes 375-392 and accompanying text (analyzing the available drafting and 
implementation techniques to mitigate transition costs in advance). 
295. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 105, at 265-66 (examining the error costs that arise from 
the formulation of contract terms); Lee, supra note 27, at 653 (discussing the error costs avoided 
by adherence to a permissive system of stare decisis). 
296. See supra notes 200--203 and accompanying text. 
297. The costs of formulation error are conceptually distinct from the uncertainty costs dis-
cussed above. Formulation errors arise when lawmakers unintentionally choose inaccurate signals 
upon adopting the agreed content of a legal directive. Although there may be substantial overlap 
in some cases, uncertainty costs, in contrast, issue from the inability of later interpreters to iden-
tify or agree on the precise content of a legal directive, and the litigation and related expenses of 
removing such doubts about its meaning and effect. Moreover, uncertainty costs can arise from 
the affirmative choice of flexible standards over more specific rules. On this latter point, see supra 
notes 225-231 and accompanying text. 
298. See supra notes 165-168 and accompanying text (discussing indeterminacy in legal norms). 
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can be a blunt instrument for articulating specific directives intended for 
general application. Because of this, legal norms are subject to the common-
place formulation errors of unintended vagueness or ambiguity,299 incom-
1 300 b d h 301 d ( d . ) . . 302 p eteness, over rea t , an more estrucuve mconststency. 
The very initiation of law thus may contain its own seeds of error.303 In 
turn, each new change in the law represents a new moment for mistakes in 
production. This is not to say that contemporary lawmakers somehow are 
more prone than their predecessors to signal their intent inaccurately. It 
simply means that, like most human enterprises, some built-in error rate 
will attend every attempt to articulate new legal norms.304 Moreover, over 
time past formulation errors commonly are ironed out or reconciled in some 
way. Detailed judicial inquiry-although controversial in modern scholarly 
debate305-often will uncover (or construct) the "true" meaning behind 
faulty legislative signals. Subsequent legislative tinkering can achieve 
the same end. Witness, for instance, the cumulative effect of judicial and 
299. A legal norm is vague when interpreters cannot divine its intended meaning and thus 
determine whether it applies to any particular factual circumstance. Ambiguity, in contrast, arises 
if a norm is subject to more than one possible meaning, such that its application to two identical 
factual circumstances may generate different legal outcomes. See E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" 
in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 953 (1967) (explaining the difference). 
300. Drafting defects of this nature occur when a legal norm fails to give express guidance on 
a contingency, even though it is within the norm's intended sphere of application. See Goetz & 
Scott, supra note 105, at 268-70 (describing the formulation error of incompleteness). 
301. Most often, overinclusiveness results from the inability of lawmakers to foresee future 
developments in the regulated field of human activity. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Law, Eco-
nomics, and the Reinvention of Public Administration: Using Relational Agreements to Reduce the Cost 
of Procurement Regulation and Other Forms of Government Intervention in the Economy, 50 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 141, 144 (1998) (noting that "[s]ome degree of overinclusiveness is the inevitable product 
of the drafter's inability to foresee ... all contingencies that might dictate departures from a given 
[legal] standard"). 
302. In this instance, the law gives legal actors conflicting instructions on what is compelled 
or permitted. A final, fortunately uncommon, type of formulation error results from mechanical 
or similar administrative mistakes in the physical reduction of legal norms with a clearly intended 
content. See, e.g., John E. Murray, Jr., The Revision of Article 2: Romancing the Prism, 35 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1447, 1473-74 (1994) (noting that a curious deletion of critical words in a section 
of the Uniform Commercial Code "may have been a printer's error"); see also Goetz & Scott, supra 
note 105, at 268 (discussing "administrative" formulation errors in private contractual terms 
resulting from inaccurate transcription or inadvertent omission or misstatement). 
303. Sometimes lawmakers will intentionally leave a legal norm ambiguous and thus defer 
resolution of an issue or delegate authority over it to another legal institution (most often, admin-
istrative agencies or the courts). This does not reflect a formulation error in the narrow sense. It 
may, however, generate significant transitional uncertainty costs. 
304. See Maggs, supra note 110, at 142-48 (describing twenty "recurring ambiguities" in 
statutes identified in a five-year study of Supreme Court opinions); see also id. at 150 (concluding 
that such recurring ambiguities "would appear to result primarily from Congress' inattention 
rather than deliberate action" such as delegating an issue to the courts). 
305. See supra note 24 (citing recent literature on the contentious debate over judicial use of 
legislative history in the interpretation of statutes). 
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legislative refinement of the Federal Rules of Evidence in the last half 
306 
century. 
Error correction, however, involves costs. Formulations later discov-
ered to be erroneous can lead private actors to make wasteful investments. 
Avoidable public costs also will arise from the judicial time and resources 
wasted on investigation and analysis;307 parallel litigation costs will be 
imposed on private participants in the process. Because the introduction of 
an untested legal norm represents a new moment of potential formulation 
error, each change in the law thus risks a new round of this form of transi-
tion costs. 
A second form of error arises at the point of application. Even when 
lawmakers adopt legal norms that (reasonably) accurately signal their intent, 
courts or administrative authorities may erroneously interpret them. Such 
interpretive error in effect imposes a new content on a legal rule, indeed 
one that is at odds with its true content. Mistakes in interpretation, like 
those in formulation, can be corrected.308 Subsequent judicial review, for 
example, can reverse a misguided decision by a lower court,309 or overturn a 
court's own improvident judgments. On issues of statutory law,310 legislatures 
306. See Margaret A. Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the Goals of 
Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255, 270 (1984) (discussing the benefits of flexible develop-
ment of the Federal Rules of Evidence by courts since enactment); Faust F. Rossi, The Federal 
Rules of Evidence-Past, Present, and Future: A Twenty-Year Perspective, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1271 
(1995) (arguing that development of the rules over time has produced increases in clarity and 
uniformity). 
307. Even in absence of formulation error in the sense discussed in the text above, faulty 
legislative signals may lead to judicial interpretations not desired by the legislature. A result is a 
new round of legislative drafting costs to clarify the ambiguity. See Maggs, supra note 110, at 129-
30 (noting that statutory ambiguity increases "replacement costs" as the legislature is forced 
"to expend its energy" to change a judicial interpretation it views as incorrect). 
308. This phenomenon may occur in the interpretation of the common law as well. The 
error here arises when a lower court (or a federal court sitting in diversity) misinterprets state 
supreme court precedent on an issue of state common law. When the misguided view operates as 
precedent in a jurisdictional sub-unit, such as in a state or federal appellate district, error costs will 
arise much in the same way as with erroneous interpretations of statutory law. 
309. A separate form of error relates to the application of legal norms to the facts of a par-
ticular case. These errors of application are common and in large measure unavoidable. They 
do not trigger the types of legal transition costs under discussion here, however, as long as the 
erroneous factual application of the law does not infect the interpretation of the legal principle at 
issue in later disputes. 
310. In theory, legislatures also have the power to overturn court decisions on issues of 
common law. In the relatively rare case that they do so, however, legislatures typically act simply 
to displace judicial authority on the issue in its entirety, not to correct any judicial "error" in the 
interpretation of the common law. 
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also retain the power to correct faulty interpretive decisions, even by a 
311 
supreme court. 
The correction of interpretive error, however, likewise involves costs. 
Similar to formulation errors, these costs will include the public and private 
process costs associated with correction itself.312 What may be more impor-
tant is the effect on private investment. The erroneous interpretation may 
compromise investments founded on the original meaning of a legal rule. 
Even if corrected, the investments may become permanently wasted by 
mere passage of excessive time until the correction. The same will occur for 
new investments encouraged by the mistaken interpretation itself. 
Consider once again the complex contract formation rules of UCC 
section 2-207.313 Shortly after the code's widespread adoption, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit interpreted section 2-207 in a way 
clearly at odds with the provision's text and official comments.314 Subse-
quent courts in other jurisdictions refused to follow the interpretation,315 
and scholars were openly critical.316 In spite of this, the matter remained 
uncorrected in the First Circuit for well over a quarter century,317 until the 
court reversed itself and joined the consensus view.318 In the interim, how-
ever, the interpretive error thwarted the code's core directive to advance 
national uniformity on one of the most significant issues in commercial 
311. The evidence suggests, however, that Congress in fact rarely acts to overturn Supreme 
Court interpretations of federal statutes. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court 
Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 335 (1991) (noting that Congress has been 
unable or unwilling to overrule judicial interpretive decisions in any systematic fashion). 
312. See supra note 307 and accompanying text. 
313. U.C.C. § 2-207 (2001) (governing contract formation and content in the case of a 
"battle of the forms"). 
314. See Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1962). 
315. See, e.g., Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1576-77 (lOth Cir. 1984) 
(rejecting Rota-Lith); Luria Bros. & Co. v. Pielet Bros. Scrap Iron & Metal, Inc., 600 F.2d 103, 113 
(7th Cir. 1979) (same); C. ltoh & Co. v. Jordan lnt'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1235 (7th Cir. 1977) 
(same); Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1168 (6th Cir. 1972) (same). 
316. See )AMES J. WHITE & ROBERTS. SUMMERS, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (5th 
ed. 2000); Arthur Taylor von Mehren, The "Battle of the Forms": A Comparative View, 38 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 265, 280--81 (1990); see also John E. Murray, Jr., A Proposed Revision of Section 2-207 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 6 J.L. & COM. 337, 345 (1986) (stating years before the First Circuit 
reversed itself that "[t]he consensus is clear that Rota-Lith is unreliable precedent"). 
317. In spite of the criticism, most federal courts in the First Circuit felt compelled to fol-
low Rota-Lith. See, e.g., Providence & Worchester R.R. Co. v. Sargent & Greenleaf, Inc., 802 
F. Supp. 680, 685-87 (D.R.I. 1992); Alloy Computer Prods., Inc. v. N. Telecom, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 
12, 14-15 (D. Mass. 1988); Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 445 F. 
Supp. 537, 546 (D. Mass. 1977). 
318. See Ionics, Inc. v. Elmwood Sensors, Inc., 110 F.3d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1997), overruling 
Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962). 
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law.319 The result was a sustained period of excessive uncertainty and 
related dispute resolution costs as the erroneous view fomented avoidable 
controversies. 
As this case illustrates, the risk of interpretive error increases with a 
new body of law, in particular a complex or innovative one. Some degree 
of error is inherent in any interpretive enterprise.320 But over time the 
accumulation of precedent on the same and related issues, of detailed schol-
arly analysis, and of simple familiarity, work to diminish the risk of misin-
terpretation of an established body of law. 
Interpretive error costs spawned by changes in the law also may be pri-
vate in nature. Even with careful professional advice,m private actors may 
misgauge the import or effect of the new law, a circumstance that is only 
likely to increase in frequency as the new norms grow in complexity and 
d 'lJZZ Th f h , , , h eta1 . e consequences o sue pnvate mterprettve error are t e same: 
Investments inspired by the erroneous interpretation may become wasted 
upon a contrary final interpretation by a competent authority.323 
Finally, private error costs also include what might be termed "igno-
rance costs." Legal change increases the likelihood that private actors will 
not even be aware of the rules of law relevant to their affairs.324 This may 
lead both to an increase in unlawful activity, as legal actors unwittingly 
violate unknown prohibitions,325 and to those actors' failure to engage in 
socially desirable actions a new body of law may have been designed to 
319. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (2001) (stating that one of the primary goals of the code was to 
bring about national uniformiry in commercial law). 
320. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 105, at 272 (observing that "the inherent fallibility of 
the interpretive process generates an irreducible risk of error"). 
321. See supra notes 146-150 and accompanying text (discussing the role of legal practitio-
ners in learning the law and communicating its content to clients). 
322. There is admittedly substantial overlap between the costs of private interpretive error 
and the broader category of uncertainty costs. The principal value of examining private interpre-
tive error separately lies in recognizing the tangible effects of actual decisions made on the basis of 
erroneous understandings of effect of new law. 
323. Although founded on an erroneous interpretation of the law (as opposed to an unan-
ticipated transition in governmental policy), these losses parallel those discussed by Louis Kaplow 
in his analysis of the effects of substantive changes in the law on long-term private investments. 
See Kaplow, supra note 11, at 515-19. 
324. There is some level of a tradeoff between ignorance costs and learning costs. As noted 
above, some legal actors may choose to run the risk of being misinformed about the law rather 
than incur the costs of learning about its content. See supra note 140. The point about transi-
tional ignorance costs is that the adoption of new law increases the likelihood that affected actors 
will not even be aware of the need to become informed in the first place. 
325. See Maggs, supra note 110, at 127 (observing the statutory ambiguity can lead to 
"increased unlawful activity"). 
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encourage.326 Advancements in international private law provide a good 
example. Commentators have observed, for instance, that there is an 
appalling lack of knowledge that an international treatl27 has displaced 
much of the Uniform Commercial Code for international sales transactions, 
even those involving Canada and Mexico.328 The consequence is that 
transactors have not adjusted their contracting practices to take advantage 
of the benefits and avoid the hazards of these changes in the law.329 
F. Public Transition Costs 
The analysis to this point has focused on the costs legal transtttons 
impose on private actors. Though less significant, the state also may expe-
rience increased costs from new legal regimes. These public transition costs 
flow primarily from the fact that the state is a participant not only in pro-
duction of the law, but also in its a~ministration and application. 
The most significant public impact will be an increase in public dis-
pute resolution costs. The state maintains an elaborate apparatus for the 
resolution of societal disputes, both public and private. It employs judges, 
clerks, and support persoi:mel; administers filing systems; and constructs and 
326. See supra notes 239-242 and accompanying text (noting the opportunity costs of 
uncertain law). 
327. The treaty referred to here is the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG), which the United States ratified in 1986. See Final Act, 
United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.97/18 (1980); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 6264 (Mar. 2, 1987) (republishing its official English 
language text); Van Alstine, supra note 47, at 696-97 (discussing the history of the ratification of the 
convention). The treaty entered into effect in 1988 and is now in force in nearly sixty countries. 
See United Nations Comm'n on lnt'l Trade Law, Status of Texts, at http://www.uncitral.org/ 
en-index.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2002). 
328. See, for example, James E. Bailey, Facing the Truth: Seeing the Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods as an Obstacle w a Uniform Law of International Sales, 32 CORNELL 
INT'L L.J. 273 (1999), in which James Bailey observes that 
many U.S. businesses, lawyers and courts have yet to realize that contracts they assume 
are governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) are actually governed by the 
CISG. The dearth of U.S. caselaw concerning the CISG despite its ten years of applica-
bility to the majority of U.S. international sales transactions is itself evidence of the lack 
of awareness of the CISG in the United States. 
Id. at 280. 
329. A good example of these hazards is the contract formation rules. The CISG differs 
markedly from Article 2 of the UCC on the rules governing the so-called "battle of the forms." 
See Burt A. Leete, Contract Formation Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods and the Uniform Commercial Code: Pitfalls for the Unwary, 6 TEMP. INT'L 
& COMP. L.J. 193, 212-14 (1992) (noting the risks in this regard); Michael P. Van Alstine, Con-
sensus, Dissensus, and Contractual Obligation Through the Prism of Uniform International Sales 
Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 21-33 (1996) (describing the differences). Although not commonly 
understood, these new formation rules cannot be avoided simply by standard protective language 
in one's standard business terms. See Van Alstine, supra, at 12-13 n.33. 
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maintains court buildings. Even for purely private disputes, the state makes 
this system available at a "price" that does not even remotely approximate 
its costs. The public court system, in other words, represents an extensive 
state subsidy for the resolution of disputes.330 
As we have seen, the introduction of new legal norms may lead to an 
increase in uncertainty in the law.331 When this is the case, a likely con-
sequence is an increase in the frequency of disputes332 (both legitimate and 
specious333 ) and a decrease in the likelihood of their extrajudicial settle-
ment.334 Through the subsidy provided by its court system, the state itself 
will bear an appreciable part of the costs of this increased activity.335 
Moreover, legal transitions will impose learning costs336 for state judicial 
officers as well (especially those in courts of general jurisdiction337 ). These 
may lead to more prolonged, and therefore more costly, proceedings. 
Similar public transition costs will arise from the impact of new legal 
norms on the hybrid work of administrative agencies.338 In their (now 
330. See Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit Non-
Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 259 (1999) (observing that "tax-
payers as a whole subsidize trials by bearing much of the costs of the public court system"); Rex 
E. Lee, The American Courts as Public Goods: Who Should Pay the Costs of Litigation, 34 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 267, 270 (1985) (observing that a public court system subsidizes private litigation). 
331. See supra notes 194-203 and accompanying text. 
332. See supra notes 211-212 and accompanying text. 
333. See supra notes 232-236 and accompanying text (discussing the likelihood of increased 
opportunism from uncertain law). 
334. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
335. See Maggs, supra note 110, at 127 (observing that "[s)tatutory ambiguity, by promoting 
litigation, also takes up judicial resources," and that reducing ambiguity "would decrease the funds 
that the public must commit to dispute resolution"); cf. Lee, supra note 27, at 651 (noting with 
regard to judicial adherence to precedent that "the costs associated with litigation aimed at refin-
ing a new rule also must be counted as a marginal cost of departure from stare decisis"). 
336. See supra notes 130-164 and accompanying text (describing the general phenomenon 
of legal learning costs). 
337. This effect may be diminished substantially when an area of the law is entrusted to 
courts of special jurisdiction. For example, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals (with regard to 
matters of patent law) and the Delaware Court of Chancery (for corporate law matters) are more 
likely to follow developments in their respective fields and thus have a shorter learning curve for 
relevant changes in the law. For a discussion of why a greater reliance on specialized courts might 
decrease the costs of legal transitions, see infra notes 416-423 and accompanying text. 
338. Similar costs may arise when one governmental unit imposes administrative obligations 
on another-for example, when the federal government imposes new mandates on the states. 
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized the constitutional limits on this practice. See 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
When permissible, inferior governmental units, similar to private legal actors, will incur transition 
costs from the need to adjust forms and practices to new legal mandates that are relevant to their 
activities. 
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expansive) capacity as adjudicatory bodies,339 administrative agencies will 
incur increased dispute resolution costs that parallel those noted immedi-
ately above.340 In their executive function, the accommodation of new leg-
islative directives will resemble private adjustment costs.341 These will 
include transitional drafting342 and administrative costs343 similar to those 
private actors bear in adapting their affairs to new legal norms.344 
Ill. THE 1M PLICA TIONS OF TRANSITION COST ANALYSIS 
A. Assessing the Impact of Legal Change 
The analysis in Parts I and II above exposes a latent flaw in the stan-
dard model of lawmaking. However framed or articulated, the dominant 
currency of lawmaking projects is benefit. In some (though by no means 
all345 ) cases, lawmakers weighing a reform proposal also may consider the 
substantive disadvantages that might flow from its adoption.346 The value of 
339. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (Supp. V 1999) (setting forth pro-
cedures for administrative adjudication); see also, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) 
(granting authority to the Social Security Administration to adjudicate disputes over social security 
benefits). 
340. See supra notes 263-273 and accompanying text. 
341. See supra notes 248-262 and accompanying text. 
342. See supra notes 263-273 and accompanying text. 
343. There is a fine line between public administrative transition costs and the inherent 
costs of executing the law. The development of certain administrative mechanisms may be the 
very goal of a statutory enactment. The costs of creating and equipping the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to administer (among others) the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (AOEA), the ADA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Pay 
Act of 1963, and aspects of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 might serve as a good example here. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g) (Supp. V 1999) (granting the EEOC oversight authority over the 
noted acts as provided therein). In other contexts, in contrast, the commonplace costs of creating 
forms and adjusting practices to accommodate new statutory mandates may reflect simple transi-
tion costs. The extent of the latter often escapes attention in the focus on the substantive leg-
islative goals. 
344. Although substantially less significant, a final note is appropriate on the costs of draft-
ing new legal norms. At the congressional level alone, the process of developing and formulating 
law involves extensive committees, legislative staff, and associated administrative support. These 
purely public drafting costs properly may be viewed as an essential governmental function. But 
there are related private costs as well. A prominent example here is the work of the private 
American Law Institute in the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code. See supra notes 51-53 
(discussing the work of the American Law Institute and the National Council of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws in drafting and revising the Uniform Commercial Code). 
345. One example is in the field of federal air quality mandates. In fact, as the Supreme 
Court recently held, the Clear Air Act bars the Environmental Protection Agency from consid-
ering economic compliance costs in setting certain air quality standards. See Whitman v. Am. 
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 486 (2001). 
346. See infra note 359 (noting the variety of federal statutes that require a substantive cost-
benefit analysis in the promulgation of new administrative regulations). 
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enhanced patient health protections may be balanced against increased 
insurance costs, to pick a topical example. But among policymakers and 
commentators alike, the almost singular focus, in terms of both advisability 
and execution, is on how a proposed change can correct some perceived 
problem or otherwise improve the substance of the law. 
A recognition of legal transition costs injects a potentially serious 
distortion into this standard calculus. As I observed at the outset, a 
parallel phenomenon exists in purely private decisions to switch between 
commercial products.347 I noted that the switching costs of doing so can be 
so great as to counsel against even the adoption of an otherwise superior 
alternative.348 Professors Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner also have 
expanded these insights to party-generated contract terms.349 They too 
have argued that the presence of switching costs may cause transactors not 
to switch even to a more efficient new term.350 This is so because internal 
learning and network benefits associated with established standard terms351 
as well as transitional administrative constraints may make the costs of 
switching352 greater than the expected benefits of adopting purportedly 
• 353 
supenor terms. 
In some respects, legal transitions way present an even more chal-
lenging problem. Because they are externally imposed by lawmakers,354 the 
adoption of new legal norms may be infected by a particularly acute form of 
fiscal illusion. This term describes the likely tendency of lawmakers to 
34 7. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
348. See Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 13, at 123-25 (discussing the switching costs in prod-
uct markets); Klemperer, The Competitiveness of Markets, supra note 13, at 138-39 (same). 
349. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, at 728 (arguing that "[s]witching costs may cre-
ate pressure for a firm to avoid adopting terms in a new contract that deviate from those in its 
existing contracts"). 
350. More broadly, Professors Kahan and Klausner have suggested that the network and 
learning externalities associated with established contractual terms may be an impediment to 
socially optimal contracting. See id. at 729-36. 
351. For a discussion of the learning and network benefits of private forms, see supra notes 
250-253, 276-283 and accompanying text. 
352. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 15, at 727-29. 
353. As noted in the introduction, the decision by private firms to incorporate in Delaware 
reflects a parallel phenomenon. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (citing literature on the 
transaction cost reasons for why Delaware remains the preferred state of incorporation). 
· 354. Powerful interest groups also can influence the content of changes in the law. 
Although this aspect of the lawmaking process most often is viewed with criticism, see supra note 
50 (citing scholarly analyses of interest group public choice theory), concentrated interest groups 
also may serve as an external constraint on the adoption of new legal norms that may entail sub-
stantial legal transition costs. An equal risk exists, however, that these interest groups will exercise 
their power with regard to the form and structure of new legal norms in such a way as to secure 
advantages over other affected legal actors. See, e.g., supra note 267 (noting the observations of 
one commentator that the adjustment costs associated with the recent revision of UCC Article 9 
may confer a competitive advantage on large· repeat players). 
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overestimate the benefits and underestimate the costs of new legal norms.355 
And the systemic neglect of this phenomenon has meant that, in contrast 
to private decisionmaking, there is little incentive for lawmakers to con-
sider the costs of transition in reviewing proposed changes to the law. 
Public lawmaking decisions of course involve a broader field of policy 
considerations than do purely private switching choices. Competing and 
perhaps incommensurable value judgments also can vary widely, not only 
among policymakers, but from context to context as well. Moreover, legal 
transition costs-like the substantive benefits and burdens of proposed legal 
reforms-are not susceptible to precise, objective determination ex ante.356 
The transitional impact of legal change can be studied, however, and what 
can be studied can be improved. 
My goal in the sections to follow is to frame the debate on an issue 
that thus far has been largely neglected. As a systemic phenomenon, law-
makers should at a minimum be sensitive to the impact of legal transition 
costs in weighing proposed changes in the law. A deeper understanding of 
the dynamics of change also may yield insights on the proper form and 
structure of reform projects, as well as on the means by which lawmakers 
might prospectively mitigate the costs associated with transitions in the 
law. 
B. Managing Legal Transitions 
1. Transition Costs and the Lawmaking Process 
It would appear at first glance that there is at least some awareness 
among lawmakers of the impact of precipitous changes in the law. Some 
statutes, for instance, contain formal provisions denominated "transition 
rules."357 These, however, tend to address only technical matters such as 
effective dates or the validity of actions taken under the old regime (such as 
f.l. ) 358 1 mgs. 
355. See Kaplow, supra note 11, at 567-70 (observing that lawmakers are susceptible to fiscal 
illusion, in which they tend to overestimate the benefits and underestimate the costs of new legal 
rules). 
356. Cf. Lee, supra note 27, at 658 (noting that the litigation, adjustment, and error costs of 
departing from precedent "do not lend themselves to precise, objective measurement"). 
357. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-701 to 9-709 (2001) (indicating transition rules for revised 
Article 9); Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998) (describing certain transition rules with 
regard to amendments of the Internal Revenue Code); Civil Rights Act of 1990, S. 2104, 101st 
Cong., 2d Sess., § 15 (1990) (setting forth "transition rules" for the 1990 amendments to the Civil 
Rights Acts). 
358. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-701 to 9-708 (2001) (setting forth the rules for revised Article 9 
governing filings and similar actions taken under the former article); Pub. L. No. 105-206, 
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A number of state and federal statutes also require some form of cost-
benefit analysis, most often as a means of regulatory oversight.359 Although 
often couched in expansive terms, however, these statutes typically target 
only the economic costs of complying with the substantive dictates of 
d . . . l . 360 a mmtstrattve regu attons. 
Taken at its broadest level, a recognition of legal transition costs will 
require that lawmakers and scholars incorporate a broader calculus in advo-
cating changes to the law. Some legal reforms of course will have merit 
irrespective of the learning, uncertainty, adjustment, and related costs 
associated with their implementation. But the analysis for others will be 
more complicated. And some may involve such severe transitional friction 
as to warrant rejection altogether. 
The impact of legal transition costs thus can be arrayed along a spec-
trum. When the costs of a proposed change are high, lawmakers should 
place elevated demands on the probability and extent of its substantive 
benefits in relation to the existing regime. This framework helps to explain 
why certain reform projects properly are rejected even though they may 
offer improvements in the law. Consider as an example the perennial calls 
for a change from an income to a consumption-based tax system.361 
Although lacking the conceptual framework advanced here, a principal 
ground for the failure of these proposals {whatever their substantive merit) 
is the substantial transition costs that their adoption would entail.362 
§ (d)(2), 112 Stat. 685 (1998) (setting forth a transition rule with effective dates for advice given 
before the statute took effect); Civil Rights Act of 1990, S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., § 15 
(defining the effective dates of certain liability amendments with regard to pending and future 
litigation). 
359. See Robert W. Hahn, State and Federal Regulatory Reform: A Comparative Analysis, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 873, 886-93 (2000) (analyzing the variety of executive and legislative efforts to 
require that administrative agencies undertake some form of substantive cost-benefit analysis 
of proposed regulations). Most recently, Congress adopted the so-called "Regulatory Accounting 
Provisions," which require the Office of Management and Budget to compile a comprehensive 
cost-benefit analysis of existing regulatory schemes. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act 
of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
360. See Hahn, supra note 359, at 912 (noting in the conclusion of a comprehensive review 
that state and federal efforts to require cost-benefit analyses relate to broader "economic costs" of 
proposed regulations, with no discussion of legal transition costs in the sense analyzed here). 
361. See, e.g., Laura Dale, The Economic Impact of Replacing the Federal Income Tax with a 
Federal Consumption Tax: Leveling the International Playing Field, 9 CURRENTS INT'L TRADE L.J. 47 
(2000) (arguing that a consumption based tax would spur economic growth and improve the 
international competitiveness of American companies); Thomas Michael Federico, Recent Con-
gressional Consumption Tax Proposals: A Theoretical Inquiry into Their Effects on the Declining U.S. 
Saving Rate, 7 U. FLA. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 337 (1996) (arguing that a consumption tax would 
increase saving). 
362. See John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax, Consumption-Type Income Tax Pro-
posals in the United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of Fundamental Tax Reform, 88 CAL L. REV. 
2095, 2184 (2000) ("The transition costs and uncertainties and potential problems of shifting 
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A sensitivity to legal transition costs counsels similar caution in other 
circumstances. The first is with innovation in highly stable areas of the law. 
Even when extant legal solutions may be suboptimal in some way, the risk 
of compromising the accumulated certainty surrounding the old norms, the 
learning and adjustment costs involved with the new, and the risk offuture 
error costs might outweigh any purported benefits of a proposed revision.363 
One might explain on this basis the opposition to the comprehensive 
revisions of the various articles of the Uniform Commercial Code, in 
particular the pending work on Article 2,364 as well as the unease of some 
commentators with the progression of established commercial law into 
the international dimension.365 Such considerations suggest an initial 
preference for targeted revisions over comprehensive overhaul in estab-
lished fields, whatever defects might exist in the existing regime. 
Perhaps paradoxically, a concern about transition costs also yields a 
cautionary message for the regulation of areas of high instability. If a field is 
subject to rapid technological or social innovation, the transition costs 
involved in the adoption of mandatory norms may be substantial.366 Insta-
bility in the target subject matter increases the risk of wasteful legal learning 
costs-as lawmakers repeatedly reassess transient legal solutions-as well as 
related uncertainty and private adjustment costs. One might cite as an 
to a consumption-based tax are huge and important."); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Uneasy Case 
for Devolution of the Individual Income Tax, 85 IOWA L. REV. 907, 987-94 (2000) (discussing the 
transition costs of switching to a requisition tax system). 
363. As I discuss immediately below, legal innovation of course also can serve interests of 
legal certainty, both by resolving contentious issues and by clearing away existing impediments to 
beneficial activities. See supra notes 359-374 and accompanying text. 
364. See, e.g., Richard Hyland, Draft, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1350 (1997). Richard 
Hyland discusses the drafting process and argues that 
I d. 
[a]s a whole Article 2 is not broke-! know no one who thinks it is. After a little use, all 
codes reveal a few unfortunate turns of phrase, structural inconsistencies, overly idealistic 
assumptions, and gaps that cannot reasonably be closed by the statutory language. 
Blemishes of that sort never justify revision-because similar problems inevitably show 
up in the revisions themselves not long after enactment. 
365. See, e.g., Stephan, supra note 28, at 761-87 (criticizing the process for the creation of 
international commercial law as well as the content of existing efforts); Walt, supra note 149, at 
698-705 (suggesting that excessive novelty may hinder the success of efforts to unify international 
sales law). 
366. Transition cost concerns may not be as serious if the new legal regime is not mandatory 
in character. Substantial instability in a field increases the likelihood that transactors will incur 
the costs of private regulation through detailed contractual arrangements (or otherwise withdraw 
from the market entirely). In such a case, the adoption of default legal rules may not impose sub-
stantial transition costs. To the contrary, it may decrease uncertainty costs by establishing a back-
ground framework for an evolution of more efficient private formulations in the field. 
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example comprehensive proposals to regulate the lntemet or other legal 
f 1 . d . . 367 aspects o e ectromc commerce an commumcatton. 
Transition cost analysis suggests that similar caution should be exer-
cised for reforms in fields that are already highly regulated. Of particular 
concern in such circumstances will be the learning costs for comprehensive 
rule revisions, the risk of uncertainty (including uncertainty regarding 
interface with related legal regimes), and future private adjustment costs. 
Complicated legal environments in which multiple jurisdictions or verti-
cally related authorities regulate the same subject raise like transitional 
concerns. When, for example, a field is subject to comprehensive state, 
national, and international regulation (in, say, intellectual property law), 
large-scale reform at any level without careful accommodation is likely to risk 
l l . . 368 severe ega transltlon costs. 
Legal change of course can be beneficial. Many existing bodies of law, 
for instance, are themselves highly uncertain or otherwise substantively 
defective. Moreover, the existing legal costs of a socially desirable activity 
may be the problem a new body of law is designed to redress. The adoption 
of new legal norms thus may serve, among other things, to clarify conten-
tious legal problems, simplify excessive complexity, facilitate new and valu-
able forms of human interaction, and otherwise advance the interests of legal 
certainty. Among the best examples here is the beneficial role of uniform 
law in facilitating transjurisdictional interchange.369 The very purpose of 
uniform legal rules is to address the learning costs of gathering reliable 
information about foreign legal systems,370 uncertainties about the content 
367. One particularly controversial example is the Uniform Computer Information Trans-
actions Act, an attempt at a comprehensive regulation of electronic and computer-generated trans-
actions. See Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ 
ulc/ulc_frame.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2001). 
368. The point about accommodation here is that, as I discuss below, lawmakers can choose 
to internalize future transition costs through more careful and thorough drafting of new legal 
norms. See infra notes 375-392 and accompanying text. 
369. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State 
Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 138-40 (1996) (discussing the variety of benefits of uniform law in 
decreasing the costs of transjurisdictional activity, many of which bear an inverse relationship 
to the costs of change analyzed here); see also David Charny, Competition Among jurisdictions in 
Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An American Perspective on the "Race to the Bottom" in the 
European Communities, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 423, 445-46 (1991) (same regarding corporate law). 
370. See Chamy, supra note 369, at 436 (observing that uniformity across jurisdictions 
"saves the decisionmakers and transactors the costs of having to develop and learn a multiplicity 
of rules"); Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 369, at 138 (noting that uniform law can decrease 
information costs). 
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and choice of applicable law,371 and the absence of an effective framework 
for the development of private contractual networks.372 
The proper role of a sensitivity to legal transition costs, therefore, is as 
one important input in a reasoned decisionmaking process.373 Substantive 
benefit may remain the principal focus in the politics of legal change. As the 
likely extent of transition costs increases, however, this input suggests that 
lawmakers should proceed with increasing care in weighing any particular 
law reform proposal (whether regulatory, deregulatory, or otherwise).374 
2. Mitigating Legal Transition Costs 
Stated briefly, the message of much of the analysis to this point is that 
the costs of legal change are real and potentially substantial. This does not 
mean, however, that there is something inherently inefficient about legal 
innovation. Rather, as we shall see below, lawmakers have at their disposal 
a variety of means to mitigate transitional friction, even for large-scale or 
complex legal reforms. 
A sensitivity to legal transition costs could manifest itself in two prin-
cipal ways. The first-which follows on the broader discussion immediately 
above375-is a systemic preference for targeted change over comprehensive 
reform. In new or highly unstable areas, for example, initiating change 
carefully and within the framework of the existing legal regime can dimin-
ish substantially the likely transition costs.376 Similarly, when experience 
with a new field is limited-or when there is significant heterogeneity in 
371. See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 369, at 138 (noting that uniform law can 
decrease "inconsistency costs" and litigation costs); see also David W. Leebron, An Analysis of 
Harmonization Claims, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 305, 311-12 (1996) (observing that the harmoni-
zation of trade rules can resolve questions of"jurisdictional interface"). 
372. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Uniformity, Choice of Law and Software 
Sales, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 261, 273 (1999) (observing that "uniform law can facilitate the 
development of a repository of judicial decisions and privately developed forms and devices that 
aid interpretation and application of specific statutory terms"). 
373. See Gillette, supra note 110, at 821 (observing that the relative merit of an existing 
legal norm must involve consideration of the transition costs of adopting a new one); see also 
Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and Comment on Conference 
Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 1154 (2000) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis can be a valuable 
tool as an "input into decision," even when doubts exist about its normative value). 
374. See supra Part l.B (discussing the variety offorms oflegal transitions). 
375. See supra notes 361-368 and accompanying text. 
376. There is strong evidence that Congress systematically fails to address the impact of 
transition costs (at least with regard to the effect of uncertain statutory provisions) when adopting 
comprehensive reforms. As Professor Gregory Maggs observed on the basis of a five-year study of 
Supreme Court statutory interpretation cases, "Congress in several instances seems to have cre-
ated a large number of idiosyncratic statutory ambiguities by making sweeping reforms of the law 
without sufficiently contemplating the consequences." Maggs, supra note 110, at 152. 
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the regulated community-transition cost concerns might suggest an initial 
policy preference for flexible standards.377 
One might cite as a positive example here the recent federal Elec-
tronic Signatures Act.378 Sensitive to its field of rapid technological innova-
tion, the act prefers a minimal and flexible enabling approach over 
comprehensive regulation. Similarly, recognizing the risk of destabilizing 
other, established legal regimes, lawmakers carefully carved from its scope 
those areas already subject to long-standing legal regulation and interpre-
. d 379 tlve prece ent. 
As an alternative or partial complement, lawmakers can seek to inter-
nalize transition costs ex ante. The ready point here is that increased care 
in choice and articulation can prospectively mitigate much of the learning, 
uncertainty, and kindred costs of new legal norms.380 Some good work 
has already been done on this score.381 And, admittedly, lawmakers often 
may lack the will to incur the political and transaction costs of precise 
drafting.382 But it is here that the insights of transition cost analysis may 
play a significant role. A more enlightened awareness of the tangible costs 
of undisciplined legal reform should give increased impetus to the perennial 
calls for more responsible legislative drafting.383 
377. To be sure, an initial preference for careful and targeted change may involve a trade-off 
as against the potential benefits of comprehensive legislative guidance. My suggestion is that in 
the described situations an attempt at large-scale regulation creates a greater risk of error and 
instability in the law, and thus a greater likelihood of substantial-or successive rounds of-
transition costs. 
378. 15 u.s.c. § 7001 (2000). 
379. See 15 U.S.C. § 7003 (describing the numerous established bodies of law exempt from 
the scope of the act). 
380. Standard-setting organizations also can internalize transition costs in purely private 
matters. Private standards can both solve coordination problems and address the learning and 
uncertainty costs of introducing new standardized formulations. See Kahan & Klausner, supra 
note 15, at 762 (observing that "to the extent that a standard-setting institution bears the cost of 
developing a standard contract term, its efforts to avoid formulation error and to educate lawyers, 
other professionals, and [a given] community provide a subsidy to early-adopting firms"). 
381. See Maggs, supra note 110, at 133-36 (discussing the efforts of scholars to develop 
"drafting checklists" for legislators, to "normaliz[e] the structure and phrasing of statutes," and 
to understand the relative merits of rules versus standards in drafting legislation); see also FED. 
COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 89-93 (1990) 
(recommending the use of detailed legislative checklists as well as the adoption of broad "fallback 
rules" to govern recurring issues). For more on the rules and standards debate, see infra notes 387-
392 and accompanying text. 
382. In addition, the "inventiveness of reality" places practical limits on the predictive abili-
ties of lawmakers in any event. See also Konrad Zweigert & Hans-)lirgen Puttfarken, Statuwry 
Interpretation-Civilian Style, 44 TUL. L. REV. 704, 704 (1970) (using this phrase). 
383. See Maggs, supra note 110, at 133-36, 154-60 (describing efforts to assist lawmakers 
in avoiding statutory ambiguities); FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 381, at 89-93 (recom-
mending certain legislative drafting techniques to limit interpretive problems for federal courts). 
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Similarly, transition cost analysis should stimulate greater attention in 
the introduction of new legal norms to accumulated certainty in a field. 
Drafters may prospectively mitigate legal transition costs by more carefully 
addressing-either through express approval or rejection-the experience 
gained with past legislative enactments and interpretive precedent over 
time.384 Increased sensitivity to such costs also should spur lawmakers to 
consider the interface with related bodies of law,385 and thereby resolve 
thorny issues of norm hierarchy before they arise. 
The worl<. of the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code may provide 
a model here. Through official comments appended to each section, the 
drafters carefully addressed where the code builds on, and where it rejects, 
past law. Through the same vehicle the drafters also accommodated the 
interaction with affiliated legal regimes.386 
In parallel with these considerations, transition cost analysis also may 
inform (and benefit from) the enduring debate over the proper balance 
between rules and standards.387 Generally, the choice of narrow rules 
involves ex ante drafting costs, whereas flexible standards tend to impose 
costs at the point of application.388 As Louis Kaplow has argued, if a par-
ticular norm is to be applied many times to familiar and substantially uni-
form conduct, a legal system likely is better served by lawmakers bearing the 
upfront costs of drafting a rule.389 Viewed in the framework of the present 
analysis, in such cases the accumulated legal knowledge about a regular, 
stable activity should permit lawmakers to internalize much of the transi-
384. In doing so, lawmakers address negative uncertainty costs of legal change. See supra 
notes 172-199 and accompanying text (analyzing the costs that legal change may impose through 
the loss of the accumulated certainty in the subject field of law). 
385. See supra notes 187-190 and accompanying text (discussing the interface resolution 
costs that may arise from legal change). 
. 386. As a result, the code was able to both reap the benefits of the accumulated certainty of 
the past and ease the assimilation of its newer or more innovative provisions. See Gregory 
E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn's Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 541, 565-66 (2000) (noting that the purpose of the comments was to provide 
detailed guidance to the courts in applying the code). See generally Robert H. Skilton, Some 
Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 597 (discussing 
the background and purpose for the code's official comments). 
387. For an introduction to the voluminous literature on the rules versus standards debate, 
see supra note 26. 
388. See Kaplow, supra note 26, at 585-86 (noting that rules involve the costs of govern-
mental acquisition and dissemination of information upfront whereas standards tend to impose 
such costs at the time of application); see also supra notes 222-231 and accompanying text (ana-
lyzing the uncertainty costs associated with crafting new legal norms as rules versus standards). 
389. See Kaplow, supra note 26, at 579-86. 
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tion costs of new legal norms at the drafting stage.390 In contrast, when 
insufficient information is available about th~ covered conduct-such as in 
new or unstable areas or where substantial heterogeneity exists-standards 
may be the preferred normative model.391 Even with standards, however, 
lawmakers may be able to reduce transition costs at the drafting stage 
through careful attention to the experience and precedent already accumu-
lated in the field.392 
Finally, it is important to observe that the impact of transition costs 
will vary according to the opportunities for exit. For default legal regimes 
(such as, for example, on most issues of corporate law) the ability of transac-
tors to contract around changes in the law may reduce (though not elimi-
nate393) their transitional impact.394 This may be done either by adopting 
express agreements to the contrary or by choosing the law of an entirely 
different jurisdiction.395 Even with new default legal norms, however, 
increased sensitivity to learning and adjustment costs may be warranted if 
the theoretical opportunities for exit are effectively meaningless.396 
Lawmakers are not required, of course, to incorporate transition 
cost concerns in their decisionmaking at all. But even for those skeptical of 
substantive cost-benefit comparisons,397 there is value in recognizing that 
390. See supra notes 380-386 and accompanying text (suggesting that where substantial 
legal certainty already exists in a given field, lawmakers may be able to internalize much of the 
costs of legal transitions through careful drafting). 
391. See supra notes 375-377 and accompanying text (suggesting that because of transition 
cost concerns in such circumstances lawmakers should prefer flexible standards); see also Kaplow, 
supra note 26, at 617 n.l75 (arguing that the choice of flexible standards of imprecise content may 
be appropriate "[t)o the extent uncertainty concerning application of the law reflects genuine 
uncertainty about the appropriate content of the law"). 
392. See supra notes 225-231 and accompanying text (examining the importance of prece-
dent for open-ended standards); see also Kaplow, supra note 26, at 577-79 (observing that over 
time precedent can transform a standard into a rule). 
393. See supra notes 103-109 and accompanying text (noting that transition costs concerns 
arise even for default legal regimes). 
394. Similarly, where exit opportunities exist the presence of legal transition costs may dis-
sipate the value of a body of law designed to facilitate a particular activity. See Walt, supra note 
149, at 698 (arguing that excessive innovation in the United Nations convention governing 
international sales law may encourage transactors to opt-out of its application). 
395. See U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (2001) (providing that the parties may agree that the law of 
another jurisdiction shall govern a transaction otherwise within the scope of the code). 
396. An example is in areas where the uniform law movement has been highly successful. 
In most fields covered by the Uniform Commercial Code, for example, all of the fifty states and 
the District of Columbia have made their laws nearly identical. The code then invalidates any 
choice of the law of a foreign jurisdiction unless it bears a "reasonable relation" to the transaction 
at issue. Id. § 1-105 (setting forth the reasonable relation rule). 
397. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some MoralUmits of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1005 (2000); HenryS. Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit 
Standard, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 971 (2000). 
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transition costs represent a source of friction for any legal change, whatever 
its normative content. As a result, the prospects for any particular reform 
project likely will improve with the degree to which it is sensitive to the 
phenomenon. The failure of the recent workplace ergonomics regulations 
in large measure may be explained on this basis.398 As this example suggests, 
the appeal even of a reform of substantial merit will diminish if it does not 
adequately address the legal costs (and the consequent political resistance) 
associated with its introduction.399 
3. Transition Cost Analysis and Stare Decisis 
There is also an affinity between transition cost analysis and the nor-
mative foundation for the doctrine of stare decisis. Deference to precedent 
imposes impediments to rapid or improvident shifts in the law (whether 
liberal or conservative400 in nature). Stare decisis thus operates as a built-in 
stabilizing mechanism. By centralizing authority in higher courts, and by 
constraining even their situational discretion, the doctrine both enhances 
legal certainty and minimizes the velocity of change.401 A derivative conse-
quence is that it functions to decrease the aggregate costs that flow from 
legal transitions. 
Seen in this light, there is a natural attraction between the value of 
deference to precedent and a sensitivity to transition costs.402 As others 
398. See Ergonomics Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 68,262 (proposed Nov. 14, 2000) (to be codified 
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910). 
399. Whatever its substantive merit, a principal criticism of the ergonomics regulation-
viewed in the framework of the present analysis-was that it involved substantial and long-term 
legal transition costs. See Albert B. Crenshaw, Fax Attack Helped Kill Ergonomics Regulations, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2001, at E3 (quoting the argument of a president of a small business asso-
ciation that "(s]mall business was concerned about the enormous complexity and vagueness 
[because although the rule goes] on for hundreds of pages, there still were no specific guidelines 
that an employer could use"); Next Steps on Ergonomics, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2001, at A24 
(noting that opponents of the regulation asserted "that they did not oppose protecting workers 
from repetitive stress injuries on the job" and would support an ergonomics rule if it were "better 
and differently crafted"). The analysis of transitional learning and uncertainty costs in supra Part 
II provides a framework for understanding these concerns. 
400. I use the term "conservative" here in the popular political sense, not in the more pre-
cise sense of a preference for the status quo. Many policymakers and commentators described as 
conservative in fact are advocates for substantial changes in the law, often in order to return the 
law to legal approaches that were rejected upon adoption of the current status quo. 
401. By mandating deference to precedent, stare decisis also creates a disincentive to repeat 
litigation over an established legal solution as well as to strategic bad faith behavior. See supra 
notes 232-236 and accompanying text (discussing the likely relationship between legal uncer-
tainty and opportunism). 
402. Judge Frank Easterbrook, for one, has highlighted the surprising lack of any effective 
theory of stare decisis. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 
CORNELL L. REV. 422, 422 (1988) (lamenting with regard to stare decisis that "no one has a prin-
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have recognized, a principal justification for the doctrine of stares decisis is 
that the systemic benefits of stability in many cases can counsel adherence 
even to a rule that has become partially outmoded or otherwise substan-
tively inadequate.403 These commentators thus have argued that courts 
should be hesitant to overrule an established precedent if the litigation, pri-
vate adjustment, and similar costs of change are likely to be high.404 
These analyses fit comfortably within the broader conceptual framework 
advanced here. Stare decisis also may advance other normative values, and 
as I have noted costs and benefits do not lend themselves to neat, 
objectively measurable comparison in any event.405 But a sensitivity to the 
legal costs oftransition can be a valuable input in a decision on whether, 
and if so in what circumstances, a court should depart from established 
precedent.406 This may be particularly true when the precedent is an essen-
tial element in a highly complicated body of related legal norms.407 
C. The Role of Mediating Institutions 
A final step in understanding the costs of legal change is to recognize 
the means by which a variety of institutions work to ameliorate the impact 
of new law ex post. Through courts and similar bodies, legal systems provide 
a public apparatus for fine tuning new legal norms that are coarse or 
otherwise uncertain. I will refer to these as mediating institutions. As we 
will see below, the presence of effective mediating institutions can diminish 
substantially the transition costs associated with the introduction of new 
law. 
In this country, the role of mediating institution traditionally has been 
played by the courts. Through interpretive decisions, the judiciary can 
speed clarification and resolve ambiguities in the law. The value of this 
cipled theory to offer"). This may be so in part because of the unclear interaction between the 
perceived value of any new legal norm and the costs associated with its introduction. 
403. See Kornhauser, supra note 258, at 86-89 (analyzing the economic costs of departing 
from precedent); Lee, supra note 27, at 657-58 (describing the Supreme Court's stare decisis deci-
sions as an effort to minimize the costs of change). 
404. See Kornhauser, supra note 258, at "86-89 (analyzing the propriety of stare decisis in 
light of "adjustment costs"); Lee, supra note 27, at 657-59 (arguing that courts should adhere to 
precedent when litigation costs, adjustment costs, and error costs are high); see also Lawrence 
E. Blume & DanielL. Rubinfeld, The Dynamics of the Legal Process, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 418 
(1982) (concluding that courts should be hesitant to change precedent where the costs of change 
are high). 
405. See supra note 255 and accompanying text. 
406. See supra notes 373-374 and accompanying text (arguing that the proper role of transi-
tion cost analysis is as an input in a decisionmaking process on legal change). 
407. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing the heightened value of legal 
precedent in a highly complicated body of law). 
HeinOnline -- 49 UCLA L. Rev. 864 2001-2002
864 49 UCLA LAW REVIEW 789 (2002) 
function is then enhanced by a tradition of thorough, sometimes scholarly, 
opinions. As I have observed above, by unpacking and adding coherence to 
the law in this way, courts in effect create public goods.408 Bolstered by the 
doctrine of stare decisis, the net effect of these public goods is a decrease in 
societal legal learning and uncertainty costs.409 Moreover, the judiciary 
often is the only body with the independence and flexibility to correct 
interpretive and similar legal errors in a timely fashion.410 
More recently, administrative bodies have come to fulfill a similar 
function. As comprehensive legislative lawmaking placed increasing strains 
on the efficacy of courts as mediating institutions, legislators began to dele-
gate to administrative bodies the authority to fine-tune the law.411 The net 
effect, once again, was the creation of an institutional structure designed to 
mediate the effects of unrefined statutory norms. The Supreme Court's now-
famous decision in Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council 412 might 
be seen in the same utilitarian terms. The Chevron Court held that 
interpretive decisions of administrative agencies are entitled to substantial 
judicial deference.413 In so doing, it enhanced the efficacy of administrative 
bodies in mitigating the transition costs of legislative law.414 
Each of these structures functions reasonably well within its area of 
competence. But as legal change continues to accelerate in both frequency 
and complexity,415 there may be grounds for more critical examination. The 
rising significance of legal transition costs in our modem polity suggests that 
lawmakers should consider whether systemic changes might improve the 
efficacy of these and other mediating institutions. Because transition costs 
themselves reflect a systemic phenomenon, this subject should provide fer-
tile ground for future scholarly analysis. The above analysis nonetheless 
permits a variety of initial observations here. 
408. See supra notes 141-14 3 and accompanying text. 
409. The importance of courts as a mediating institution is augmented by a legal education 
system that continues to regard judicial opinions as the primary vehicle for transferring legal 
knowledge. 
410. See supra notes 295-329 and accompanying text (analyzing the potential error costs of 
legal change). 
411. See supra note 46 (citing prominent examples in which Congress has granted rule-
making authority to administrative agencies). 
412. 467 u.s. 837 (1984). 
413. See id. at 844 (holding that interpretive decisions of administrative agencies within 
their fields of delegated expertise are entitled to substantial deference by reviewing courts). 
414. Other public and private institutions also operate as informal mediating institutions 
with regard to the learning costs of new law. See supra notes 144-150 and accompanying text 
(examining the role of legal scholars and practitioners in disseminating knowledge about the law). 
415. See supra notes 39-65 and accompanying text (discussing the "acceleration of law"). 
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Transition cost analysis might first give impetus to critical examina-
tions of our existing court system. In large measure, the present system was 
structured in an era of slow accretion of common law norms and of a sub-
stantially more limited federal role in governance. As a result of federal law 
expansion into new fields and absorption of matters traditionally left to the 
states, however, an increasing mass of material has been entrusted to the 
federal system. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, with few exceptions,416 nonetheless remains 
the only entity able to provide final, national guidance on the meaning and 
effect of federal law. As federal law expands, therefore, so too do delays 
in the definitive, national resolution of intercircuit conflicts, the correction 
of interpretive errors, and the clarification of other uncertainties in the law. 
Framed in the present analysis, the result is increased legal transition costs 
for each change involving federal law.417 To be sure, a legal system must 
balance the uncertainty costs of delay with the error costs of haste. But 
even with a perfectly tailored certiorari policy,418 practical considerations 
limit the Supreme Court to a review of only a small number of cases per 
year (and these often are on issues of constitutional law). In this light, a 
fuller appreciation of the impact of legal transition costs may give renewed 
energy to proposals to reform the review process or otherwise introduce new 
structures to speed national resolution of uncertainties in the law.419 
416. One notable exception is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. For an 
examination of this model, see infra note 422 and accompanying text. 
417. The most significant impact of delay is an increase in uncertainty costs, as the lack of 
definitive guidance on the content of the law hampers efficient planning and spawns avoidable 
disputes. See Kaplow, supra note 26, at 614 (suggesting that our present legal system may be defi-
cient because "massive costs of delay in settling the law are regularly incurred" and because of 
"substantial duplication" of the costs devoted to resolving a legal issue). 
418. The question of the efficacy of the present court system is thus broader than the con-
tentious debate over how quickly the Supreme Court should intervene to resolve intercircuit 
splits. In some cases, concerns about excessive haste may justify some patience while difficult 
issues percolate in the lower courts. See Maggs, supra note 110, at 131-32 (describing the debate 
on this issue). 
419. For suggestions in this vein, see COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT 
APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, 
67 F.R.D. 195 (1975), which published the so-called Hruska Commission Report, criticized the 
"failure of the federal judicial system to provide adequate capacity for the declaration of national 
law," id. at 217, and advocated the creation of a National Court of Appeals; FED. COURTS STUDY 
COMM., supra note 381, at 126, which proposed legislation authorizing Supreme Court reference 
of some issues to an en bane panel of a circuit court; and Maggs, supra note 110, at 169-70, which 
suggested consideration of a system in which federal courts would be required to defer to the first 
circuit court decision on the interpretation of a statute. See also Hellman, lntercircuit Conflicts, 
supra note 25, at 248 (lamenting that with the exception of the creation of the Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals, "Congress has taken no steps to expand the capacity of the system to resolve 
issues at the national level"). 
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Consider then as a comparison point European court systems. Estab-
lished almost exclusively to interpret and apply legislative law, these sys-
tems quickly adopted specialized courts (that is, for example, administrative 
courts for administrative matters), each with its own independent appellate 
and supreme court.420 One important consequence is a more expeditious 
national resolution of contentious issues.421 The United States has followed 
this model only in limited circumstances-most notably with creation of 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.422 Transition cost analy-
sis might give support for increased scholarly inquiry into whether this 
model should be expanded to other fields.423 
Similar utilitarian considerations suggest more active reliance on other 
forms of mediating institutions and structures. The somewhat controversial424 
practice of informal legal guidance by administrative agencies,425 for instance, 
might find justification in transition cost concerns. For new bodies of law not 
entrusted to administrative agencies, more extensive use of standing liaison 426 
420. In each of the specialized areas there are local courts, appellate courts, and a separate 
supreme court (for example, the Supreme Administrative Court or Supreme Civil Court). The 
decisions of such supreme courts then operate as the definitive national resolution of the legal 
point at issue, subject only to a review for constitutional conformity by a Supreme Constitutional 
Court. See Erhard Blankenburg, Patterns of Legal Culture: The Netherlaruls Compared to Neighboring 
Germany, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 37-40 (1998) (discussing the court system in France); Nicolas 
Marie Kublicki, An Overview of the French Legal System from an American Perspective, 12 B.U. INT'L 
L.J. 57 ( 1994) (discussing the court system in Germany). 
421. In addition, the expertise developed by the specialized courts over time should reduce 
public learning and error costs. A likely derivative benefit is a reduction of litigation costs from 
more efficient administration of disputes. 
422. The Federal Circuit has sole appellate authority over certain defined subject matters, 
such as patent law and claims against the federal government. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000). 
With regard to this experiment, see generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case 
Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989). 
423. Cf. D'Amato, supra note 113, at 1 (observing that, even with uniform law, the pres-
ence of multiple interpreting institutions without an effective final arbiter may lead to an overall 
increase in legal uncertainty); Kaplow, supra note 26, at 613-15 (discussing the costs of delay and 
duplication of litigation efforts that arise in our present court system). 
424. See Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action 
Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 988-95 (1998) 
(criticizing excessive judicial deference to SEC policymaking through no-action letters). 
425. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 907.4 (2000) (delineating the authority of the SEC with regard to 
no-action letters); 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.367(a)-3(c)(9) (2000) (delineating the authority of the IRS 
with regard to "private letter rulings"). 
426. A proposal along this line was advanced in April 1990 by the Federal Courts Study 
Committee, a body created by Congress· to propose improvements in the federal court system. See 
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act,§ 102, 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000). To address the 
costs of statutory ambiguity, the committee recommended the creation of a new body in the judi-
cial branch identified as the Office of Judicial Impact Assessment. This body would have the 
authority to review proposed new legislation for potential uncertainties and to inform Congress of 
interpretive problems that arise in the courts. See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 381, 
at 89-90. For more on the report of the committee, see Maggs, supra note 110, at 154-66. 
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and oversight commissions427 may dissipate transitional friction by identify-
ing prospective problems and monitoring subsequent developments. One 
might cite the semiofficial Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform 
Commercial Code as a generally positive example here.428 More common 
judicial reference to the work of scholarly commentators also should assist 
in mitigating the learning and uncertainty costs of new law, as the 
experience with the elaboration of European codes has demonstrated.429 
Like considerations should spur more extensive study of the value of 
legislative and judicial metarules of interpretation.430 
On a separate track, transition cost concerns suggest that our legal sys-
tem should not be entirely complacent about the increasing privatization of 
dispute resolution.431 I have noted above the public goods aspect of judicial 
opinions in reducing the learning, uncertainty, and similar. costs of new 
1 432 p . b' . h b f' f h bl' d . 433 aw. nvate ar ttratton removes t ese ene tts rom t e pu tc omam. 
427. Legislative bodies now extensively engage private commissions in the review and 
drafting of new statutory regimes. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text. Increased 
awareness of the transition costs associated with new law might counsel more common reliance on 
expert oversight bodies to monitor the law after adoption. 
428. A recent report of the board illustrates its role as a mediating institution. As noted 
above, the introduction of the revised Article 9 may involve substantial transitional friction. See 
supra notes 156-160 and accompanying text. To address such concerns, the Pemanent Editorial 
Board disseminated a report on the effect of revised Article 9 during the transitional phase. See 
Permanent Editorial Board Report, June 13, 200 I: Article 9 Perfection Clwice of Law Analysis 
Where Revised Article 9 Is Not in Effect in All States by July 1, 2001 (June 13, 2001), available at 
http://www.ali-aba.org/ali/peb60l_partl.htm. 
429. See INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 474 (0. Neil MacCormick & 
RobertS. Summers eds., 1991) (noting the valuable role of scholarly analysis in the interpretation 
of European codes); Bruce W. Frier, Interpreting Codes, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2201, 2205 (1991) (dis-
cussing the important interaction "between 'case law' (jurisprudence) and academic writing {doc-
trine)" in the interpretation of the French civil code). 
430. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1007, 1036-51 ( 1989) (discussing the value of a variety of metarules, clear statement rules, 
and presumptions in statutory interpretation); see also FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 
381, at 93 (recommending legislative adoption of "fallback rules" to address recurring issues of 
statutory interpretation); Maggs, supra note 110, at 158-60, 167-68 (discussing the Study Com-
mittee recommendation and separately advocating judicial creation of similar fallback rules). 
431. In a variery of recent decisions the Supreme Court has expanded the permissible scope 
of arbitration. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (holding that 
the Federal Arbitration Act also permits the arbitration of most employment contracts); Green 
Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 81 (2000) (emphasizing the "liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements" and holding that arbitration agreements may be enforceable even 
if they do not allocate the costs of the arbitration (citations omitted)). 
432. See supra notes 141-143 and accompanying text. 
433. A similar criticism has been leveled at the seeming preference of public court systems 
for private settlement of public litigation. See Owen M. Fiss~ Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 
1073, 1085-86 (1984) (observing that settlements can deprive a legal system of the benefits of 
formal judicial interpretations of disputed legal issues). Some arbitral decisions are made publicly 
available, and thus also can create public goods regarding the interpretation and application of 
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Nonpublic dispute resolution may advance other valid societal interests,434 
but as it continues to expand in both breadth and judicial acceptance, a 
recognition of the impact of legal transition costs may counsel increased 
critical attention. 435 
Most aspects ·Of mediating institutions, as the cited subjects illustrate, 
reflect policy choices.436 To be sure, public policy and pragmatic considera-
tions will limit the realistic alternatives; and the implications of transition 
cost analysis will vary with the regulated context and the regulating agency. 
Nonetheless, the simple message here is that a fuller understanding of the 
role of mediating institutions may yield valuable insights into how a legal 
system can more effectively mitigate the costs of legal change, or in some 
circumstances avoid them altogether. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the essential measures of a legal system's legitimacy is its ability 
to respond to progress in the human affairs it regulates. By their basic 
nature, properly functioning democratic institutions can be expected-
subject to certain constitutional constraints437-to engage in an almost 
law. The common practice of publication of arbitral awards in labor law in the Bureau of 
National Affairs' Labor Relations Reporter provides a good example. 
434. See Steven H. Goldberg, "Wait a Minute. This Is Where I Came in." A Trial Lawyer's 
Search for Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1997 BYU L. REV. 653, 679-80 (1997) (discussing the 
advantages of private arbitration over formal public litigation); see also Walt, supra note 149, at 
696-97 (noting that private arbitration permits transactors to capture the benefits of novel contract 
terms, and thereby address the positive learning externality that public litigation would otherwise 
create). 
435. See FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 189 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999) ("The disclosure of awards is 
universally considered to contribute to the predictability of results, and the codification of usages 
by a professional organization will very often be the result of the publication of such decisions."); 
Christopher B. Kaczmarek, Public Law Deserves Public Justice: Why Public Law Arbitrators Should 
Be Required to Issue Written, Publishable Opinions, 4 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 285, 297-99 
(2000) (discussing the advantages of the publication of private arbitral awards). 
436. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 26, at 613 .(citing the delays, the common preference of courts 
for narrow rulings, the Supreme Court's certiorari policy, and the limited scope of declaratory 
judgments, and stating that "most of these features reflect choices rather than inherent features of 
a legal system"). <-
437. The complicated lawmaking process under the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights 
place serious limitations on the adoption of law by fleeting majorities. As James Madison 
observed in the Federalist Papers, one of the core purposes of these aspects of the Constitution was 
to render the majority ·"unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression." THE 
FEDERALIST No. 10, at 20 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966); see also Vincent Blasi, 
The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 453 (1985) 
(observing that the Constitution was designed as "a force for tempering the shortsightedness and 
unruliness of electoral politics ... [and) a check against majority oppression of minorities"). 
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ceaseless process of review for necessary and appropriate adjustments in the 
law. This should be particularly true in a dynamic and consciously hetero-
geneous polity. 
My objective in this Article has been to fill a gap in our understanding 
of the dynamics of legal change. The analysis demonstrates that, apart from 
customary debates about substantive benefits and costs, legal systems will 
experience friction simply in adjusting to the existence of new legal norms. 
As a systemic phenomenon, an analysis of these legal transition costs 
touches upon strands of a variety of debates about the proper form, func-
tion, and application of law. What I have attempted here is to pull 
together these scattered strands and integrate them into a broader analytical 
framework. 
The first essential element in this framework is a recognition that the 
learning, uncertainty, adjustment, and kindred costs of legal change are real 
and potentially substantial. Admittedly, these costs are not susceptible to 
neat, objective quantification ex ante. But along with substantive public 
policy considerations-the expected societal benefits of new legal solutions, 
the degree of ossification in existing ones, and so on-a sensitivity to legal 
transition costs should be a valuable, perhaps necessary, input in a reasoned 
decisionmaking process on proposed legal reforms. 
The more important, positive implication of transition cost analysis 
lies in its role in facilitating the assimilation of new legal norms. Recogni-
tion of the tangible effects of undisciplined legal change underscores for 
lawmakers the importance of the available drafting and implementation 
techniques that can mitigate transitional friction before it arises. A more 
enlightened awareness of the impact of transition costs thus should ease 
both the adoption and acceptance of new law. 
More broadly, transition cost considerations may warrant enhanced 
critical examination of what I have referred to here as mediating institu-
tions. A deeper understanding of the role of courts, agencies, and similar 
institutions should yield insights into how a legal system can more effec-
tively ameliorate the transitional impact of changes in the law. I have 
advanced a variety of primary observations on this score. The systemic 
nature of legal transition costs also should make this subject a rich field for 
further scholarly analysis. 
"Th[e] search for static security-in the law and elsewhere-is mis-
guided. The fact is that security can only be achieved through constant 
change .... "438 As Justice William 0. Douglas's insightful words make 
clear, there is not an inherent antagonism between legal innovation and a 
438. WILLIAM 0. DoUGLAS, STARE DECISIS 7 (1949). 
HeinOnline -- 49 UCLA L. Rev. 870 2001-2002
870 49 UCLA LAW REVIEW 789 (2002) 
respect for the values of certainty and stability. The core message of the 
analysis here is that a failure to appreciate the legal costs of change none-
theless may make the law less effective and less responsive, and ultimately 
compromise the value of otherwise beneficial legal reforms. 
